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INTRODUCTION
Congress loves to regulate the Internet. From spam to copyright,
from the domain name system to the telecommunications infrastruc-
ture, Congress has tried its hand at a whole host of "problems" caused
by the Internet. But, when it comes to regulating the Internet, little
has been more important to Congress than protecting children from
objectionable' sexually explicit content. Congress has now passed
laws three times in the past decade. Its first attempt, the Communi-
cations Decency Act ("CDA"), was struck down on First Amendment
grounds in the United States Supreme Court's seminal 1997 decision,
Reno v. ACLU2 Congress's second effort, the Child Online Protection
Act ("COPA"), was an attempt to respond directly to the Court's deci-
sion in Reno. COPA is currently subject to an injunction in a case that
the Court recently remanded for the second time. 3 Both the CDA
and COPA were broad attempts to prohibit certain forms of expres-
sion on the Internet.
The third federal law to regulate sexually explicit material on the
Internet, the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), took a dif-
ferent tack altogether. Rather than imposing a broad prohibition on
the material that Congress considered inappropriate, CIPA requires
public libraries and public schools, as a condition of receiving certain
federal benefits, to use "technological protection measures" (for ex-
ample, filtering software) to prevent library patrons and public school
students from accessing objectionable sexually explicit material over
the Internet. The Court upheld CIPA against a constitutional chal-
lenge in June 2003 in United States v. American Library Association.4
All three statutes were challenged on First Amendment grounds,
and, as different courts and commentators have discussed in great de-
tail, all three raise significant First Amendment questions. In this Ar-
ticle, I argue that the third statute, CIPA, implicates not just the First
Amendment, but another fundamental constitutional issue as well:
federalism. CIPA, a federal law, imposes conditions on public librar-
I use the term "objectionable" because almost any other term I could use has become a
term of art, laden with legal meaning. By using the phrase, I do not mean to imply a personal
condemnation of the material, but using the phrase "allegedly objectionable" (or "allegedly"
anything) is far too cumbersome.
2 521 U.S. 844 (1997), affg929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The district court's decision is
ordinarily referred to as Reno I, while the Supreme Court's decision is referred to as Reno I. As
we will see, there are several more relevant "Reno" cases. I will maintain these conventional ref-
erences.
See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004) ("Ashcroft IF).
539 U.S. 194 (2003). For reasons that will be clear below, I refer to this case as ALA II.
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ies, which are themselves municipal government entities and, thus,
creatures of state governments. The constitutional challenge to CIPA
was thus a battle between the federal and state governments, some-
thing that the parties, courts, and other commentators have all ig-
nored. In this Article, I will argue that this fact should have mattered
and will explore some ramifications of thinking about the statute
through a federalism lens.
By framing the debate about CIPA in terms of the First Amend-
ment, the parties effectively forced the Supreme Court to create rigid
constitutional doctrine when what may be needed is system-wide
flexibility to accommodate ever-changing technology. In contrast to
a First Amendment approach, focusing on the underlying principles
of constitutional federalism would have given the Court the opportu-
nity to invalidate an overbroad regulation such as CIPA and yet would
have permitted a wide variety of regulatory approaches to vexing
problems such as sexually explicit speech on library Internet termi-
nals. In short, I will argue that federalism helps us view CIPA in a
new and important light and simultaneously helps facilitate a process
of lawmaking that is more likely to lead to better policymaking in the
long run. If the Court had considered these principles, it could have
avoided the all-or-nothing approach to the problem that CIPA and
the First Amendment challenge to it necessitated.
I will proceed in five Parts. Parts I and II set the stage for the dis-
cussion that follows. Part I describes Congress's first two attempts to
regulate sexually explicit material on the Internet, the CDA and
COPA, as well as the First Amendment challenges to those two laws.
In Part II, I address the question of Internet filters in public libraries
and then describe CIPA and the case challenging its constitutionality,
United States v. American Library Association ("ALA I').5 Among the
five opinions in the case, I look particularly at Justice Stevens's dis-
sent, which was the only opinion that would have invalidated CIPA
while simultaneously preserving the ability of local libraries to install
filters on their Internet access if they so chose.
In Part III, I look at the question of filters in public libraries
through the lens of federalism. I conclude that the decision as to
whether a public library ought to install filters is one that should be
made at the local, rather than at the federal, level. I conclude further
that both the federal government and the challengers to the law
missed these important principles. I argue that some-though not
all-of these principles were reflected in Justice Stevens's dissent in
ALA II, notwithstanding the fact that none of the parties were arguing
for the result he reached. Justice Stevens's "compromise" result,
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when viewed through the lens of the principles of constitutional fed-
eralism, makes a great deal of sense, particularly in situations involv-
ing the regulation of fast-changing technology.
In Parts IV and V, I explore the way in which doctrine might have
reflected these federalism concerns. In Part V, I look at the federal
spending power, the power Congress exercised when promulgating
CIPA. After giving a jurisprudential history of the federal spending
power, I describe South Dakota v. Dole, the case that consolidates the
Court's current doctrine for conditional grants to states.6 Current
spending power doctrine required the court to analyze CIPA under
what is known as the "independent constitutional bar" rule.7 Doing
so, however, forced the Court to ignore the fact that CIPA is a federal
law with structural federalism implications, and not simply an imposi-
tion on individual rights. Thus, while the "independent constitu-
tional bar" rule might feel intuitively uncontroversial, it fails to reflect
the complexity of the law to which it was applied.
Finally, in Part V, I explore recent spending power scholarship in
light of the "new federalism." In particular, I focus on the work of
constitutional scholar Lynn Baker, who has proposed doctrinal
changes to the spending power.8 I apply her proposal to CIPA and
explore the ways in which her proposal reflects the constitutional pol-
icy concerns that CIPA raises. I conclude that CIPA might well have
been declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds under Baker's
proposal and that the change in doctrine she suggests might thus
have led to a result that comports with the principles of constitutional
federalism that I outlined in Part III. Nonetheless, I conclude that
the analysis her proposal requires does not reflect the full extent of
CIPA's complexity. As Justice Stevens may have recognized-though
there were no doctrinal tools to help him articulate this fact-CIPA
raises both structural and rights-based constitutional concerns. In
this sense, CIPA tells us something about the difficulty of fashioning
constitutional doctrine to the increasing complexity of federal law-
making in the modern era.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id. at 209-12.
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911
(1995) (arguing that the Court should more strictly interpret the Spending Clause in cases in-
volving conditional funding to states).
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I. BACKGROUND: PRE-CIPA FEDERAL RESTRICTIONS ON SEXUALLY
EXPLICIT CONTENT ON THE INTERNET
A. Communications Decency Act
Congress's first attempt to regulate sexually explicit content on
the Internet was the Communications Decency Act of 1996 ("CDA").9
The CDA was part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, but the
relevant portions were, in stark contrast to most of the Telecommu-
nications Act, hastily drafted and only briefly debated.' ° The CDA
contained two provisions that were challenged immediately upon the
statute's passage. The first, referred to by the Court as the "indecent
transmission" provision," prohibited the knowing transmission, by
means of a telecommunications device, of "obscene or indecent"
communications to any recipient under the age of eighteen. 2 The
second provision, referred to by the Court as the "patently offensive
display" provision, prohibited the use of "an interactive computer
service" to send or display "patently offensive" communications "in a
manner available to a person under eighteen years of age.' 4
In Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme Court invalidated both provisions
on First Amendment grounds. The Court's principal holding was
that the statute unduly restricted "a large amount of speech that
adults have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one an-
other."'5 Although the Court recognized the importance of "the gov-
ernmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials,"'
16
it relied on earlier cases holding that the government cannot limit
adults to "only what is fit for children"'7 as long as "less restrictive al-
ternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate
purpose that the statute was enacted to serve."'" This formulation of
9 Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133-143 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
'0 See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 858-59 (1997) ("Reno l) (noting that, in contrast to the
other six titles of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, "[the CDA] contains provisions that
were either added in executive committee after the hearings were conducted or as amendments
offered during floor debate on the legislation."). The Court seemed less willing to give Con-
gress deference because of this fact. See id.; see also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803, 808, 822 (2000) (invalidating another provision in the Telecommunications Act,
and also noting that the provision had been added as a floor amendment).
" Reno I, 521 U.S. at 859.
12 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (2002).
13 521 U.S. at 859.
47U.S.C. § 223(d).
521 U.S. at 874.
6 Id. at 875.
17 Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Butter v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383
(1957), appears to be the Court's first formulation of this well-known phrase.
's 521 U.S. at 874.
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the question necessitates a factual inquiry: are there any "less restric-
tive alternatives" that would be "at least as effective" as the CDA at pro-
tecting children from harmful materials? As Eugene Volokh has
pointed out, it is difficult to imagine any alternatives as effective as
the CDA's nearly total ban on dissemination of the harmful speech, 9
and certainly neither the Court nor the statute's challengers provided
20any.
One thing the Court did do, however, was refer specifically to fil-
ters, contrasting the CDA's provisions with "currently available user-
based software" which, according to the stipulated facts, "suggest[ed]
that a reasonably effective method by which parents can prevent their
children from accessing sexually explicit and other material which
parents may believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be
widely available. 2 1 While the Court did not explicitly rely on the exis-
tence of filters as the "less restrictive alternative," the Court clearly
viewed filters as a way in which the solution to the problem of un-
wanted speech would shift from speaker to recipients. Although doc-
trinally this reference to filters appears to be little more than unnec-
essary dicta, it is clear from some of the challengers' briefs and the
lower court opinions that the efficacy of filters was argued at great
length.22 Though the Court did emphasize that filters were "user-
" Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending Balancing, 1997 Sup.
CT. REV. 141, 149 (1997).
20 Id. at 149-56 (discussing the Court's proposed alternatives in order to show that they are
not equally effective); cf United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 840-45
(2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that a federal law aimed at preventing signal bleed in
cable television programming should be upheld because proposed alternatives were not as ef-
fective). Indeed, in Reno II, the Court specifically noted that "at the time of trial existing tech-
nology did not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from obtaining ac-
cess to its communications on the Internet without also denying access to adults." 521 U.S. at
876. If no such technology exists, this would seem to buttress rather than undermine the gov-
ernment's defense of the statute as the "least restrictive alternative" to serving the compelling
interest of protecting children from harmful materials. Interestingly, more than a year had
passed between the trial and the Court's opinion, and the phrase "at the time of trial" was thus
not irrelevant to the Court's conclusion. Stuart Benjamin has written on the problem of appel-
late courts relying on lower court fact-finding when facts can change, both in general and with
the fast pace of technological change in particular. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping Into the
Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEX. L. REV. 269 (1999).
21 Reno II, 521 U.S. at 877 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
("Reno F)) (emphases in original).
22 See Reno I, 929 F. Supp. at 842 (discussing the advantages and limitations of filtering soft-
ware); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 931-35, 944-46 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (same); United
States Supreme Court Appellant Brief at 40, Reno II (No. 96-511) (arguing that less restrictive
alternatives to filtering software are not equally effective), available at 1997 WL 32931; United
States Supreme Court Reply Brief at 13, Reno 11 (No. 96-511) (arguing that filtering software is
too restrictive), available at 1997 "WL 106544; United States Supreme Court Appellee (ACLU)
Brief at 36, Reno (No. 96-511) (arguing the benefits of filtering software), available at 1997 WL
74378; United States Supreme Court Appellee (American Library Association) Brief at 34-35,
Reno II (No. 96-511) (noting that filters were as effective as CDA), available at 1997 WL 74380;
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based" and that this gave control to parents rather than to the gov-
ernment, it is clear in retrospect that the plaintiffs' attempt to say that
the problem could be solved with technological rather than legal re-
strictions has now returned to haunt those who made that argu-
ment,23 since it is filters that CIPA attempts to rely upon.24 Indeed,
discussion of the question of whether filters should be mandated in
public schools and libraries began soon after Reno II.2
5
B. Child Online Protection Act
Congress returned to the drawing board soon after Reno H and
passed the Child Online Protection Act of 1998 ("COPA") .26 COPA
provided for civil and criminal penalties for anyone who "in interstate
or foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any mi-
nor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors." 7 Like
the CDA, therefore, COPA broadly criminalized the distribution over
the Internet of sexually explicit material that adults have a constitu-
tional right to view, but did so for the purpose of protecting children.
From the standpoint of COPA's supporters in Congress, however,
what was key to COPA were not the similarities between it and the
CDA, but rather the differences. COPA's drafters clearly considered
Brief of Amici Curiae Family Life Project of the American Center for Law andJustice at 19, Reno
11 (No. 96-511) (discussing the limited effectiveness of filtering software), available at 1997 WrL
22917; Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 22-23, Reno II (No. 96-511) (arguing that
the reach of filtering software is limited), available at 1997 WL 22918; Brief of Amici Curiae Mo-
rality in Media, Inc. at 25, Reno H (No. 96-511) (same), available at 1997 WNL 22908; Brief of
Amici Curiae Enough is Enough et al. at 20, Reno 11 (No. 96-511) (same), available at 1997 VArL
22958.
23 Lawrence Lessig, What Things Regulate Speech: CDA 2.0 v. Filtering, 38 JURIMETRICSJ. 629,
632 n.15 (1998) (noting the ACLU's opposition to filters after Reno II, notwithstanding its reli-
ance on filters as a less-restrictive alternative in that case).
"4 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) (noting that "the
mere possibility that user-based Internet screening software would 'soon be widely available' was
relevant to our rejection of an overbroad restriction of indecent cyberspeech [in Reno I]"). See
generally Tom W. Bell, Free Speech, Strict Scrutiny, and Self-Help: How Technology Upgrades Constitu-
tional Jurisprudence, 87 MINN. L. REV. 743, 763-65 (2003) (using RenoalIas an example of the
Court considering the opportunities for individual "self-help" in analyzing the "least restrictive
means" prong in strict scrutiny).
21 See Robert Corn-Revere, United States v. American Library Association: A Missed Opportu-
nity for the Supreme Court to Clarify Application of First Amendment Law to Publicly Funded Expressive
Institutions, in CATO SUPREME COURT REVqEW 2002-2003, at 105, 106-07 (James L. Swanson ed.,
2003) ("Almost immediately [after the Supreme Court's decision in Reno I/], the debate over
Internet filtering software centered on whether such filters should be required at the principal
public institutions that provide Internet access-public libraries and schools.").
47 U.S.C. § 231 (2002) (enforcement preliminarily enjoined by ACLUv. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d
240 (3d Cir. 2003), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004)).
27 /d. § 231(a)(1).
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Reno Hcarefully.2s Indeed, Congress seems to have viewed Reno Has a
road map to passing a constitutional statute aimed at protecting chil-
dren from sexually explicit material on the Internet, rather than as
the ringing victory for free speech rights that the ACLU and other
plaintiffs claimed it to be.29
The ACLU and a number of other plaintiffs brought a First
Amendment challenge to COPA. The district court granted a pre-
liminary injunction against enforcement of the law.30 In determining
that the plaintiffs had shown a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits, the court concluded that COPA was a content-based regula-
tion of speech and was thus subject to strict scrutiny. The court's fo-
cus was again on the question of whether the statute was the least re-
strictive means of accomplishing that goal, and again the plaintiffs
argued that filtering technology was less restrictive. The district court
agreed, stating that "blocking or filtering technology may be at least
as successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to harm-
ful material online without imposing the burden on constitutionally
protected speech that COPA imposes on adult users or Web site op-
erators. 3 ' Due to the procedural posture of the case-deciding the
question on a motion for a preliminary injunction, rather than after a
full trial-the court did not conclusively decide that the statute was
not the least restrictive means. Nonetheless, the court found the ex-
istence of filtering technology to provide "at least some evidence that
COPA does not employ the least restrictive means.02 While the court
stated in a footnote that the plaintiffs were "not argu[ing] that Con-
28 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) ("Ashcroft 1F) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment) ("Congress and the President were aware of our decision [in Reno II], and we
should assume that in seeking to comply with it they have given careful consideration to the
constitutionality of the new enactment."); see also Ashcroft II, 124 S. Ct. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dis-
senting) ("Congress read Reno with care. It dedicated itself to the task of drafting a statute that
would meet each and every criticism of the predecessor statute that this Court set forth in
Reno."); H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998) ("H.R. 3783 has been carefully drafted to respond to
the Supreme Court's decision in [Reno I] and the Committee believes that the bill strikes the
appropriate balance between preserving the First Amendment rights of adults and protecting
children from harmful material on the World Wide Web."); id. at 12-15 (detailing how COPA
differs from CDA in ways that Reno II deemed constitutionally relevant); Yochai Benkler, Net
Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Foroard, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 1203, 1249 (2000) (noting that
the drafters of COPA "attempted to [ban or burden the introduction of sexual material at its
source] while crossing every 't' and dotting every 'i' required by [Reno I]").
'8 SeeJOSEPH RUssOMANNO, SPEAKING OUR MINDS 442-44 (2002) (documenting a roundta-
ble discussion with lawyers for Reno Hplaintiffs describing their reactions to the decision).
ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Reno IH').
Id. at 497.
32 Id. The plaintiffs also argued that Congress could have made the statute less restrictive by
limiting it to "pictures, images, or graphic image files," or by not imposing such serious criminal
penalties, or by incorporating the substance of the affirmative defenses into the actual elements
of the crime (which would have shifted the burden of proof on those issues from the defendant
to the prosecutor). Id.
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gress should statutorily require the use of such technology to shield
minors from such materials,"33 filters once again featured promi-
nently in the court's conclusion that a congressional attempt to regu-
late sexually explicit materials was not sufficiently tailored to the goal
of protecting minors.
After the government appealed the district court's grant of a pre-
liminary injunction, the case went up and down twice between the
Third Circuit and the Supreme Court.3 4 More than five years after
the district court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed largely for
the same reasons. Indeed, the Court even went so far as to say that
filters "may well be more effective than COPA.,35 The government ar-
gued that filters could not constitute an "alternative" for purposes of
the constitutional analysis "because Congress may not require [fil-
ters] to be used. 3 6 Relying on United States v. Playboy Entertainment
Group,"' the Court rejected that argument on the grounds that Con-
gress could encourage parents' use of filters. 8 In Playboy Entertainment,
the Court invalidated a federal law requiring cable operators who
provide sexually explicit channels either to scramble or block those
channels or to limit their availability to the hours between 10 p.m.
and 6 a.m. Part of the Court's rationale for striking the statute down
was that an "opt-out" provision in the same law-one that required
cable companies to block or scramble the sexually explicit channels
upon a cable subscriber's request-was a less restrictive alternative. 9
The Court thus concluded that government encouragement of fil-
ters could be a less restrictive alternative to COPA."° However, be-
cause the case was originally on appeal from the grant of a prelimi-
nary injunction and because there had been a five-year delay between
the district court's fact-finding and the Court's opinion-a delay
made even more acute by the fact that the technology had changed
dramatically during that period 41-the Court remanded the case for a
full trial. Based on the Court's opinion, however, it is highly unlikely
that the statute will be upheld on remand.
While COPA was in the midst of being challenged, Congress tried
a third approach to regulating sexually explicit content on the Inter-
I ld. at 497 n.6.
See ACLU v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2003), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004); ACLU v.
Reno, 217 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom. Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2792 (emphasis added).
Id. at 2793.
37 529 U.S. 803 (2000).
Ashcroft I, 124 S. Ct. at 2793-94.
Playboy Entm't, 529 U.S. at 840-43.
See generally Bell, supra note 24 (discussing ways in which courts treat self-help remedies as
less restrictive alternatives under First Amendment strict scrutiny analysis).
4, See generally Benjamin, supra note 20 (discussing the problem of appellate courts relying
on lower courts' fact-finding when facts can change).
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net, this time involving its power of the purse and Internet access at
public libraries. I address this third statute, CIPA, in the next Part.
II. FILTERS IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES
In this Part, I turn to the question of the installation of filtering
technology on public library Internet access. In Section A, I address
the constitutional challenge to a local library board's decision to in-
stall Internet filters prior to passage of CIPA. In Section B, I describe
CIPA, and, finally, in Section C, I describe the constitutional chal-
lenge to the law. I focus in Section C on the way in which the Court's
doctrinal analysis ignored important aspects of the statute and how
Justice Stevens's opinion incorporated some of those concerns, not-
withstanding the clear flaws in his analysis of the doctrine. His opin-
ion, I argue, incorporates federalism concerns, which, as I argue in
Part III, properly belonged in the case.
A. Constitutional Challenges to Local Filtering Decisions
As the Internet became more widespread through the 1990s,
more and more public libraries began to offer patron Internet access.
From 1994 to 2000, the percentage of public libraries with some form
of public Internet access increased from approximately twenty-one
percent to ninety-six percent.42  The Telecommunications Act of
1996, which I discuss in more detail below, 43 was indispensable in in-
creasing library access to the Internet.
44
Internet access at public libraries naturally brought with it much
of what is available through the Internet, including sexually explicit
content. In response, a number of libraries began experimenting
with a variety of ways to prevent patrons from accessing such content.
12 Compare John Carlo Bertot & Charles R. McClure, Public Libraries and the Internet 2000 Sum-
mary Findings and Data Tables 3, 10 fig.3 (Nat'l Comm'n on Libraries and Info. Sci. 2000) (not-
ing an increase in library Internet access from 83.6% to 95.7% between 1998 and 2000, and of-
fering additional statistics based on metropolitan status and poverty), with John Carlo Bertot,
Charles R. McClure & Douglass L. Zweizig, The 1996 National Survey of Public Libraries and the
Internet: Progress and Issues fig.5 (1996) (reporting public libraries connected to the Internet by
population of legal services area and region), available at http://slis-two.lis.fsu.edu/-cmcclure/
nspl96/Figures.gif.
" As noted above, the Communications Decency Act was also part of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996. See supra text accompanying note 10 (noting that the CDA was part of the
Telecommunications Act). The CDA was distinct from the portions of the Telecommunications
Act that I discuss below.
4 See Corn-Revere, supra note 25, at 107 ("[The] increase in Internet access was promoted in
part by Section 254(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996."); cf AUSTAN GOOLSBEE &
JONATHAN GURYAN, THE IMPACT OF INTERNET SUBSIDIES FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS (NBER Working
Paper No. W9090, 2002) (arguing that E-rate subsidies did, in fact, induce Internet investment
in high-poverty and low-Internet schools).
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Many libraries instituted "acceptable use" policies to prohibit use of
the Internet for illegal activity, including viewing illegal sexually ex-
plicit materials. It is now the case that virtually all public libraries
have such a policy.45 In addition to having "acceptable use" policies, a
number of libraries and library systems also bean to install blocking
and filtering technology on Internet terminals.
One such library system was the Loudoun County Library in Lou-
doun County, Virginia. In 1997, the library's board of trustees
adopted what they referred to as a "Policy on Internet Sexual Har-
assment," which required, among other things, that all library com-
puters be equipped with software that blocked "(a) child pornogra-
phy and obscene material; and (b) material deemed harmful to
juveniles. 4 7 A group of library patrons formed a nonprofit organiza-
tion, "Mainstream Loudoun," and then challenged the constitutional-
ity of the policy.
In Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of Loudoun County,48 a
federal district court addressed the question of whether mandatory
blocking of materials on a library's Internet terminals violated the
First Amendment. The crux of the court's opinion turned on a
choice between two different characterizations of Internet filtering in
a public library: is Internet filtering analogous to a book "selection"
decision or a book "removal" decision? The plaintiffs argued that the
decision to make the Internet available in the library was analogous
to the purchase of a set of encyclopedias, and that the library board's
filtering policy was analogous to "a decision to 'black out' selected ar-
ticles considered inappropriate., 49 The library board, in contrast, lik-
ened the Internet to "a vast Interlibrary Loan system and con-
See, e.g., MADISON PUBLIC LIBRARY, INTERNET USE POLICY AND GUIDELINES (2002) (listing
"legal and acceptable" uses), available at http://www.madisonpubliclibrary.org/useplcy.html.
46 A slew of law review articles have detailed the ways in which filtering or blocking tech-
nologies work. See, e.g., R. Polk Wagner, Filters and the First Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REv. 755,
759-69 (1999) (describing filtering and blocking technology); see also Mark S. Nadel, The First
Amendment's Limitations on the Use of Internet Filtering in Public and School Libraries: What Content
Can Librarians Exclude?, 78 TEX. L. REv. 1117, 1120-21 (2000) (same); RichardJ. Peltz, Use 'The
Filter You Were Born With': The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons
of Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REv. 397, 401-02 (2002) (same). One of the best lay descriptions
of the technology is the expert report submitted by Benjamin Edelman on behalf of the plain-
tiffs in American Library Association v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("ALA r).
See Expert Report of Benjamin Edelman at 14-23, ALA I (No. 01-1332), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/pubs/aclu-101501.pdf. Since I do not intend
to enter the debate about the inadequacies of the technology to make determinations about
whether particular content is constitutionally protected, I will spare the reader another recita-
tion of the details of the technology.
17 See Mainstream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp. 2d
552, 556 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("Mainstream Loudoun IF) (footnote omitted).
" 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D. Va. 1998) ("Mainstream Loudoun r).
49 Id. at 793.
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tend[ed] that restricting Internet access to selected materials [was]
merely a decision not to acquire such materials rather than a decision
to remove them from a library's collection."50
The reason the characterization of the policy as either a "removal"
decision or as a "selection" decision mattered was that, under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free
District, No. 26 v. Pico,51 the First Amendment limits the discretion li-
braries have to make a "removal" decision. According to Pico, "selec-
tion" decisions are to be given great deference by courts,52 notwith-
standing the fact that they are essentially "content-based"
determinations made by government officials and would thus ordi-
narily be subject to "strict scrutiny." In contrast, a "removal" decision
raises the specter of censorship in ways that a "selection" decision
does not and, according to Pico, is to be treated with suspicion and is
thus subject to strict scrutiny.53
The Mainstream Loudoun court held that the plaintiffs' analogy
made more sense, relying on the fact that, in contrast to "an Interli-
brary loan or outright book purchase, no appreciable expenditure of
library time or resources is required to make a particular Internet
publication available to a library patron."54 The court also pointed
out that "it costs a library more to restrict the content of its collection
by means of blocking software than it does for the library to offer un-
restricted access to all Internet publications., 5  As I discuss in greater
detail below, the Mainstream Loudoun court's conclusion was by no
means the last word on this question, as the same choice of analogies
was the crux of the question in the constitutional challenge to CIPA.
Having chosen to analogize Internet filtering to a "removal" deci-
sion, the Mainstream Loudoun court then looked to the "public forum"
doctrine, the First Amendment doctrine that applies to speech re-
strictions on government property. The court concluded that a pub-
lic library is a "limited public forum" and that government restric-
tions on Internet access in a public library are thus subject to strict
scrutiny.56
Id.
457 U.S. 853 (1982). The Pico decision was highly splintered, with most lower courts and
commentators relying on an opinion authored by Justice Brennan as representing the "Court's"
reasoning. The Brennan opinion represents three Justices at times and fourJustices at others.
52 Id. at 871-72 (plurality opinion).
53 Id.
5 Mainstream Loudoun 1, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 793; see also id. at 795 (noting that "considerations
of cost or physical resources cannot justify a public library's decision to restrict access to Inter-
net materials").
'5 Id. at 795.
56 Mainstream Loudoun I, 24 F. Supp. 2d 552, 561-63 (E.D. Va. 1998).
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The court then concluded that the policy was not narrowly tai-
lored because (1) there were less restrictive alternatives than install-
ing Internet filters; and (2) the filtering policy effectively restricted
adult access to constitutionally protected materials.5
Since Mainstream Loudoun, scholars have commented on the case
and the broader question of the constitutionality of Internet filters in
public libraries. Some scholars have defended the court's reason-
" Id. at 567-68.
58 See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 46 (discussing generally the constitutionality of filtering contro-
versial content in public libraries); see also, e.g., FILTERS & FREEDOM (Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. ed.,
1999) (compiling papers discussing free speech issues related to Internet controls); Bernard W.
Bell, Filth, Filtering, and the First Amendment: Ruminations on Public Libraries' Use of Internet Filtering
Software, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 191, 221-25 (2001) (describing four instrumentalist justifications
for filters in public libraries that might be used to sustain their constitutionality); Gregory K.
Laughlin, Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of the Use of Software Filters
to Control Access to Internet Pornography in Public Libraries, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 213 (2003) (exploring
the history of censorship in public libraries and the nature of the Internet access problem, and
arguing that individual responsibility is the best way to deal with Internet access in public librar-
ies); Peltz, supra note 46 (discussing the constitutionality of filtering Internet access in public
libraries); Matthew Thomas Kline, Note, Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees of the Lou-
doun County Library, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 347 (1999) (focusing on First Amendment ques-
tions implicated by Mainstream Loudoun); Kiera Mehan, Note, Installation of Internet Filters in Pub-
lic Libraries: Protection of Children and Staff vs. The First Amendment, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 483,
492-503 (2003) (agreeing with Mainstream Loudoun's analysis and considering its implications
for the future); Junichi P. Semitsu, Note, Burning Cyberbooks in Public Libraries: Internet Filtering
Software vs. The First Amendment, 52 STAN. L. REV. 509 (2000) (same); J. Adam Skaggs, Note,
Burning the Library to Roast the Pig? Online Pornography and Internet Filtering in the Free Public Li-
brary, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 809 (2003) (arguing that Mainstream Loudoun was correctly de-
cided); Jeannette Allis Bastian, Filtering the Internet in American Public Libraries: Sliding Down the
Slippery Slope, I FIRST MONDAY No. 10 (1997) (discussing library Internet access in light of con-
stitutional issues and the realities of the public library), at http://firstmonday.dk/issues/
issue2_10/bastian/; cf Wagner, supra note 46, at 773-77 (noting that the First Amendment
analysis depends upon that accuracy and precision with which filters can match unprotected
categories of speech).
ALA II, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) ("ALA IT), rev'g 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002), which I
discuss in great detail in Part II.C, has triggered even more commentary. See, e.g., Corn-Revere,
supra note 25; Steven D. Hinckley, Your Money or Your Speech: The Children's Internet Protection Act
and the Congressional Assault on the First Amendment in Public Libraries, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 1025
(2002) (arguing that CIPA should receive strict First Amendment scrutiny and should, thereby,
be held impermissible); Susan Hanley Kosse, Try, Try Again: Will Congress Ever Get it Right? A
Summary of Internet Pornography Laws Protecting Children and Possible Solutions, 38 U. RICH. L. REV.
721, 738-59 (2004) (discussing the history of CIPA and the constitutional challenge to it);
Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Cul-
ture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78-83 (2003) (arguing that the disagreement be-
tween the plurality and Justice Souter turned on different cultural conceptions of the public
library); The Supreme Court 2002 Term Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 349 (2003) (describing
CIPA and concluding that the Court "missed an opportunity to provide broader guidance on
the thorny problem of government funding of private speech in public cultural institutions");
Susannah J. Malen, Note, Protecting Children in the Digital Age: A Comparison of Constitutional Chal-
lenges to CIPA and COPA, 26 COLUM.J.L. & ARTS 217, 245-48 (2003) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should uphold CIPA); Felix Wu, Note, United States v. American Library Association:
The Children's Internet Protection Act, Library Filtering, and Institutional Role, 19 BERK. TECH. L.J. 555
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ing,5 9 while others have questioned it."° I do not intend to enter that
debate, except to note that all commentators that I have found have
argued within the paradigm defined by the Mainstream Loudoun
court: all see the issue solely in terms of the First Amendment, and
some have, in fact, explicitly grafted that approach onto the question
of the constitutionality of CIPA.61 While there are many different ap-
proaches-from questioning the applicability of the public forum
doctrine to the public library62 to arguing that filtering amounts to a
government delegation of power to private entities, i.e., the filteringS63
software companies 6 -no one has inquired seriously about the ways
in which a federal statute might differ from a local library or library
board deciding to require filters on Internet access. 64 I turn now to
describing the federal law, before looking into ways in which it raises
additional constitutional questions beyond those raised by the Main-
stream Loudoun case.
B. The Federal Children's Internet Protection Act
1. Statutory and Regulatory Background Prior to CIPA
CIPA conditioned funding from two different programs, one
known as the "E-Rate" discount program and the other under the Li-
(2004) (considering the First Amendment issues raised by Internet access in public libraries in
light of ALA Hand concluding that CIPA fails strict scrutiny).
See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 46, at 453-78 (arguing that Mainstream Loudoun was correctly
decided).
0 See, e.g., Nadel, supra note 46, at 1119 (arguing that "contrary to... Loudoun ... there is
no constitutionally significant difference between the library's discretion to manage its book-
shelves and its discretion to manage its Internet terminals").
6' See, e.g., Peltz, supra note 46, at 478 (arguing that Mainstream Loudoun was correctly de-
cided and that the "court's reasoning.., should compel the same result in the case of CIPA,
the federal statute"); see also, e.g., Skaggs, supra note 58, at 847 (arguing that CIPA "fails the nar-
row-tailoring prong of the strict scrutiny test").
62 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 58, at 195 (arguing that "conventional approaches to analyzing
the constitutional issues raised by public libraries' increasing use of Internet filtering software
are flawed, because they focus on the interests of speakers rather than the interests of their au-
diences").
0 See Nadel, supra note 46, at 1146-51 (arguing that decisions about library materials should
belong to schools, libraries, or governmental bodies).
6 In a symposium held at Fordham Law School during the pendency of ALA II, Charles
Sims, one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, wondered aloud about the federalism implications of
the Court treating CIPA as if it were exactly the same as a challenge to a single library installing
filters on its Internet ternminals. See Symposium, www.TheGovernmentHasDecidedltlsln Your
(Read:Our)BestInterestsNotToViewThis.com: Should the First Amendment Ever Come Second?, 13
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 831, 878 (2003) [hereinafter
urw. TheGovernmentHasDecided]; cf Skaggs, supra note 58, at 851 (recognizing, though not ana-
lyzing, federalism concerns of proposed federal law that would mandate location of computer
terminals in public libraries).
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brary Services and Technology Act. In this subsection, I describe
these two federal funding programs.
a. The E-rate Discount
United States telecommunications policy includes a system of re-
distributing the costs of telecommunications services, a policy known
as "universal service." Codified at section 254 of the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, "universal service" provides subsidies for several dif-
ferent types of consumers of telecommunications services, including
those in high-cost areas, low-income individuals, schools and libraries,
and rural health care providers.' The provision that subsidizes such
services for schools and libraries, section 254(h), is known as the
Schools and Libraries Discount, or the "E-rate". 6
Under Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") regula-
tions, most providers of telecommunications services must contribute
a portion of their revenues to what is known as the Universal Service
Fund. The Fund then distributes this money to eligible carriers who
provide telecommunications services to the groups eligible for uni-
versal service. In short, those not eligible for the benefits of sec-
tion 254 pay a tax (one collected by telecommunications compa-
nies)67 that is used to subsidize the cost of telecommunications
services for those that are eligible. The universal service program, in-
cluding the E-rate component, are administered by a private corpora-
tion, the Universal Service Administrative Company, under the su-
pervision of the FCC.6s
In order for a library to be eligible for the E-rate discounts, a li-
brary must satisfy three requirements: (1) the library must be eligible
for assistance from a state administrative agency under the Library
Services and Technology Act;69 (2) the library must be funded as an
independent entity separate from any schools; and (3) the library
may not be a for-profit business.7 The E-rate discounts range from
20% to 90% and both eligibility and the amount of the discount gen-
erally depend upon the economic need of the library.7' The E-rate
program provides discounts for a variety of telecommunications ser-
47 U.S.C. § 254 (2002).
Id. § 254(h).
67 Anyone with a landline telephone is likely familiar with universal service, since most of the
nation's major telecommunications providers itemize the tax on phone bills.
47 C.F.R. § 54.701(a) (2002).
69 See Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-295 (1996) (codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 9121-23,
9131-34, 9141, 9151, 9161-63). See also infraSection II.B.1.b (describing the Act).
70 47 C.F.R. § 54.501(c).
"' 47 C.F.R. § 54.505. A library's economic need is generally tied to the school district in
which the library is situated and is determined by the number of students in the district eligible
for the National School Lunch Program. Id.
[Vol. 7:1
Se.2]LTERS AND FEDERALISM
vices, including Internet access, although the Internet discounts ap-
ply only to basic conduit access to the Internet and not for any spe-
cific online content.72 As I noted earlier, the E-rate discounts made
the Internet accessible to a number of libraries and library systems
that otherwise would have been unable to afford access.
b. Library Services and Technology Act
The Library Services and Technology Act ("LSTA") of 1996, Sub-
chapter II of the Museum and Library Services Act,7 3 provides a num-S • 74
ber of grant programs for libraries, among which is the Grants to
States program. Under the Grants to States program, the Director of
the Institute of Museum and Library Services, a federal agency estab-
lished as part of the National Foundation on the Arts and the Hu-
manities, provides funds to "State library administrative agenc [ies] ,
official agencies of the states charged by the law of the state with the
extension and development of public library services throughout the
state.76 States are generally permitted to use their federal funds for
any purpose related to the use of information technology in librar-
77 • 78
ies, although each state must match the federal funds it receives
and must achieve a minimum "maintenance of effort" to ensure that
the federal grants do not replace state funds.79
n See In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Unv'l Serv., 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 9009, 9011-12, 9014
(1997).
7' 20 U.S.C. § 9101 et seq. (2002).
7' The broad purposes of the Act are set forth in the Act itself. At the time LSTA was prom-
ulgated, the Act listed its purposes as:
(1) to consolidate Federal library service programs;
(2) to stimulate excellence and promote access to learning and information resources
in all types of libraries for individuals of all ages;
(3) to promote library services that provide all users access to information through
State, regional, national and international electronic networks;
(4) to provide linkages among and between libraries; and
(5) to promote targeted library services to people of diverse geographic, cultural, and
socioeconomic backgrounds, to individuals with disabilities, and to people with lim-
ited functional literacy or information skills.
Id. § 9121 (2002) (prior to 2003 amendments). Though it is this earlier version of the statute
that is relevant to this Article, it should be noted that these purposes were amended by the Mu-
seum and Library Services Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-81, § 201, 117 Stat. 997 (2003) (amend-
ing § 9121). In the current version of the Act, the previous prongs (2) through (5) have been
struck and new paragraphs were inserted at (2) through (4).
71 Id. § 9133(a).
7' Id. § 9122 (5).
77 See id. § 9141(a) (listing ways in which funds can be used). Other than the fact that the
money must be spent on technology and electronic networks, the primary constraint is that no
more than four percent of the federal grant be spent on administrative costs. Id. § 9132 (a).
7' Id. § 9133(b).
7I Id. § 9133(c) (2).
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2. Children's Internet Protection Act
CIPA was passed in 2001,80 five years after the Telecommunica-
tions Act and the LSTA, and it imposes conditions both on discounts
under the E-rate program and on LSTA grants under the Grants to
States program. 8 ' After the CDA and COPA, CIPA was the third in
the federal government's attempts to regulate sexually explicit mate-
rial on the Internet. While its name suggests that it was aimed at pro-
tecting children, a review of its operation clearly indicates a broader
purpose. Moreover, Congress was clear that it was using the power of
its purse to enlist local authorities in its goal. 3
a. Section 1721(b) of CIPA: Amendments to the E-rate Program
Section 1721(b) of CIPA requires libraries enjoying E-rate dis-
counts to install filters on all computers with Internet access. More
precisely, CIPA requires all libraries who want the E-rate discounts to
make two certifications. First, "with respect to minors," the library
must certify that it has and is enforcing "a policy of Internet safety
that includes the operation of a technology protection measure with
respect to any of its computers with Internet access that protects
against access through such computers to visual depictions that are
(I) obscene; (II) child pornography; or (III) harmful to minors.
'' 4
Second, it must certify that it has, and is enforcing a broader Internet
safety policy for all patrons (whether children or adults) "that in-
0 Like most federal legislation, there was a whole host of bills in earlier Congresses. Some
of those bills are listed in Yochai Benkler, Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1203, 1250 n.213 (2000). I discuss some of the legislative background below. See
infta Part II.B.2.c (discussing concerns raised during CIPA's consideration).
", See Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1721(b), 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-335 to 2763A-352 (2000) (amending 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)) (E-Rate Program); id. §
1712 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 9134) (LSTA grants). In addition, CIPA conditions funding to
elementary and secondary schools under both the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965 and the E-rate program. See id. § 1711 (enacting 20 U.S.C. § 3601); id. § 1721 (a) (amend-
ing § 254(h)). I do not directly discuss the aspect of CIPA that applies to funding of elementary
and secondary schools because its constitutionality was not challenged.
82 See S. REP. No. 106-141, at 7 (describing CIPA as enacted to further the "compelling inter-
est of the government in protecting children from exposure to sexually explicit material"); see
also id. at 3 (noting that the "Internet presents a unique threat to normal sexual development in
children by playing upon common elements that contribute generally to antisocial behavior in
children").
8" See id. ("[B]y accepting Federal dollars through the Universal Service fund, [a library] be-
comes a partner with the Federal government in pursuing [the] compelling interest [of protect-
ing children from harm caused by exposure to easily accessible sexually explicit materials on
the Internet].")
CIPA, § 1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(B)). Strictly speaking, a "technology
protection measure" is not necessarily a filter. Other measures may, arguably, satisfy the statu-
tory definition of a "technology protection measure." Nonetheless, I will use the terms synony-
mously for convenience.
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cludes the operation of a technology protection measure with respect
to any of its computers with Internet access that protects against ac-
cess through such computers to visual depictions that are-(I) ob-
scene; or (II) child pornography. '"' In effect, if a library has com-
puter terminals used only by adults, the required filters need only
block visual depictions that are obscene or child pornography. All
other terminals must have filters that also block visual depictions that
are "harmful to minors."
CIPA does permit libraries to override the filters: "[a]n adminis-
trator, supervisor, or other person authorized by the certifying au-
thority... may disable the technology protection measure con-
cerned, during use by an adult, to enable access for bona fide
research or other lawful purpose. ', 86 This aspect of CIPA, referred to
as the Disabling Provision, was central to the government's defense of
the statute. The phrase "technology protection measure" is defined
as "a specific technology that blocks or filters access to visual depic-
tions that are-(A) obscene ... ; (B) child pornography... ; or (C)
,,87harmful to minors.
Notwithstanding its clear tying of the E-rate funds to the use of fil-
ters, CIPA specifically prohibits federal interference in local determi-
nations "regarding what matter is appropriate for minors."""
b. Section 1712 of CIPA-Amendments to LSTA Programs
Section 1712 of CIPA does for the LSTA programs what section
1721 (b) does for the E-rate discounts, limiting grants to states fund-
ing to libraries that certify that they have and are enforcing "Internet
safety" policies similar to those required for E-rate discounts 9
c. Federalism Concerns Raised During CIPA 's Consideration
A federal law that affected the daily lives of thousands of local gov-
ernment entities was bound to raise federalism issues-or, at least,
the local control issue at the heart of many of the underlying ration-
47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (6) (C).
Id. § 254 (h) (6) (D).
:7 Id. § 1703(b) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1) (2003)).
" Id. § 1732 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 254(l) (2)).
Id. § 1712 (amending 20 U.S.C. § 9134, adding 20 U.S.C. § 9134(0). One distinction be-
tween the two, possibly the result of a drafting error, was that the disabling provision for the E-
rate program permits disabling of the filters only for adults, whereas the disabling provision for
the LSTA programs allows disabling for anyone, thus presumably for minors as well. Compare 20
U.S.C. § 9134(0 (3) (disabling provision for E-Rate Program), with 47 U.S.C. § 254(h)(6)(D)
(disabling provision for LSTA program).
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ales for the principles of federalism. ° And, indeed, it did. Oppo-
nents of the law drew on the local control argument as a rhetorical
matter, and supporters clearly understood the possible problems and
tried to do something about them.
Congressional proponents of the legislation were themselves
clearly aware of the prickly issue of local control. Indeed, right from
the very beginning, proponents in Congress recognized that a federal
filtering law had implications for decision making by local libraries
and sought to mollify any such concerns. When Senator McCain (R-
Ariz.) introduced the first version of what became CIPA (then known
as the Internet School Filtering Act) in 1998, the bill explicitly stated
that only the local authority (i.e., "school, school board, library" or
other certifing authority) would determine what matter is "inappro-
priate for minors" and explicitly prohibited any "agency or instru-
mentality of the United States Government" from (1) "establish [ing]
criteria for making such determination"; (2) "review[ing] the deter-
mination made by [the local entity]"; or (3) "consider[ing] the crite-
ria employed by [the local entity]." '  This language is identical to
that found in the final legislation.92
In public comments, legislative supporters of the McCain bill em-
phasized this aspect of it and went even further in calling it legislation
that would facilitate local control. For example, Internet School Fil-
tering Act cosponsor Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) noted that
"[t] he filtering device is a local control device. The school district-
the schools-will determine which filtering device and how to use it
at their own school. The same with the libraries.0 3  A week later,
o I discuss the rationales of federalism and the relationship between federalism and local-
ism, infra, in Part III.
9' Internet School Filtering Act, S. 1619, 105th Cong. (1998). See 144 CONG. REC. S519
(1998) (debating and discussing the Act); see also S. REP. No. 105-226, at 7 (1998) ("S. 1619
places the determination of what material is inappropriate for minors in the hands of the local
school or library authorities, which are best equipped to make that determination based on
their knowledge of the local community and their traditional role of acting in loco parentis.").
A number of different bills were introduced and debated in both Houses of Congress through-
out the 105th and 106th Congresses. With the exception of a few of the House bills, nearly all
bills had some form of this language.
" See CIPA, § 1732 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 254). When promulgating the implementing
regulations, the FCC clearly understood its role in this regard. In In re Federal-State Joint Board on
Universal Service, 16 F.C.C.R. 8182 (2001), the FCC stated:
We decline to promulgate rules mandating how entities should implement [the Dis-
abling Provisions]. Federally-imposed rules directing school and library staff when to
disable technology protection measures would likely be overbroad and imprecise, poten-
tially chilling speech, or otherwise confusing schools and libraries about the require-
ments of the statute. We leave such determinations to the local communities, whom we
believe to be most knowledgeable about the varying circumstances of schools or libraries
within those communities.
Id. at 8204.
" 144 CONG. REc. S8162 (daily ed.July 15, 1998).
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when the bill was reintroduced as an amendment to an appropria-
tions bill, Senator Murray again emphasized local control: "What is
great about our bill is that it gives power to local school districts and
libraries to determine which filtering device to use and what consti-
tutes inappropriate material. Decisions must remain at the local level
with those who best know their students."94 Vice President Gore like-
wise emphasized local control in his statement supporting the
McCain bill.
95
Even Bruce Taylor, a well-known antipornography advocate,96
talked of the McCain bill as an "act of 'federal partnership"' that
"leaves the determination of what constitutes material deemed
'harmful to minors' exclusively to the States to decide and seeks to
severely limit federal review of state decisions in this regard." 7  In
fact, Taylor even went further in promoting local control by arguing
that the bill should have been amended to "preserve exclusive state
court adjudication of all matters connected to the determination of
what constitutes material 'harmful to minors' or 'inappropriate for
" Id. at S8611 (daily ed. July 21, 1998); see also id. at S8612 (noting that the bill "allows local
school districts to make important decisions about Internet content"). Indeed, when Senator
McCain initially introduced the first version of the bill in the 105th Congress, he noted that "the
bill prohibits the federal government from prescribing any particular filtering system .... It
thus places the prerogative for determining which filtering system best reflects the community
standards precisely where it should be: on the community itself." Id. at S519 (Feb. 9, 1998); see
also S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp.: Full Committee Hearing on Internet Indecency, 105th
Cong. 910 (1998) (Statement of Sen. McCain, Chairman) (same), available at
http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/210mcc.htm; 145 CONG. REC. S531 (daily ed. Jan. 19,
1999) (same comments after introduction of CIPA in 106th Congress).
"5 See Statement of Al Gore, Safe Schools Internet Act (Mar. 23, 1998), at http://
www.techlawjournal.com/censor/80324blo.htm. Gore said:
This legislation is not a "one-size-fits-all-approach" that mandates government values in
our schools. Instead, our plan will empower schools to make decisions based on local
values .... We must bring the combined power of parents, teachers, and technology to-
gether if we are going to protect our students in a way that will work in every community
and reflect the values of each community.
Id. As I note below, President Clinton ultimately opposed CIPA. See infra text accompanying
note 117 (noting Clinton's opposition to CIPA, even though he signed the bill for other rea-
sons).
" Taylor was head of the National Law Center for Children and Families at the time and is
currently serving as special counsel to Attorney General Ashcroft for obscenity prosecutions.
97 NLC Comments on S. 97: The Children's Internet Protection Act: Hearing on S. 97 Before the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transp., 106th Cong. 8-10 (1999) (statement of Bruce A. Taylor,
President and Chief Counsel, The National Law Center for Children and Families) [hereinafter
Taylor], available at http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/0304tay.pdf. Taylor also noted:
The Bill does not seek to create a 'federal definition' of proscribed matter, but is di-
rected at supporting decisions under state law, which come within permissible federal
Constitutional parameters for school and library administrators. The choice of 'technol-
ogy' is to be implemented as a state administrative decision, through an interpretation by
state officials, who have been vested under state law with regulatory decision making
power over the respective schools or libraries affected by this funding program, as part of
the normal course of their official duties.
Id. at 10-11.
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minors,' ...... and of clearly removing subject matter jurisdiction from
the lower federal courts over the same issues.
'" 98
Nor were these comments about local control limited to the nicely
scrubbed Congressional Record and prepared statements. Senator
McCain was even quoted in The New York Times emphasizing this fact:
what to block, he said, "is only up to the school board and the library
board .... It's not up to anybody else."99 Likewise, an aide to Repre-
sentative Ernest Istook (R-Okla.), a proponent of CIPA, was quoted in
The New York Times as saying that the law was "designed for local de-
termination of content."
Opponents of the bill also understood the local control implica-
tions of the law and sought to use them to oppose the bill. So, for
example, several national education groups voiced concerns about
the bills on the basis that they subverted local control.' 1 Likewise, the
ACLU, which represented some of the challengers to the law, raised
similar concerns, even though, as I discuss in great detail below,
10 2
their legal arguments in court virtually ignored those concerns. Im-
mediately after Congress adopted CIPA, Chris Hansen, a Senior Staff
Attorney at the ACLU and attorney of record for the Multnomah
County Public Library,0 3 one of the lead plaintiffs in the constitu-
tional challenge to CIPA, was quoted as saying, " [ t] his is the first time
since the development of the local, free public library in the 19th
century that the federal government has sought to require censorship
Id. at 12-14.
John Schwartz, Support is Growing in Congress for Internet Filters in Schools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
20, 2000, at A28 (quoting Senator McCain).
'w Rebecca S. Weiner, Federal Meddling or Local Empowerment? Congress and Educators Disagree,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2000, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/08/cyber/education/
02education.htrnl.
"' See, e.g., id. (quoting Dan Fuller, Director of Federal Programs for the National School
Boards Association, as saying, "Many schools have already developed policies. This is members
of Congress dictating local policy."); see also Internet Filtering in Schools and Libraries: Hearing on S.
97 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) (statement of the Na-
tional Education Association) ("The NEA is very concerned that S. 97 represents a serious en-
croachment on local decision making prerogatives. The NEA maintains that it is the school
district and not the federal government that is best positioned to decide whether or not to fil-
ter."). Senator Leahy quoted the National Association of Independent Schools as stating:
[I)t is an individual school's decision to determine how best to address this issue in a way
that is commensurate with its mission and philosophy .... It is certainly not the role of
the federal government to proscribe a course of action that interferes with what is decid-
edly a local matter.
146 CONG. REc. S5844 (daily ed. Jun. 27, 2000).
'u See infra Part I.C (describing and discussing the challenge to CIPA).
1o See Brief of Appellees Multnomah County Public Library, et al., ALA II, 539 U.S. 194
(2003) (No. 02-361), available at 2003 WL 367640 (listing Chris Hanson as attorney of record).
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in every single town and hamlet in America .... More than 100 years
of local control of libraries ... is being casually set aside."'
0 4
The American Library Association ("ALA"), another plaintiff in
the case and a steadfast opponent of filters in public libraries, ° also
drew on the local control argument. Interestingly enough, at one
point early in the process, one ALA representative went so far on the
local control theme as to say that different libraries could respond to
the issue in different ways, effectively acknowledging the propriety of
a local library choosing to install filters.0 6 The ALA's later actions,
however, clearly-and understandably-belied its emphasis on local
autonomy.
Another librarian, Candace Morgan, speaking on behalf only of
her own local library system, gave congressional testimony that per-
haps best speaks to the issue. She made clear that she did not oppose
filters-her library system was in fact on the verge of installing filters
on their Internet terminals-but that she nonetheless opposed
CIPA's filtering requirement:
In my experience, the role of the community in helping to inform
and shape a solution is critical. My concern with the proposed legislation
is that, while it permits some discretion to local officials to determine
what material is "deemed to be harmful to minors" and what software to
use to block that content, it denies local communities the opportunity to
determine what approach will best serve children in these communities
in dealing with challenging content. It is not just that one solution
doesn't fit all communities. It is also that a federal mandate on a matter
so closely tied to local norms and values is, in my view, counterproductive
and even harmful. The legislation may not only discourage communities
'm See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Promises Legal Challenge as
Congress Adopts Bill Imposing Internet Blocking in Libraries (Dec. 18, 2000), available at
http://archive.aclu.org/news/2000/n 121800a.html.
'o5 See generally Statement by the American Library Association Intellectual Freedom Commit-
tee on Library Use of Filtering Software (July 1, 1997, rev. Nov. 17, 2000), at http://
www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/filt-stm.html (opposing filtering software as unconstitutional); Resolu-
tion of the American Library Association on the Use of Filtering Software in Libraries (July 2,
1997), available at http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/ifresolutions/filtering
resolution.pdf (resolving that "the use of filtering software to block access to constitutionally
protected speech violates the Library Bill of Rights?).
'm See Inappropriate Materials on the Internet: Hearing on Legislative Proposals to Protect Children
from Inappropriate Materials on the Internet Before the House Subcomm. on Telecomm., Trade, and Con-
sumer Protection, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Agnes M. Griffen, Dir. of the Tucson-Pima
Public Library, on behalf of the AlA), available at 1998 WL 18088393. Griffen testified:
Notwithstanding many librarians' concerns about the use of filters, some libraries have
made the judgment to install blocking or filtering software .... Each community in its
own way[] has to address these complex issues in conjunction with local library boards,
with library users, with local government officials, as well as with the general community.
This process of developing local use policies is in and of itself[] an important educa-
tional process for a community to conduct .... Congress should not interfere with local
community decision making by mandating a single approach to a multifaceted problem.
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from doing the hard work to reach their own solutions; it also lacks the
legitimacy necessary to foster broad community support.
While no one approach to Internet safety will satisfy everyone in the
community, I believe it is possible to work with the community to fashion
a "bottom up" approach that respects community values, addresses core
concerns and provides useful solutions. Not surprisingly, local decision-
making processes vary significantly and the solutions are extremely di-
verse. But what they have in common is involvement of the community,
understanding of local norms and values, knowledge of practices that
take into account the information needs of children and teens, and a
general good faith desire to find a solution that respects the diverse per-
spectives in the community.107
Opponents in Congress likewise sounded the theme of local con-
trol. During discussion of the Internet School Filtering Act on the
Senate floor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) stated that "Internet fil-
tering issues should be discussed and implemented locally, not na-
tionally."1 °8 After noting that "[t] he intention of the amendment is
good," Senator Leahy claimed that "[t]he primary problem with this
amendment is that it usurps local authority on whether to use filter-
ing technologies. '"10 9 He went on to say that he "would support efforts
to address these issues that allow more flexibility at the local level.""
Senator Burns (R-Mont.) made similar comments."'
117 The Children's Internet Protection Act: Hearing on S. 97 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci.,
and Transp., 106th Cong. (1999) (testimony of Candace Morgan, Assoc. Dir., Ft. Vancouver Re-
gional Library) [hereinafter Morgan Testimony], available at http://commerce.senate.gov/
hearings/0304mor.pdf.
"8 144 CONG. REC. S8612 (daily ed. July 21, 1998); see also 146 CONG. REc. S5865 (daily ed.
June 27, 2000) (documenting Senator Leahy's "serious concerns with the McCain proposal to
require schools and libraries to send certifications to the FCC about their installation of certain
blocking software and the risk that the FCC will become a national censorship office, with the
responsibility of... policing local enforcement of the Internet access policy").
'0' 144 CONG. REC. S8613. Senator Leahy further elaborated:
Wresting control of educational and informational access from the local communities
that are best equipped to make these decisions is not going to solve the problem of in-
appropriate material on the Internet .... Local school boards, administrators, and li-
brarians more familiar with their own systems and culture are the proper people to de-
cide how best to implement any programs restricting access to information.
Id.
110 Id.
. Id. at S8614 (noting his "serious reservations about the federal government mandating the
use of specific technologies to solve the problem of schoolchildren's access to inappropriate
material on the Internet" and stating that "school boards are much more effective in making
decisions about appropriate policy or technology when dealing with Internet access for students
than Washington"). Senator Burns concluded:
I remain steadfastly opposed to big government mandates on the filtering issue .... I
continue to believe that local communities acting through their school and library
boards, rather than ... the federal government, are in the best position to make deci-
sions on this critical issue.
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In contrast to groups like the ACLU and ALA, however, congres-
sional opponents rarely opposed the McCain bill explicitly.' Rather,
they sought to introduce amendments aimed at the same problem,
but ones that did not impose a filtering requirement. Some of these
substitute amendments afforded local decision makers greater flexi-
bility, and this fact was of significant importance during debate about
the various proposals. Senator Santorum (R-Pa.), for example, intro-
duced legislation that would have given schools and libraries the op-
tion of either installing filters or developing an Internet use policy
with community involvement. 3  He made clear that he viewed his
amendment as premised on
a philosophical argument [that] says: Should we have Washington come
down and hammer you and say here is what you have to do, or should we
have a program that says: Here is the problem. Local parents and teachers
and community, you go out and bring the community together and do the hard
work of democracy, which is to work together to come up with a solution to
the problem.
114
It is not hard to see echoes of librarian Candace Morgan's point that
a uniform federal filtering requirement "discourages communities
from doing the hard work to reach their own solutions" and "lacks
the legitimacy necessary to foster broad community support,"1 5 and,
.2 Indeed, the Senate passed CIPA by a vote of 95 to 3.
"' 146 CONG. REC. S3266 (daily ed. May 2, 2000) (proposed amendment); id. at S584243
(daily ed. June 27, 2000) (proposed amendment). Santorum's bill was called the "Neighbor-
hood Children's Internet Protection Act," presumably to distinguish it from the McCain pro-
posal on the basis of its emphasis on "neighborhoods." See S. 1545, 106th Cong. (1999) (Santo-
rum's bill); see also 145 CONG. REC. S10390 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Senator
Santorum introducing S. 1545 in Congress). When CIPA became law, so too did a version of
the Neighborhood CIPA. However, the version of Neighborhood CIPA that became law simply
required an Internet use policy rather than giving schools and libraries the option of creating
such a policy in lieu of filtering. See 47 U.S.C. § 254(1) (2002).
Senator Burns (R-Mont.) considered introducing an amendment during the 105th Congress
that would have required only an Internet use policy but not filters. See CENTER FOR
DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, AMENDMENT TO S. 1619 INTENDED TO BE PROPOSED BY MR. BURNS,
at http://www.cdt.org/speech/burns.html (last visited Aug. 25, 2004). As noted above, Senator
Burns had also expressed concerns about federal intrusion into local decision making. See supra
note 111 (quoting Senator Burns's comments on CIPA).
146 CONG. REC. S5843 (emphasis added).
See supra text accompanying note 107 (quoting Candace Morgan's congressional testi-
mony opposing CIPA's filtering requirement). The debate between Senators McCain and
Santorum that followed the introduction of the Santorum amendment revolved primarily
around the local control issue. Compare, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. S5867 (daily ed. June 27, 2000)
(statement of Sen. McCain "describ[ing] what [his] bill does as far as local control is con-
cerned" and noting that "local authorities are given complete authority" and that "the Federal
Government is expressly prohibited from interfering in the process of local control"), with id. at
S5868 (statement of Sen. Santorum that "we have an honest philosophical disagreement on
whether we should have a one-size-fits-all Federal mandate that you have to buy filtering soft-
ware").
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indeed, the American Library Association supported the Santorum
Amendment."
6
Finally, even when President Clinton signed the bill, he expressed
his opposition, drawing on the local control theme. Although he did
not veto CIPA because it was part of an omnibus spending bill with
hundreds of other provisions, President Clinton clearly agreed to
CIPA reluctantly. His statement upon signing the bill explicitly stated
that he was "disappointed" with CIPA and emphasized that he was "a
strong supporter of locally driven efforts" to combat the problem of
protecting children from inappropriate material online: "I believe
that local development and implementation of an Internet-
acceptable use plan is a more effective, appropriate solution than
mandatory filtering for ensuring comprehensive protection while
meeting the diverse needs of local schools and libraries.
" 17
I do not mean to overstate the impact of the local control issue on
the actual support for, or opposition to, the legislation. Indeed, I
suspect the issue was used by many (but certainly not all) of the par-
ticipants largely for rhetorical purposes. On the one hand, surely
Senator Murray did not really believe that the legislation was increas-
ing local choice when the whole point of the law was to add a condi-
tion to money that localities had already been receiving without that
condition. At some level, it seems likely that Senator Murray under-
stood this, but simply felt that, by framing the law in a way that em-
phasized what it was not-a single national rule specifying content in
all public libraries-she could mute criticism that the law was a fed-
eral interference with local decision making.
On the other hand, many opponents were likely doing the same.
The ALA and ACLU had been so vociferous in their opposition to fil-
ters in public libraries on First Amendment grounds" s-
notwithstanding the ACLU's arguments in Reno v. ACL' 9 and
116 See 146 CONG. REc. S5843 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement of Sen. Santorum)(noting
the endorsement of the ALA). An amendment to the McCain bill, introduced by Senators
Leahy (D-Vt.) and Hatch (R-Utah), was likewise defended as preferable to the original McCain
bill pardy on the grounds that it "leaves the solution on how best to protect children from in-
appropriate online materials accessible on computers in schools and libraries to the local
school boards and communities." 146 CONG. REC. S5865 (daily ed. June 27, 2000) (statement
of Sen. Leahy). Yet, the amendment was a proposal to require Internet service providers to
provide their customers with filtering software and, thus, had literally nothing to do with com-
puters in schools and libraries (though, of course, by the fact that it did nothing with respect to
the issue, the amendment did in fact "leave[] the solution . . to the local school boards and
communities"). Id. See generally id. at S5865-66 (discussing the benefits of the Hatch-Leahy
amendment).
"7 President's Statement on Signing the Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY 2001, 36
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 3167, 3171-72 (Dec. 21, 2000).
"' See supra note 105 (citing statements by the ALA and the ACLU opposing filters on First
Amendment grounds).
,' 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
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Ashcroft v. ACLI 20 that filters (in the home, at least) were a less re-
strictive alternative to protecting minors from sexually explicit con-
tent than the criminal prohibitions in the CDA and COPA-that it is
hard to imagine either group seriously believing their own rhetoric
about local control.
121
Here, I do not mean to imply bad faith on their part, but it is im-
portant to understand the role of groups such as the ALA, a national
organization, in the broader debate about filters in public libraries.
The national ALA (and its Office of Intellectual Freedom) clearly op-
posed filters on the grounds that they constitute a form of censorship
and thus contradict fundamental principles of intellectual freedom,
principles that are part of the librarians' professional responsibili-
ties.122 And, yet, there is an intense debate within the community of
librarians about the role of Internet filters, with many librarians (in-
123
cluding members of the ALA) fervently opposing the ALA's stance.
Thus, while it is clear that the ALA opposed CIPA, the passage of
CIPA did give the ALA an opportunity to challenge a single law on
First Amendment grounds in a way that could have, had the ALA pre-
vailed in the case, amounted to imposing the ALA's view of filters on
dissenting local librarians who otherwise wanted to filter. In effect,
then, the ALA's opposition to local libraries that want to filter on
their own belies their reliance on the local-control argument.
' 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
121 But cf supra note 106 and accompanying text (noting an ALA representative's local con-
trol argument and quoting her testimony before a House subcommittee). In addition, it is
worth noting that one state, Texas, even filed an amicus brief in ALA 11 urging the Supreme
Court to reverse the district court's decision to strike the statute down on First Amendment
grounds, but specifically "tak[ing] no position on Congress's ability, through its spending
power, to command the use of Internet filters in public libraries or require their use by State or
local governmental entities." Brief of State of Texas as Amicus Curiae at 2, ALA I, 539 U.S. 194
(2003) (No. 02-361), available at 2002 WL 32157243.
112 See Statement of the ALA Intellectual Freedom Committee on Library Use of Filtering
Software (July 1, 1997, rev. Nov. 17, 2000) (opposing filters on public library computers), at
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/filt-stm.html; see also Resolution of the American Library Asso-
ciation on the Use of Filtering Software in Libraries (July 2, 1997) (resolving that filters on pub-
lic library computers violate the Library Bill of Rights), available at http://
www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/ifresolutions/filteringresolution.pdf.
"2 See, e.g., E-Rate and Filtering: A Review of the Children's Internet Protection Act: Hearing Before
the House Subcomm. on Telecom. and the Internet, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th Cong.
(2001) (testimony of Laura Morgan, Librarian, Chicago Public Library) (arguing in favor of
filtering), available at http://energycommerce.house.gov/107/hearings/O404200lHearingl55/
Morgan252.htm; Joyce Howard Price, Librarians Win EEOC Protection from Pornography, WASH.
TIMES, May 26, 2001, at A2 (describing a case in which the EEOC found that a failure to install
filters, among other things, contributed to a hostile workplace environment for librarians); see
also, e.g., infra note 294 (quoting a public librarian in Virginia who both supports use of filters
and opposes CIPA for local control reasons); cf Kim Houghton, Note, Internet Pornography in the
Library: Can the Public Library Employer Be Liable for Third-Party Sexual Harassment When a Client
Displays Internet Pornography to Staff., 65 BROOK. L. REv. 827 (1999) (discussing the possibility of
library liability based on staff exposure to sexual Internet content).
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C. American Library Association v. United States2 4
As with the CDA and COPA, a broad array of parties brought suit
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin implementa-
tion of CIPA soon after its passage. The list of plaintiffs included the
ALA (a national organization of librarians, libraries, and others "in-
terested in libraries and librarianship"); several of the ALA's state and
regional chapters; the South Central Library System of Wisconsin (an
organization whose membership consists solely of public libraries
themselves); the Multnomah County (Oregon) Public Library (as its
name implies, an actual library and department of Multnomah
County, Oregon, and thus an arm of local government, making it ul-
timately a creature of the State of Oregon); patrons of public librar-
ies, both adults and minors; as well as a number of online content
providers whose sites had been blocked by filters.
25
I list these plaintiffs partly to aid in understanding the variety of
different parties involved in the case but also to point out that the
plaintiffs included both governmental and non-governmental actors,
at the local, state, and national levels. As I will discuss in greater de-
tail below, the nature of the different plaintiffs sheds some light not
only on the types of claims the plaintiffs brought, but also on the na-
ture of the law itself. For now, it is worth emphasizing what may be
obvious, that local government entities were among the plaintiffs su-
ing the federal government.
The plaintiffs made two separate arguments: first, that CIPA vio-
lated the First Amendment; and, second, that it violated the unconsti-
tutional conditions doctrine.'2  The Complaints made no reference
to the Tenth Amendment or principles of state sovereignty, notwith-
standing the fact that the law conditioned funds from the federal
government to state government entities. 2 7 The United States' de-
fense of the statute, in contrast, initially sought to treat the law as a
straightforward exercise of the federal spending power and to argue
,2' 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002) ("ALA /), rev'd, 539 U.S. 194 (2003) ("ALA If').
". See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 414-16. This last group encompassed both those that pro-
vide sexually explicit content and some that did not, including a Republican candidate for
Congress who had advocated in favor of filters but whose web site was blocked by filters.
126 See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ALA I (No. 01-CV-1303); see also Mult-
nomah County Public Library's Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, ALA I (No. 01-
CV-1322). The complaints also referenced the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause because
of allegations that the law was vague and granted librarians too much discretion. These claims,
however, were tied directly to the First Amendment claims.
127 See sources cited supra note 126.
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that it should be upheld under the broad latitude that Congress has
to attach conditions to its spending.""
It turns out, though, that doctrinally the defendants' claim that
the law was a simple exercise of the spending power devolved into a
pure First Amendment question. Under South Dakota v. Dole,29 condi-
tional federal funding to states is subject to four limitations, one of
which is known as the "independent constitutional bar" rule.10 Un-
der this rule, Congress may not grant funds to states on the condition
that "the recipient 'engage in activities that would themselves be un-
constitutional.""'''  Because the relevant recipients of CIPA funding
are the public libraries, the spending power question then becomes
"whether libraries would violate the First Amendment by employing
the filtering software that CIPA requires." 2  If the answer to that
question is "yes," CIPA would be an unconstitutional exercise of the
spending power, whereas if the answer is "no," it would be upheld.
This was thus the first question the courts needed to answer.
I turn then to this question, after which I discuss the plaintiffs'
second argument, that CIPA violated the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine.
1. First Amendment Analysis
A three-judge district court panel granted judgment for the plain-
tiffs, declaring CIPA unconstitutional and enjoining the federal gov-
ernment from enforcing its conditions on recipients of LSTA funds
and E-rate discounts. The district court spent the bulk of its opinion
analyzing the question of whether public libraries violate the First
Amendment by installing filters on their Internet access. While the
court went into far more detail about both the nature of the filtering
technology and the First Amendment doctrine, the court's analysis
closely parallels that of the court in Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of
Trustees of the Loudoun County Library.1
33
The federal government argued, as had the library defendant in
Mainstream Loudoun, that a public library's decision to install filters
should be treated precisely like its decision to choose books for its
"' See Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
Complaints at 15-34, ALA I (No. 01-CV-1303) (arguing that the statute should be upheld under
the federal spending power, as the spending power should be broadly construed).
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
M I describe the Dole test in greater detail below. See infra Part IV.B.
" ALA I, 539 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (quoting Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (1987)).
32id.
1 24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998). See supra Part II.A (describing Mainstream Loudoun
and commentary on the case).
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print collection. 134 As in Mainstream Loudoun, the district court re-
jected this argument, concluding instead that the installing of filters
constituted an exclusion of particular speech rather than an affirma-
tive selection decision, and in particular, a selective exclusion from
the Internet, which the Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLUhad referred
to as a "vast democratic forum."'1 35  When choosing books for a li-
brary's collection, the ALA I court said, the library's collection devel-
opment staff make editorial judgments by
evaluat[ing] the book's quality by reference to a variety of criteria such as
its accuracy, the title's niche in relation to the rest of the collection, the
authority of the author, the publisher, the work's presentation, and how
it compares with other material available in the same genre or on the
same subject.1
6
In contrast, offering Internet access, whether filtered or not, involves
the providing of a vast amount of content, "almost none of which ei-
ther the library's collection development staff or even the filtering
companies have ever reviewed.'
3 7
The district court concluded that a library providing public Inter-
net access creates a public forum, and a decision to filter would thus
be subject to strict scrutiny. 3s The court's focus was the "narrow tai-
loring" prong of the strict scrutiny test. Determining that all available
filters blocked far more than constitutionally proscribable speech, the
court concluded that this overblocking meant "that any public li-
brary's use of a filtering product mandated by CIPA will necessarily
fail to be narrowly tailored to address the library's legitimate inter-
ests.", 3 9 Finally, the court rejected the argument that the Disabling
Provisions cured the statute's constitutional defect.
140
In sum, the court concluded that CIPA was unconstitutional un-
der the "independent constitutional bar" rule because any library that
installed filters would violate the First Amendment. The key here is
not in the details of the various prongs of the strict scrutiny test, but
SeeALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 457. The court described the government's argument:
[T]he government forcefully argues that a public library's decision to limit the content
of its digital offerings on the Internet should be subject to no stricter scrutiny than its
decisions about what content to make available to its patrons through the library's print
collection. According to the [United States], just as a public library may choose to ac-
quire books about gardening but not golf, without having to show that this content-based
restriction on patrons' access to speech [satisfies strict scrutiny], so may a public library
make content-based decisions about which speech to make available on the Internet,
without having to show that such a restriction satisfies strict scrutiny.
Id.
135 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
201 F. Supp. 2d at 463.
"' Id. at 464.
Id. at 470-71 (discussing the application of strict scrutiny).
"9 Id. at 479.
Id. at 484-89 (explaining why disabling provisions do not cure the defect).
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rather in the overall methodology, which was to go through a doc-
trinal First Amendment analysis, step by step, treating the question as
one about the relationship between the library, as a governmental en-
tity, and the public (both the web site owners whose sites were
blocked and the patrons whose access to those sites would be
chilled). The result was a tightly reasoned and, indeed, logically un-
assailable opinion that read like a straightforward application of the
public forum jurisprudence. Yet, the result is clearly lacking in one
important respect: the court was asked to decide the constitutionality
of a federal statute that conditioned funds to public libraries, but its
analysis resulted in a legal decision that not only invalidated the fed-
eral statute, but also amounted to a holding that the use of filters on
Internet terminals in every public library in the country-including
those not receiving federal money---was unconstitutional. This is a
startling result for a case challenging the exercise of the federal
spending power, notwithstanding the unassailable logic of the court's
reasoning. I return to this point in further detail below.14
The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and va-
cated the injunction.1 42 There were five opinions. Chief Justice
Rehnquist announced the judgment and wrote an opinion for a four-
Justice plurality (Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas in addition
to himself). Justices Kennedy and Breyer wrote separate opinions,
each concurring in the judgment, and Justices Stevens and Souter
wrote separate dissents, withJustice Ginsburg joiningJustice Souter.43
I begin with the plurality opinion and Justice Souter's dissent, as
these two framed the question as the district court did: under Dole's
"independent constitutional bar" rule, does a public library violate
the First Amendment by placing filters on its Internet access?
For the plurality, the answer was easy. Rejecting the argument
that library Internet access is a public forum, the plurality agreed with
the United States' argument that a library that provides Internet ac-
cess is simply making a "collection decision." According to the plu-
rality, "[p]ublic library staffs necessarily consider content in making
collection decisions and enjoy broad discretion in making them."'
Such decisions are part of "a public library's exercise of judgment in
selecting the material it provides to its patrons" 145 and are thus not
subject to the heightened scrutiny applied to restrictions on public
fora. Rather, the plurality concluded, content decisions are part of
141 See infra text following note 440 (discussing the odd pairing of a spending power case with
the "independent constitutional bar" rule).
142 ALA II, 539 U.S. 194 (2003).
143 Id.
" Id. at 204.
"' Id. at 205.
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the library's "mission[] of facilitating learning and cultural enrich-
ment."1 46 Once the plurality decided that offering Internet access
constituted a collection decision rather than a restraint on private
speech in a public forum, it concluded that substantial deference
must be given to a library to make such decisions even though they
are obviously content based.
For Justice Souter, the question was the same, though the answer
was different. 147 Though he did not explicitly apply the public forum
doctrine, he nevertheless concluded that the decision of a public li-
brary to install filters should be subject to "conventional strict scru-
tiny."14 8 In particular, Justice Souter rejected the plurality's claim that
blocking material on the Internet should be treated as analogous to a
collection decision, calling such filtering "censorship."'' 49 According
to Justice Souter, "The proper analogy... is not to passing up a book
that might have been bought; it is either to buying a book and then
keeping it from adults lacking an acceptable 'purpose,' or to buying
an encyclopedia and then cutting out pages with anything thought to
be unsuitable for all adults."'150 In short, Justice Souter treated a filter-
ing or blocking decision as a removal decision, rather than as a col-
lection decision, and thereby concluded that a library that installs fil-
ters violates the First Amendment.
Much can be said about the attempt to analogize filters on library
Internet terminals to either a collection decision or, as Justice Souter
put it, to "cutting pages out of an encyclopedia.,1 1 Much has been
said and much more, no doubt, will be. I am not interested here in
probing the merits of the analogy, however. Rather, I wish to empha-
size that, like the district court, both the plurality and Justice Souter
took the "independent constitutional bar" rule as their starting point
and, thus, treated the constitutionality of CIPA as wholly uncon-
nected to the fact that the law being challenged was a federal law. In
both opinions, the constitutionality of the statute depended solely on
the role played by the local public library.
' Id. at 195.
17 Id. at 231-43 (Souter,J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 242.
149 Id. at 235, 241.
Id. at 237.
Id.
See supra Part II.A (discussing Mainstream Loudoun and commentary on the case). A more
subtle criticism of justice Souter's analogy is the argument that access to the Internet is not in
fact access to content at all, but is instead access to a conduit such as, for example, the postal
service: "to say that libraries must accept all that may be accessed via the unfiltered Internet is
somewhat, though not perfectly, analogous to saying that a library must retain in its collection
all unsolicited submissions of free books, recordings, and other media which it receives via the
mail." Laughlin, supra note 58, at 262.
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So, consider as an example this statement from the plurality opin-
ion: "To create [a public] forum, the government must make an af-
firmative choice to open up its property for use as a public forum."
'' 3
While there is little doctrinally objectionable about the statement, it
ignores the fact that, with CIPA, it is the federal government that is
getting to decide whether to "open up" a local government's prop-
erty.' 5 4 The doctrine requires the Court to ignore the different levels
of government completely.
The plurality does allude to the spending power aspect of the case
at one point in the midst of its First Amendment analysis. Respond-
ing to the dissenters' claim that "overblocking will 'reduce the adult
population ... to reading only what is fit for children, "15 the plural-
ity argues that the cases on which the dissenters rely "are inapposite
because they addressed Congress's direct regulation of private con-
duct, not exercises of its Spending Power.' 56 But, of course, whether
the law is an exercise of the Spending Power is doctrinally irrelevant
when the issue is whether the spending condition satisfies the "inde-
pendent constitutional bar" rule. The relevant question at that point
in the analysis is instead simply whether the local or state government
recipient of the funds would violate the First Amendment by comply-
ing with the condition. Thus, the cases prohibiting the government
from "reduc [ing] the adult population... to reading only what is fit
for children" are directly applicable because the issue is simply
whether a library that installs filters violates the First Amendment.
Justice Breyer's opinion concurring in the judgment likewise
heads straight to the First Amendment issue, treating the spending
power aspect of the law as doctrinally irrelevant. As he has done in
the past when new technologies are at issue, 7 Justice Breyer con-
cluded that CIPA should be analyzed under a "heightened scrutiny"
that was neither "strict scrutiny" nor "rational basis."'' s  Under
Breyer's analysis, the "key question" is typically "one of proper fit,"
159
153 ALA II, 539 U.S. at 206.
' Notice also the awkwardness of the plurality's use of the term "government" when refer-
ring to the federal government. Many of the challengers to the statute were, of course, "govern-
ments" as well.
'5' ALA II, 539 U.S. at 222 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bttler v. Michigan, 352 U.S.
380, 383 (1957)).
Id. at 209 n.4 (plurality opinion).
"' See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 227 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring in
part) (using heightened, but not strict, scrutiny to evaluate cable broadcast statute); Denver
Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 740-47 (1996) (plurality opinion
written by Justice Breyer) (same); see also United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S.
803, 846 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that statute is "proportionate" to the govern-
ment's compelling interest).
ALA II, 539 U.S. at 217 (BreyerJ., concurring in the judgment).
1,9 • ,
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but the question is not, as in strict scrutiny, whether the law is "nar-
rowly tailored" and the "least restrictive means" but rather "whether
the harm to speech-related interests is disproportionate in light of
both the justifications and the potential alternates. 16 Relying on
the intermediate level of scrutiny given to restrictions on commercial
speech and content-neutral laws, 61 Breyer concluded that CIPA
should be upheld because the Disabling Provisions resulted in a bur-
den that was no "more onerous than traditional library practices as-
sociated with segregating library materials in, say, closed stacks, or
with interlibrary lending practices that require patrons to make re-
quests that are not anonymous and to wait while the librarian obtains
the desired materials from elsewhere.0
62
In a similar vein, Justice Kennedy relied on the Disabling Provi-
sions and, in particular, on the United States' interpretation of the
statute that "a librarian will unblock filtered material or disable the
Internet software filter without significant delay" for any adult who so
requests. If this was the case, something which Justice Kennedy
would be willing to accept for purposes of the facial challenge to the
statute, he concluded that "there is little to this case. 164 Both he and
Justice Breyer invited as-applied challenges to the statute if a particu-
lar library failed to adhere to the United States' representation.
If we stop for a moment, it will be easy to see that something is not
quite right here. The doctrine of facial challenges creates a certain
awkwardness. Justices Kennedy and Breyer are stating that an as-
applied challenge could be brought to a federal statute if the actions
of a local government entity, the public library, fail to comport with a
representation made by the federal executive branch during the Su-
preme Court argument. This situation contrasts sharply with the
paradigm of the "application" of a statute for purposes of facial con-
stitutional challenges: a situation in which the government making a
representation about the operation of the statute is the one that in
fact implements it.
1w Id.
6 See id. at 218 (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557 (1980) (commercial speech), and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)
(content-neutral laws)).
.6 Id. at 219.
' Id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The ALA clearly saw Justice Ken-
nedy's reliance on the United States' interpretation of the disabling provision as a chance to
make lemonade out of lemons. Soon after the Court issued its decision, the director of the
ALA's Office of Intellectual Freedom was reported to have said, "[w]e're going to suggest to
libraries that they post a sign that says 'Filters are required, but if you want unfiltered access,just
ask us and we will turn off the filter.'" See Supreme Court Upholds CIPA, LIBR.J. (June 24, 2003),
available at http://libraryjournal.com/article/CA306553.
' 539 U.S. at 214 (Kennedy,J., concurring in the judgment).
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Finally, let me turn to Justice Stevens's dissent because, for my
purposes, it is the most interesting opinion. The first portion of the
opinion reads like a paean to several of the principles of constitu-
tional federalism. This is of course surprising since it is Justice Ste-
vens who has so vigorously dissented from the Court's federalism
"revolution" at every opportunity. 115 Justice Stevens begins his opin-
ion by stating that he agrees with the plurality "that it is neither inap-
propriate nor unconstitutional for a local library to experiment with
filtering software as a means of curtailing children's access to Internet
Web sites displaying sexually explicit images"; he further agrees "that
the 7% of public libraries that decided to use such software on all of
their Internet terminals in 2000 did not act unlawfully." 166 For pur-
poses of the "independent constitutional bar" rule, then, Justice Ste-
vens has effectively conceded the whole game. Because doctrinally
the question under the "independent constitutional bar" rule is
whether the state government recipient of the federal funds would
violate the Constitution by accepting the funding condition, Justice
Stevens's concession that a library that accepts the funds would not
necessarily be violating the Constitution effectively renders the statute
constitutional under the independent constitutional bar rule. Were
he to have followed that doctrine, that would have been the end of
the issue, and he would have been forced to join the plurality's opin-
ion.
Why, then, is this portion of the opinion a dissent rather than a
concurrence? Because, Justice Stevens continues, the relevant ques-
tion is not simply whether a library that installs filters violates the First
Amendment. Rather, for him, it is a "vastly different question" to ask
"[w] hether it is constitutional for the Congress of the United States to
impose [a filtering requirement] on the ... 93% [of libraries who are
not, on their own, filtering Internet access on all their terminals]."
Now, why should this be so? The answer appears to be based on the
rationales of constitutional federalism. Justice Stevens tells us that
165 One example is Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), in which Justice Ste-
vens dissented:
Given the absence of precedent for the Court's dramatic application of the sovereign
immunity doctrine today, it is nevertheless appropriate to identify the questionable heri-
tage of the doctrine and to suggest that there are valid reasons for limiting, or even re-
jecting that doctrine altogether, rather than expanding it. Except insofar as it has been
incorporated into the text of the Eleventh Amendment, the doctrine is entirely the
product ofjudge-made law.
Id. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Indeed, he is the only sitting Justice to reject Hans v. Louisi-
ana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the case that interprets the Eleventh Amendment as broadly conferring
sovereign immunity on states. See 517 U.S. at 84-93 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (explaining that
Hans does not mandate sovereign immunity in suits not mentioned in the Eleventh Amend-
ment).
' ALA II, 539 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
167 Id.
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CIPA fails to "allow[] local decision makers to tailor their responses
to local problems," but instead "operates as a blunt nationwide re-
straint on adult access to an enormous amount of valuable informa-
tion that individual librarians cannot possibly review."1 6s
After discussing the statute's overblocking, Justice Stevens then
explains further that "CIPA does not permit any experimentation"
and, yet, "the District Court expressly found that a variety of alterna-
tives less restrictive are available at the local level."169 He then continues
by stating that "[t]hose findings are consistent with scholarly com-
ment on the issue arguing that local decisions tailored to local cir-
cumstances are more appropriate than a mandate from Congress.
1 7
Rather than simply taking the district court's less restrictive alterna-
tives and discussing them in the context of the public forum doctrine
and/or a "strict scrutiny" analysis, Justice Stevens says that what is im-
portant about these less restrictive alternatives is that they are avail-
able at the local level. Now, it is true that the district court had like-
wise discussed them as alternatives for local libraries, but that was
because, at that point in its analysis, the district court's focus under
the independent constitutional bar rule was on the constitutionality
of a local library installing filters, not on the federal statute per se. In
contrast, Justice Stevens's point was that CIPA, a federal law, "does not
permit any experimentation." ''
In short, Justice Stevens seems to be pushing for an awkward re-
sult: the federal law should be declared unconstitutional under the
First Amendment, but a local restriction that effects the same policy
should be upheld. It appears, therefore, that Justice Stevens seeks to
incorporate the principles of constitutional federalism into First
Amendment jurisprudence. To be sure, he focuses on the local li-
brary rather than the states themselves, and he certainly does not say
that a state law that either requires library filtering or ties funding to
libraries on the condition that they install filters, would be constitu-
tional. 1 2 Nonetheless, it seems odd to think of the First Amendment
as prohibiting Congress from doing something that local government
officials may do.
cs Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
I70 d. Stevens follows that statement with a footnote quoting extensively from Gregory
Laughlin's Sex, Lies, and Library Cards: The First Amendment Implications of the Use of Software Filters
to Control Access to Internet Pornography in Public Libraries. Id. at 224 n.3 (quoting Laughlin, supra
note 58, at 279).
171 Id. at 223.
7 Justice Stevens's unconstitutional conditions analysis focuses on the local library's discre-
tion, and so, I suspect he would probably have found a state law similar to CIPA to be unconsti-
tutional as well. See infra text accompanying notes 211-21 (describing Justice Stevens's ap-
proach to the unconstitutional conditions question).
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Treating Congress differently from state and local governments
with respect to the First Amendment (and the Bill of Rights in gen-
eral) has, however, an obvious textual and historical pedigree. In-
deed, Justice Stevens's approach appears logically flawed partly be-
cause our modern conception of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause is that it "incorporates" the provisions of the First
Amendment's Speech Clause.'73 We thus treat the states and munici-
palities as equivalent to the federal government for purposes of ana-
lyzing the constitutionality of a measure under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment, and this assumption is embedded in
our thinking about that clause. The interesting thing about Justice
Stevens's approach, however, is that, perhaps unbeknownst to him,
he is harkening back to the best-known proponent of the view that
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does not incorpo-
rate the First Amendment: the second Justice John Marshall Harlan.
In a series of opinions starting with Roth v. United States'74 and its' 75
companion case, Alberts v. California, Justice Harlan staked out a po-
sition that the First Amendment imposed more stringent restrictions
on the federal government passing laws related to the suppression of
sexually explicit expression than did the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause on state laws regulating the same material.
76
See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we ... assume
that freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."); see
also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-07 (1974) (using the same First Amendment
standards in assessing the constitutionality of both state and federal obscenity prosecutions).
17 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
1 Id.
See id. at 496-508 (Harlan, J., concurring in Alberts and dissenting in Roth); see also
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493-97 (1966) (Harlan,J., dissenting) (adhering to the
views he had expressed in Roth and Alberts); A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a
Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 456-58 (1966) ("Memoirs")
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (same);Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 203-04 (1964) (Harlan, J., dis-
senting) (arguing that "in permitting the States wide, but not federally unrestricted, scope in
this field, while holding the Federal Government with a tight rein, lies the best promise for
achieving a sensible accommodation between the public interest sought to be served by obscen-
ity laws.., and protection of genuine rights of free expression"). See generally Norman Dorsen,
John Marshall Harlan, Civil Liberties, and the Warren Court, 36 N.Y.1. SCH. L. REV. 81, 84-85 (1991)
(discussing Harlan's Roth opinion in the context of his views about federalism); Norman
Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Conservative, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 249, 262-63
(1969) (discussing Harlan's approach); Daniel A. Farber &John E. Nowak, Justice Harlan and the
First Amendment, 2 CONST. COMMENT. 425, 431-32 (1985) (same);J. Harvie Wilkinson III,Justice
John M. Harlan and the Values of Federalism, 57 VA. L. REV. 1185, 1216-17 (1971) (same).
Justice Harlan's view about "incorporation" was consonant with the Justice he replaced on
the Court, Justice Jackson, whose dissent in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 287-95 (1952)
(Jackson, J., dissenting), makes the historical case against "incorporation." See Roth, 354 U.S. at
503 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Harlan citing Jackson's Beauharnais dissent and stating his agree-
ment with Jackson's views about "incorporation"). Interestingly, early in his career on the
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In Roth and Alberts, the Court upheld the constitutionality of both
a federal obscenity statute (one criminalizing the mailing of obscene
materials) and a California obscenity statute (one criminalizing,
among other things, the writing, drawing, or distribution of obscene
materials). While Justices Douglas and Black dissented in both cases
on First Amendment grounds, Justice Harlan would have upheld the
California statute but invalidated the federal law. Starting from the
view that the Court had failed to distinguish between the different
factors "involved in the constitutional adjudication of state and fed-
eral obscenity cases,' 77 Justice Harlan concluded that a federal law
criminalizing obscenity should be given less deference than a state
law doing the same because (1) the federal interest in regulating
sexually explicit expression, based as it was on the power to "establish
Post Offices and post Roads,",178 is "attenuated," and (2) "the dangers
of federal censorship in this field are far greater than anything the
states may do.', 179 He then notes the importance of the states as "ex-
perimental social laboratories"'8 0 and concludes that "no overwhelm-
ing danger to our freedom to experiment... is likely to result from
the suppression of a borderline book in one of the States, so long
as... other States are free to experiment with the same or bolder
books."""'
Justice Stevens certainly seems to share Justice Harlan's view, at
least with respect to the greater dangers posed by federal restrictions
on expression. As Justice Stevens put it, the dangers of the federal
government imposing a "nationwide restraint"'8 2 on library Internet
Court, then Associate-Justice Rehnquist, who replaced Justice Harlan, likewise believed the First
Amendment applied less stringently on the states than the federal government. See First Nat'l
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 823 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 291 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Rehnquist served as a law clerk to Justice Jackson when the Court decided Beauharnais. See
Laura K Ray, A Law Clerk and His Justice: What William Rehnquist Did Not Learn From RobertJack-
son, 29 IND. L. REV. 535, 578 (1996) (comparing Justice Rehnquist's and Justice Jackson's ap-
proaches to the law).
... Roth, 354 U.S. at 496 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
'7' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
Roth, 354 U.S. at 505 (Harlan,J., dissenting).
180 Id.
'' Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(concluding that "it is the part of wisdom.., to leave room for [state] experimentation [in
regulation of obscenity], which indeed is the underlying genius of our federal system");
Randolph Stuart Sergent, The "Hamlet" Fallacy: Computer Networks and the Geographic Roots of Ob-
scenity Regulation, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 671, 696 (1996). Sergent noted thatJustice Harlan
relied heavily on the assumption that the consequences of one state's suppression of
sexual speech would be small enough that no great harm to freedom of speech in gen-
eral could result from balancing the state's interest in the moral welfare of its citizens
against the right of individual citizens to engage in sexually oriented speech.
Id.
L ALA 1, 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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access are greater than when a single library filters because federal
regulation "does not permit any experimentation." 18 3 In short, Justice
Stevens's First Amendment analysis can be seen as embracing the
principles of federalism. 1
8 4
2. Unconstitutional Conditions Analysis
In addition to the direct First Amendment claim under the South
Dakota v. Dole "independent constitutional bar" rule, the challengers
also argued that CIPA violated the "unconstitutional conditions" doc-
trine. The "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine "holds that the
government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that in-
fringes his constitutionally protected.., freedom of speech even if he
has no entitlement to that benefit.' '1 5 Notice how the "unconstitu-
tional conditions" doctrine contrasts with the "independent constitu-
tional bar" rule. The relationship that the "unconstitutional condi-
tions" doctrine probes is the relationship between the government
funder and the recipient of the funds, and it assumes that the recipi-
ent of funds has constitutional rights that he, she, or it must relin-
quish in order to receive those funds. So, while the Dole "independ-
ent constitutional bar" rule analysis discussed in the previous section
requires that we forget about the relationship between the federal
and state governments (i.e., the local libraries) and focus entirely on
whether the local libraries are violating the Constitution, the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" analysis focuses on the relationship between
the government and the recipient of the funds and asks us to forget
that, here, the recipient is a public library, an arm of a local, and thus
state, government.
'" Id. at 223 (Stevens, J., dissenting). It is worth noting, at this point, that under Salerno v.
United States, 481 U.S. 739 (1987), the facial challenge required the plaintiffs to show that no
library could comply with CIPA's conditions in a constitutional manner. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745
("A facial challenge to a legislative Act is, of course, the most difficult challenge to mount suc-
cessfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid."). See ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 401, 451 (citing Salerno); see also ALA II, 539
U.S. at 202-03 (discussing the district court's interpretation of Salerno); id. at 2309-10 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (same). It was under that standard that the district court held, and that
Justice Souter would have held, CIPA unconstitutional.
184 Cf Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 591-92 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority opinion invalidating a state open primary law under the First
Amendment and noting that under "principles of federalism," the Court should have "re-
spect[ed] the policy choice made by the State's voters"); see also Gregory P. Magarian, Toward
Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REv. 1219, 1256-57 (2001) (noting Stevens's
invocation of federalism principles in First Amendment determinations).
185 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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At the end of its opinion, the district court turned to the "uncon-
stitutional conditions" argument in a four-page footnote.'8 6  The
court explicitly addressed the question of whether libraries, as mu-
nicipal entities, could claim First Amendment rights. Most courts
that have addressed the issue have concluded that municipal entities
do not have First Amendment rights.1s7 In so holding, these courts
have relied largely on a comment made by Justice Stewart in his con-
currence in Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Commit-
tee, 8 8 that " [t] he First Amendment protects the press from governmen-
tal interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
Government."'8 9 These cases, however, focus primarily on whether a
municipal entity has rights against its own state, and as Judge Posner
once put it, there might be good reasons to create a distinction be-
tween a municipal entity claiming rights against "the state of which it
is the creature" and its doing so against "the federal government or
another state."9 °
Surveying the case law, the district court concluded that "the no-
tion that public libraries may assert First Amendment rights for the
purpose of making an unconstitutional conditions claim is clearly
plausible, and may well be correct."'' Even if public libraries did not
ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 490-94 n.36.
m See David Fagundes, Does the First Amendment Protect Government Speech? 3 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[T]he majority of courts have embraced ...
'the well-settled principle of law that the First Amendment protects only citizens' speech rights
from government regulation, and does not apply to government speech itself.'" (quoting Sons
of Confed. Veterans, Inc. v. Holcomb, 129 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944-45 (W.D. Va. 2001))).
412 U.S. 94 (1973).
Id. at 139 (Stewart, J., concurring). CBS v. DNC involved a group called Business Execu-
tives' Move for Vietnam Peace, which had filed a complaint with the FCC. The group argued
that a radio station had violated the First Amendment because it had refused one of the group's
paid editorials under a blanket policy of refusing to accept editorial advertisements. This por-
tion of Justice Stewart's concurrence focused on the question of state action, and he concluded
that the radio station is not a state actor for purposes of the First Amendment. Id. His com-
ment about government not having First Amendment rights was made in response to the dis-
sent, which would have held the broadcasters to be state actors because they had been granted
government (i.e., FCC) licenses to broadcast. After noting that the First Amendment confers
no protection for the government, he immediately thereafter states, "To hold that broadcaster
action is governmental action would thus simply strip broadcasters of their own First Amend-
ment rights," an untenable result. Id. His point, then, was made in a completely different con-
text from that in which it has subsequently been used. As a side point, it is worth noting that
policies similar to that at issue in CBS v. DNC continue to create controversy even today. See,
e.g., Eli Pariser, One Thing That Won't Be Tackled on Sunday: Issues, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2004, at
B15 (describing CBS's refusal to air MoveOn.org advertisement about the budget deficit during
the Super Bowl due to "controversial public policy issues").
'9 ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d at 492 n.36 (quoting Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186,
193 (7th Cir. 1996)).
'0' Id. Again, though, what neither the district court nor Judge Posner in Creek did, was to
point out that there is also a federalism issue when either a municipality or a state seeks to assert
First Amendment rights against the federal government.
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have First Amendment rights, the court continued, "they could rely
on their patrons' rights, even though their patrons are not the ones
who are directly receiving the federal funding."'' 2  As the court rec-
ognized, this last point is analytically a little odd because it brings into
the equation the patrons who are, of course, not receiving any funds;
however, incorporating the patrons' First Amendment rights nicely
brings into the equation at least one important component of the
First Amendment question that would otherwise have been missing in
the unconstitutional conditions analysis: the relationship between
the library and its patrons.1 , 3 In any event, the court concluded that it
was at least "plausible" that the "unconstitutional conditions" doc-
trine could apply to CIPA.
Assuming that the libraries did have the right to make an uncon-
stitutional conditions claim, the court then analyzed the statute un-
der the relevant doctrine. Because the court had already held that
the law violated Dole's independent constitutional bar rule, it did not
actually decide the unconstitutional conditions issue, instead simply
concluding that the "plaintiffs have a good argument" that they
would prevail . In so concluding, the district court focused on "the
role that public libraries have traditionally served in maintaining First
Amendment values,'0"5 drawing particularly on Legal Services Corpora-
tion v. Velazquez.' 9'
In Velazquez, the Supreme Court invalidated a law that provided
Legal Services Corporation funds to lawyers on the condition that,
among other things, the lawyers refrain from all "effort[s] to amend
or otherwise challenge existing law" when representing their cli-
ents. 9 7 The Velazquez Court concluded that the government could
not condition funds in this manner. Among its rationales, the Court
noted that the condition distorted the "usual functioning" of a me-
dium of expression, in particular the legal profession and judicial sys-
tem.' Relying particularly on Velazquez's second rationale, the ALA I
court concluded:
CIPA arguably distorts the usual functioning of public libraries both by
requiring libraries to: (1) deny patrons access to constitutionally pro-
tected speech that libraries would otherwise provide to patrons; and (2)
delegate decision making to private software developers who closely
1'9 Id.
... Presumably, to the extent that speakers' fights are relevant as well, the court might also
have mentioned the rights of web site operators.
'94 ALA I, 201 F. Supp.2d at 494 n.36.
"5 Id. at 493 n.36.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
Id. at 538 (quoting Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 504(a) (16), 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996)).
1 Id. at 543.
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guard their selection criteria as trade secrets and who do not purport to
make their decisions on the basis of whether the blocked Web sites are
constitutionally protected or would add value to a public library's collec-
tion."'
When the case was appealed to the Supreme Court, only the plu-
rality and Justice Stevens addressed the unconstitutional conditions
issue.0 0 The plurality sidestepped the question of whether the librar-
ies, as government entities, could bring an unconstitutional condi-
tions claim, stating that, even if they could assert such a claim, the
claim "would fail on the merits. 2 0 ' The plurality contended that
"when the Government appropriates public funds to establish a pro-
gram it is entitled to define the limits of that program."20 2 The opin-
ion effectively renders the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine a
nullity, devolving the issue down to the mere fact that Congress is
spending money and that libraries may simply refuse the money:
CIPA does not "penalize" libraries that choose not to install [filtering]
software, or deny them the right to provide their patrons with unfiltered
Internet access. Rather, CIPA simply reflects Congress' decision not to
subsidize their doing so. To the extent that libraries wish to offer unfil-
tered access, they are free to do so without federal assistance. A refusal to
fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the impo-
sition of a 'penalty' on that activity. A legislature's decision not to subsi-
dize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right."'
The plurality appears to have been prepared to revive the principle
underlying Justice Holmes's famous statement that a policeman "may
have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitu-
tional right to be a policeman, 2 4 which the Court has explicitly re-
205jected in the modern era.
The plurality then rejected the plaintiffs' argument that Velazquez
controlled, describing Velazquez as dependent on the fact that "the
role of lawyers who represent clients in welfare disputes is to advocate
against the Government, and there was thus an assumption that coun-
sel would be free of state control. 2 6 The plurality argued that, in
contrast, "[p]ublic libraries . . . have no comparable role that pits
them against the Government. 0 7
' ALA 1, 201 F.Supp.2d at 494 n.36.
2" Justice Souter also stated that he agreed "in the main" with Justice Stevens. ALA I1, 539
U.S. 194, 230 (2003) (Souter,J., dissenting).
" Id. at 211.
Id. (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)).
Id. at 212 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
04 McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
See Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) (rejecting McAuliffe).
ALA II, 539 U.S. at 213.
W7 -J
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It is hard to deny that the ALA II plurality, all four of whom had
dissented in Velazquez, sought to narrow significantly Velazquez's cen-
tral holding. But, put that aside for a moment. Instead, let us ac-
cept the plurality's narrow reading of Velazquez. Even assuming the
plurality correctly read Velazquez, there is a good argument that it
should still have held for the plaintiffs in ALA II. One simple answer
to the plurality on this is that, in fact, libraries are, in very real ways,
"pit[ted] ... against the Government" because of their role in pro-
moting the principles of freedom of speech.2 9 While the point is not
made explicitly in terms of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine,
Justice Souter touches on this role for libraries in his dissent.1 0 A
second response, however, is that libraries are municipal entities and
thus creatures of state governments and that principles of constitu-
tional federalism are specifically designed to "pit" state governments
against the federal government to ensure liberty. I address the inter-
section of these two responses in more detail in Part III.
Finally, let me return to Justice Stevens's dissent. Justice Stevens's
approach to the unconstitutional conditions question contrasted
sharply with the plurality and goes so far as almost to conflate the dis-
tinction between a penalty and a benefit. He begins by drawing upon
the portion of the plurality's opinion that discussed the independent
constitutional bar rule, noting that "'libraries must have broad discre-
tion to decide what material to provide to their patrons.' 2 1 He then
argued that, like a university,212 "a library's exercise of judgment with
respect to its collection is entitled to First Amendment protection."
213
Thus, "[a] federal statute penalizing a library for failing to install fil-
tering software on every one of its Internet-accessible computers
.08 Cf Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitu-
tion: Culture, Courts and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 78 n.351 (citing Robert C. Post, Subsidized
Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 176-80 (1996)) (noting that the plurality's characterization of the law
as simply defining the government program "presupposes that we have already deemed the
conditions contained in CIPA to be rules that government applies to itself to define the scope
of its own programs").
"' AM. LIBRARY ASS'N, LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS (adopted June 18, 1948; amended Feb. 2,
1961, and Jan. 23, 1980; inclusion of "age" reaffirmed Jan. 23, 1996) [hereinafter LIBRARY BILL
OF RIGHTS] (listing promotion of free speech as a basic duty of libraries), available at
http://www.ala.org/ala/oif/statementspols/statementsif/librarybillrights.htm.
2', ALA II, 539 U.S. at 237-41 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the ways in which the li-
brary community has opposed government censorship throughout the twentieth century).
21 Id. at 220 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 204 (plurality opinion)).
21 Id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing for this analogy Justice Frankfurter's famous
concurrence in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in
result)).
21 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). It could be that this principle, rather than the decentraliza-
tion principles that Justice Stevens discussed in the first part of his opinion, is ultimately what
animates Justice Stevens's conclusion that local libraries must have the discretion to decide
whether to include filters as part of their Internet usage policies.
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would unquestionably violate that Amendment.21 4  Because "[a]n
abridgment of speech by means of a threatened denial of benefits can
be just as pernicious as an abridgment by means of a threatened pen-
alty," Justice Stevens concluded that CIPA was equivalent to a law that
"penaliz [ed]" libraries that refused to employ filters. 5 In response to
the plurality's contention that CIPA was simply a "decision not to sub-
sidize the exercise of a fundamental right, ' 6 Justice Stevens noted
that "CIPA requires libraries to install filtering software on every com-
puter with Internet access if the library receives any discount from the
E-rate program or any funds from the LSTA program. ''2 7 The plain-
tiffs were thus challenging a restriction "that applies to property that
they acquired without federal assistance., 21 8 I return to this point be-
low when discussing Professor Baker's theory of the spending power
because the distinction raised by Justice Stevens mirrors, to a certain
extent, Professor Baker's proposal.
Justice Stevens then turned to the Court's unconstitutional condi-
tions cases, relying on Velazquez in much the same way as the district
court.2 9 He also distinguished National Endowment for the Arts v.
Finley, a case in which the Court upheld a statute that set forth crite-
ria, including "decency" and "respect," for federal grants funding
arts. In contrast to CIPA, Justice Stevens argued, the statute at issue
in Finley did not involve the "Federal Government... seeking to im-
,,221pose restrictions on the administration of a nonfederal program.
2" Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens uses the descriptive adverb "unquestionably,"
but one might reasonably ask why this might be so. Certainly the plurality does not seem to
agree. But, what might be more interesting here is the way in which this sentence might work
just as well with the Tenth Amendment rather than the First. As I discuss below, the pen-
alty/subsidy distinction is at the heart of the constitutionality of conditional federal grants of
funds to states.
2 Id. at 227 (Stevens,J., dissenting).
2W Id. at 212 (plurality opinion) (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (quoting
Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 549 (1983))).
M Id. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f)(1) and 47 U.S.C.
§ 254(h) (6) (B), (C)).
211 Id. at 230 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 227-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Velazquez for the proposition that a "distorting
restriction must be struck down under the First Amendment").
524 U.S. 569 (1998).
2 ALA II, 539 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He also noted that Finley was not applica-
ble because the case was not a challenge to a library's decision to install filters: "If this were a
case in which library patrons had challenged a library's decision to install and use filtering soft-
ware, it would be in the same posture as Finley. Because it is not, Finley does not control this
case." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although Justice Stevens is not crystal clear here, he does
not appear to be saying that Finley is inapplicable simply because the "posture" of the challenge
to CIPA is not the same as Finley. Rather, what he appears to be saying is that Finley came out as
it did, in part, because of the need for judicial deference to the discretion that resided with the
federal "panel of experts" that decided upon the award of grants. In contrast, the discretion to
decide what is in a library's collection should belong to the library itself, not to Congress. But,
in so distinguishing Finley, what he elides is that Finley involved not simply a challenge to the
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In the most literal sense, this distinction is easy to critique. Here, the
programs being funded are the E-rate discounts and LSTA funding.
Both programs are in fact federal programs. What Justice Stevens
appears to be saying is that the "program" of relevance is the "pro-
gram" of libraries providing Internet access to their patrons. In other
words, the provider of the E-rate and LSTA funds, the federal gov-
ernment, was distinct from the ultimate administrator of the Internet
access, the local public libraries.
Because Justice Stevens focused on the role of the library and its
discretion, his result effectively splits the difference between the plu-
rality and Justice Souter. In contrast to the plurality, he would have
found the federal statute unconstitutional, and yet, in contrast to Jus-
tice Souter, he would have permitted local libraries to filter if they so
chose. Notwithstanding the doctrinal difficulties with Justice Ste-
vens's result, there is something intuitive about it, as it avoids the all-
or-nothing result of both the plurality and Justice Souter. As I argue
in the following Part, one reason why Justice Stevens's result may
have an intuitive appeal is that the principles of constitutional feder-
alism suggest that he understood aspects of the law, as a federal law,
that eluded the rest of the Court.
III. A NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM AS APPLIED
TO FILTERS IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES
In this Part, I take a step backwards and ask a broader question, in
some sense a meta-question, with respect to CIPA: within our system
of constitutional federalism, does it make sense for the decision
about installing technological protection measures (i.e., filters) in
public libraries to be made at the federal level? CIPA is a federal
statute and the First Amendment is of course part of the Federal
Constitution. Thus, as different as they are, the plaintiffs' position
(as embodied largely in the district court's decision and Justice
Souter's dissent) and the United States' defense of the statute have
one important thing in common: they each result in a national deci-
sion, made at the national level. I will argue, in contrast, that the de-
cision as to whether to install filters in any particular library should
not be made at the federal level. I am not making a doctrinal claim
here, but the implication of my conclusion in this Part is that there
are good reasons to support Justice Stevens's "compromise" result,
experts' discretion, but a challenge to congressional constraints on that discretion. That is pre-
cisely the same in ALA. The difference, however, as he alluded to earlier, is that the "panel of
experts" that had the discretion was a federal panel administering a federal grant program,
whereas libraries are local government agencies.
Sept. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
which would have invalidated CIPA while permitting those local li-
braries that install filters to continue doing so.
As I outline the various rationales in favor of federalism, let me be
clear about what I am taking as a starting assumption. First, I am not
questioning the value of federalism in general. Moreover, I am ac-
cepting the appropriateness of using the principles of constitutional
federalism, rather than what Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley refer to as6 . .. .122
administrative decentralization," to enforce those values. In a re-
lated vein, I am also accepting, for purposes of this Article, the idea
that states, rather than local governments, should be the place to op-
erationalize the values of federalism.222 If this is not the case, how-
ever, the fact that public libraries are local, rather than state, entities
would strengthen the arguments in favor of the federalism values in
this context. 24  I am also not questioning the underlying idea that
some role for judicial enforcement of federalism principles is appro-
225priate. Finally, in this Part, I am not making an argument about
M Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA
L. REV. 903 (1994). This recent scholarship harkens back to what Karl Llewellyn argued seventy
years ago. See Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 38 (1934)
(noting that state lines do not correspond to the place where divisions of authority should be
drawn). But see DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 122-23 (1995) (noting the ab-
sence of a "clean slate" and thus the need to understand principles within the context of the
history of American federalism); Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58
U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 488-89 (1991) (noting that the argument that tyranny prevention in favor
of federalism cannot be solved by "decentralization," as it requires there to be a separate locus
of governmental power); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 381-83
(1997) (arguing that "[t] here are some very real difficulties with the argument advanced in Na-
tional Neurosis"); Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism
After Garcia, 1985 Sup. CT. REV. 341, 388-91 (1985) (noting that only federalism, rather than
administrative decentralization, can effect the anti-tyranny rationale of federalism).
.. See Richard Briffault, "What About the 'Ism'?" Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1305 (1994) (noting that "the values said to be advanced by
federalism ... may be served better by local governments than by states").
12 Let me emphasize this point. I do not mean to elide this important distinction between
local control and state control. I agree with Briffault that many of the arguments for federalism
are rooted in principles that are better promoted by local governments than state governments.
However, with respect to CIPA, I can fully accept these criticisms and simultaneously apply fed-
eralism principles because the governmental objects I would here protect from federal control
are in fact local, not state, entities.
225 This is, of course, hotly contested. See generally Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that judicial
enforcement of federalism is particularly unnecessary today because political parties can protect
federalism); Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (arguing that
aggressive judicial intervention to protect states from Congress is unnecessary). Jesse Choper
has also written on a related issue, arguing that the courts should preserve their political capital
for individual rights cases by rendering structural issues, including federalism, nonjusticiable.
SeeJESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 193-205 (1980). But see Steven G.
Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez,
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any specific provisions of the Constitution: CIPA was clearly an exer-
cise of the spending power, and Parts IV and V will explore spending
power doctrine and the impact that changes in that doctrine might
have on the constitutionality of CIPA. Rather, at this point, I am sim-
ply attempting to apply the values of federalism in the context of the
issue of filters in public libraries. My argument here focuses entirely
on the functional aspects, or "consequentialist values,""22 of constitu-
tional federalism, not the specific ways in which to operationalize
those principles through doctrine.
In short, for purposes of this Part, I am agnostic on a large num-
ber of important issues. My goal here is simply to articulate the val-
ues that underpin constitutional federalism and to make the case that
those values ought to have played a part in the broader issue of the
constitutionality of a federal law regulating Internet access in public
libraries, assuming a role for judicial enforcement of federalism prin-
ciples and a connection between enforcement of those values and the
values themselves.
For the moment, I will also ignore the spending power issues and
thus treat the law at issue as what I will call "Regulatory CIPA," a hy-
94 MICH. L. REV. 752 (1995) (arguing that the courts are as needed in federalism cases as in
cases involving the Bill of Rights); but cf Bradford R. Clark, The Supremacy Clause as a Constraint
on Federal Power, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 91 (2003) (responding to Choper and Kramer by argu-
ing that express authority to invalidate federal statutes is found in Supremacy Clause). Ilya
Somin has argued that judicial intervention is particularly appropriate in the context of condi-
tional grants to states. See Ilya Somin, Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial
Restriction of Federal Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461, 495-97 (2002). I do briefly
discuss judicial enforcement in the context of promoting political accountability. See infra text
accompanying notes 252-55 (describing political accountability rationale as a rationale forjudi-
cial enforcement of federalism).
Ultimately, the broader question of which branch of government should appropriately in-
corporate the federalism concerns I raise in this Part may well be the deepest, most difficult,
and most important of all. See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 158-59 (1994) (introducing
the question of whether the judiciary or the legislature should be deciding federalism ques-
tions). I am, thus, purposely avoiding the broader question of the Court's role in the American
constitutional scheme, a difficult and thorny question. Robert Post and Reva Siegel have ar-
gued, for example, that the Court's recent approach to constitutional adjudication, particularly
in cases involving the scope of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, demonstrates a fun-
damental misconception of the Court's historical and appropriate role in American society. See
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Protecting the Constitution from the People: Juricentric Restrictions on
Section Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
Although I am thus assuming here a role for the judiciary, one approach to answering the
preliminary question of the appropriateness of that role is to engage in comparative institu-
tional analysis. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES 232-70 (1994) (discuss-
ing comparative institutional analysis as it applies to judicial review in general); id. at 230 n.64
(describing JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980), as
an example of institutional analysis that argues that the Supreme Court should focus primarily
on individual rights and let the political process resolve federalism issues).
26 Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers
to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1074 (1995).
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pothetical federal law that mandates that local public libraries install
filters on their Internet access, rather than one that conditions funds
217on so doing. While at first blush this might seem problematic, re-
call that the analyses adopted by both the ALA // plurality and Justice
Souter's dissent, premised as they were on the South Dakota v. Dole
"independent constitutional bar" rule, effectively treat the law as
though it is a mandate, ignoring the fact that it is a conditional fund-
ing law. Doctrinally, as I explained above, there is nothing wrong
with this. The "independent constitutional bar" rule effectively de-
mands that a court ignore the fact that the law is an exercise of the
spending power. For this reason, it makes sense for me to do the
same thing for this Part, notwithstanding the fact that I will spend a
great deal of time discussing the spending power issues in Parts IV
and V.
228
A. The Values of Federalism
The benefits of constitutional federalism can be divided into two
broad categories:2 (1) horizontal rationales, those that derive from
the fact of a multiplicity of parallel jurisdictions (i.e., the fact that
there are a number of different states) and, in a related vein, the fact
that individual units of government are thus smaller; 20 and (2) verti-
cal rationales, those that derive from the fact that each individual is
17 Or, at least, it should seem problematic if one does not adhere to the strong Madisonian
view of the spending power. See infra text accompanying note 328 (describing Madison's view
that all federal spending should be tied to a separate enumerated power).
.. To be sure, the "independent constitutional bar" rule focuses on the relationship between
the local library and the public, and my discussion of Regulatory CIPA below focuses instead on
the federal government. By focusing on the relationship between the local library and the pub-
lic, however, the "independent constitutional bar" rule analysis effectively conflates the federal
and local governments. So, this distinction should not undermine my assumption.
See Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard ofJudicial Review,
51 DuKE LJ. 75, 106-07 (2001) (describing "vertical" and "horizontal" concerns); see also Brif-
fault, supra note 223, at 1313-14 (describing the "virtues" of federalism). I use the term "verti-
cal" in the way Baker and Young do, notwithstanding the fact that, in a theoretical sense, consti-
tutional federalism presumes the federal and state governments to be, in the words of Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991), "coordinate," rather than the state government to be subor-
dinate to the federal. See Briffault, supra note 223, at 1308 (citing Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458, for
the theory that "federal and state governments are on the same plane"). As Richard Briffault
has put it, "[a] true federalist would, of course, deny that the federal-state relationship is a verti-
cal one at all" because there is no hierarchy between the federal and state governments. Id. at
1313 n.36 (citing DANIELJ. ELAZAR, EXPLORING FEDERALISM 34-38 (1987)).
mO See Briffault, supra note 223, at 1312 ("Underlying the claim that federalism will pro-
mote... political benefits... are assumptions concerning the small size of the states, relative to
the nation, and the fact that the existence of states creates multiple centers of political power
within the federal system.").
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subject to two different levels of governing authority (the federal and
the state).23'
In the "horizontal" rationale category, federalism is perhaps most
often justified in terms of geographic diversity. As Justice O'Connor
put it in Gregory v. Ashcroft, federalism "assures a decentralized gov-
ernment that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a hetero-
geneous society. , 23 2 This rationale has both a static and a dynamic
211version. Under the static version of this argument, geographic di-
versity is valued for its own sake because it allows different communi-
ties to choose different modes of governance and different substan-
tive legal rules that reflect the diversity of citizen preferences, needs,
or interests. Geographic constraints might, in some circumstances,
also necessitate geographic diversity. For example, driving ninety
miles per hour on 1-90 in South Dakota might not be particularly
dangerous, but doing so on the same highway between downtown
Chicago and O'Hare Airport or between Boston and Newton, Massa-
chusetts might be. Different jurisdictions might thus reasonably
choose different speed limits on account of geographic differences.
Dissimilar communities might also have different moral or ethical
norms, what Susan Klein has referred to as "independent-norm fed-
eralism, ',234 norms that affect government 3policy. For example, Min-
nesota might wish to prohibit fornication, whereas Tennessee might
"' See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) ("It was the genius of [the Framers'] idea that our citizens would have two political capaci-
ties, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.").
12 501 U.S. at 458; see also Friedman, supra note 222, at 401-02 (noting that "federalism en-
hances our lives by preserving and creating diversity"); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 222 (2000) (explaining that de-
centralized decision making promotes political and cultural diversity); Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1493-94 (1987) (reviewing
RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (same); Deborah Jones Merritt,
The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8-9
(1988) (same).
233 Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and
Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 78 (1998) (defining and describing "static" and "dynamic" ver-
sions of the geographic diversity rationale).
231 Susan R. Klein, Independent-Norm Federalism in Criminal Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1541, 1542
(2002) (describing independent-norm federalism as "foster[ing] a community's expression of
morality," even where "a state's norm is independent of the federal norm").
235 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2003) (stating that "[w]hen any man and single
woman have sexual intercourse with each other, each is guilty of fornication, which is a misde-
meanor"); see also Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990) (upholding landlord's right to
refuse to rent to an unmarried couple because the couple intended to violate the fornication
statute). Of course, in light of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which held that a state
statute criminalizing sodomy was unconstitutional, fornication laws might be held unconstitu-
tional.
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not.23 6 I turn to this issue shortly, as it undergirds my discussion of
the issue of filters in public libraries.
The "geographic diversity" argument is usually put forth in its dy-
namic form, relying on the presumed right and ability of citizens to
"vote with their feet. 2 3 ' Drawing on the highly developed (and ar-
guably somewhat overstated) interpretation of Charles Tiebout's fa-
mous theory of interjurisdictional competition, 8 the argument is that
the presence of a multiplicity of jurisdictions will promote competi-
tion among governments for citizens and corporations (and their re-
lated tax dollars), thereby maximizing choice and utility for everyone
and resulting in an aggregate increase in social welfare.
See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 101
(1996) (noting that Tennessee has no statute prohibiting fornication).
211 See William Van Alstyne, Federalism, Congress, the States and the Tenth Amendment: Adrift in the
Cellophane Sea,. 1987 DUKE L.J. 769, 777 (noting the "constraints imposed as an incident of fed-
eralism itself, namely that people can and will move, enter, or exit, if suitably attracted or re-
pelled, as each state has reason to bear in mind"); see also THOMAS R. DYE, AMERICAN FEDERALISM:
COMPETITION AMONG GOVERNMENTS (1990) (arguing that competitive federalism better reflects
the Founders' original intent); Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the Commerce Clause
After Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 843, 847 (2000) ("State governments seek to attract
households and businesses by enacting competitive policies; this jurisdictional competition
produces overall efficiency for the nation in the long run, much in the way a market forces cor-
porations to adopt efficient business practices, which leads to overall increases in consumer wel-
fare."); Richard A. Epstein, Exit ights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147 (1992)
(focusing on the individual's right to move to a different state as a strategy to counter govern-
ment abuse); Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the Future, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1574 (1994) (discussing the value of state governments in providing choice
of living conditions); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 222, at 918 n.62 (citing economic literature
that argues that people can choose where to live based on government services and costs). But
see SHAPIRO, supra note 222, at 35-43, 81-82 (noting barriers to individuals' mobility, and ex-
ternalities that cannot be compensated with a free market system); Richard Briffault, Our Local-
ism: Part lI-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 415-25 (1990) (arguing that de-
centralized power is meant to advance local decision making, not to facilitate movement
between local governments); Rubin & Feeley, supra note 222, at 922-23, 944-50 (discussing the
lack of regional variety in the United States). See generally Symposium, The Allocation of Govern-
ment Authority, 83 VA. L. REV. 1275 (1997) (offering four papers addressing the economic analy-
sis of federalism). The notion that citizens can move unencumbered from one state to another
is also embodied in the constitutional right-to-travel cases such as Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (holding unconstitutional a state statutory provision denying welfare to state resi-
dents based on their not having resided in one state for long enough), and Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489 (1999) (holding unconstitutional a durational residency requirement for receipt of
TANF benefits).
See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (ar-
guing that local governments compete for "voter-consumers"); see also supra Part V.A.I.a (dis-
cussing Baker's reliance on Tiebout's theory in articulating her proposed changes to spending
power doctrine). One contemporary example suggesting the possibility that Tiebout's theory
might well play out at the state level is the Free State Project, a movement of libertarians to re-
cruit like-minded individuals to New Hampshire in order to help effect libertarian-leaning po-
litical change. See Pam Belluck, Libertarians Pursue New Political Goal: State of Their Own, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 27, 2003, at Al (reporting on Free State Project).
29 Tiebout's theory rests on the view that "the consumer-voter moves to that community
whose local government best satisfies [that consumer-voter's] set of preferences." Tiebout, su-
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A second "horizontal" rationale for federalism derives from the
benefits that inhere in "experimentation.,140  As Justice Brandeis fa-
mously put it in his dissent in New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, "[i]t is one
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel so-
cial and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the coun-
try. 2 41 Under this rationale, individual states can try different solu-
tions to policy problems, and a comparative analysis can assist in
determining how a particular policy problem can best be solved. The
overall benefit to the national community is made even more signifi-
cant, moreover, because the costs of failure will be limited to a par-
pra note 238, at 418. Tiebout himself saw the theory as applicable primarily to local govern-
ments, but noted that the argument "also applies, with less force, to state governments." Id. But
cf. Frank B. Cross, The Folly of Federalism, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 22 (2002) (arguing that Tiebout
"never suggested that his model supported state-level government"). Many of the assumptions
necessary to realize Tiebout's model have been empirically tested and challenged. See Tiebout,
supra note 238, at 423 (urging the checking of his assumptions). See generally Vicki Been, "Exit"
as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 473, 514-18 (1991) (discussing and collecting variety of sources that offer evi-
dence that local jurisdictions compete for residents, while recognizing that the evidence may
not prove that the competition promotes efficiency); William E. Oates, On Local Finance and the
Tiebout Mode 71 AM. ECON. REv. 93, 93 (1981) (referring to Tiebout's assumptions as "so pat-
ently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous"). Notwithstanding these criticisms of Tiebout's
model, "Tiebout's core observation-that local jurisdictions compete for residents-enjoys wide
acceptance." Been, supra at 517.
210 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("[T]he federalist structure ofjoint sov-
ereigns.., allows for more innovation and experimentation in government."); SHAPIRO, supra
note 237, at 87-90, 138-39; see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV.
499, 528-30 (1995) (describing the promotion of the experimentation argument in support of
federalism); Charles Fried, Federalism-Why Should We Care?, 6 HARv.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (1982)
(discussing the positive and negative aspects of using states for experimentation); Lewis B.
Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 847, 853-55
(1979) (offering examples of state experimentation); McConnell, supra note 232, at 1498
("Elementary statistical theory holds that a greater number of independent observations will
produce more instances of deviation from the mean. If innovation is desirable, it follows that
decentralization is desirable."); Merritt, supra note 237, at 1575 ("[S] tates offer the laboratories
for social experimentation immortalized by Justice Brandeis's quotable words."). But cf Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD.
593, 593-94 (1980) (arguing that "[iun a multiple government system the overall incentive to
take risks is reduced if [a] politician hopes to free ride on the activities of other governments").
2 4 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also
id. ("There must be power in the states and the nation to remould, through experimentation,
our economic practices and institutions to meet changing social and economic needs."). New
State Ice invalidated, on substantive due process grounds, a law that both required a license to
sell ice and required the denial of such licenses once the relevant government commission de-
termined that the public's need for ice had been met. The case thus did not explicitly involve
judicial enforcement of federalism principles, but Justice Brandeis's language has taken on a
life of its own and is now used to support the "experimentation" rationale of federalism. See,
e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Brandeis's New State Ice dissent for an "experimentation" rationale).
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ticular region, while the benefits of success can be spread throughout
the country.
Like the "geographic diversity" rationale, the experimenta-
tion/innovation rationale for federalism has a dynamic version, again
premised on the right and ability of individuals to emigrate. If some
states create better policy, those "states will induce immigration (with
concomitant benefits, such as tax dollars) by the residents or firms of
less successful states. 243 These first two rationales (diversity and ex-
perimentation/innovation), at least in their dynamic form, are prem-
ised largely on the competitive benefits to be gained by a multiplicity
of parallel jurisdictions.
A third "horizontal" rationale, derived from the smaller size of the
governmental unit, rather than the fact of a multiplicity of jurisdic-
tions, is that federalism is said to facilitate the conditions necessary
for a more just society. As Michael McConnell has put it, "the natural
sentiment of benevolence, which lies at the heart of public spirited-
ness, is weaker as the distance grows between the individual and the
objects of benevolence., 244 Whether towards the end of republican
virtue245 or some other goal,246 a smaller political unit fosters a sense of
community.
2'2 In some sense, this rationale depends on exactly the opposite factual presumption that
the "geographic diversity" argument depends upon. For an "experiment" in one state to be
most helpful for understanding the implications of applying the policy elsewhere, there must be
some relevant similarity of conditions. Whether federalism is any better at furthering the goal
of "experimentation" than, say, an international comparative analysis of policy problems seems
to be premised on the basic similarities of the states. It requires a presumption that Minne-
sota's "experiment" will be more helpful to the analysis than Canada's because Minnesota's ex-
perience with a particular policy is a better indication of how such a policy would work in, say,
Wisconsin, or even the United States overall.
243 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 233, at 79; see also Rubin & Feeley, supra note 222, at 920-21
nn.68-69 (citing sources for and against the view that interstate competition is beneficial).
24 McConnell, supra note 232, at 1510 (citing ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (D.D. Rapheal & A. L. Macfie eds., 1976)). To be fair, I wonder whether "benevo-
lence" is helpful to the decentralization argument at all when it is the state versus federal gov-
ernment at issue. I would guess that, in this day and age, most citizens of the United States find
their benevolence running towards the nation before it runs to the state, though, of course, it
might be more likely to run towards a local unit. Moreover, I would think that this statement is
more likely to be true if the word "distance" is not limited to geographical distance, but refers
more to those personal connections that make up the various concentric rings of intimacy that
describe most people's lives. See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 222, at 944-45, 948 (noting that
state lines do not coincide with group affiliations that people relate to, e.g., local, such as family
and neighborhood, or trans-state, such as race, religion, and ethnicity). But see SHAPIRO, supra
note 222, at 123-24 (arguing that existing state boundaries should be respected because they
"represent the accumulated efforts and wisdom of generations of our predecessors"); Mark C.
Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar flaws: Constructing A New Approach to Federalism in Congress
and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 187, 217-18 (1996) (arguing that there are benefits from
states' lack of cohesiveness).
.. See McConnell, supra note 232, at 1510 (discussing how the federal government is too dis-
tant to foster a sense of community and "republican virtue").
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A related rationale, also dependent upon the small size of the po-
litical unit, is the increased opportunities for political participation
federalism is said to promote. When the political unit is smaller, it
enables the exchange of information and ideas and, hence, the de-
liberation necessary for increased political participation by citizens. 4 8
This "political participation" argument can be made in terms of
both the "horizontal" and the "vertical" nature of federalism; it can
be based not only on the smaller political units that a decentralized
system provides, but also on the fact that in a federal system, each in-
dividual is a member of two separate polities, the state and the na-
tional. As Richard Briffault has put it, "With two governments, there
are more offices to run for and more candidates to campaign for,
contribute to, and vote for than would be the case if there were only
one government, thus multiplying the opportunities for citizen par-
ticipation. 2 49  Promoting political participation would, thus, fall un-
der both a "horizontal" and a "vertical" rationale for federalism.
Finally, in the "vertical" category, I put what might be described as
"tyranny prevention." As the Court put it in New York v. United States,
2,6 In a slightly different vein, Mark Tushnet argues that even though he believes that it is
difficult to sustain a federalist system over the long term, the gradual process of moving from a
federalist system to a centralized one could effect a Rawlsian, morally pluralist society. See Mark
Tushnet, Federalism and Liberalism, 4 CARDOZOJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 329, 343-44 (1996).
247 See Merritt, supra note 237, at 1574 ("[S] tate governments help diversify participants in the
political process."); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 789-90
(1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that
federalism increases citizen participation in government); SHAPIRO, supra note 222, at 139
("[Sitate courts and other state institutions may serve as effective participants in a dialogue
about the best and most effective means of protecting federal rights."); Friedman, supra note
222, at 389-94 (discussing the significance of citizen participation in federalism); Vicki C. Jack-
son, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2221
(1998) (same); McConnell, supra note 232, at 1507-11 (same); Meritt, The Guarantee Clause,
supra note 232, at 7-8 (same). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1425 (1987) (discussing citizens' role in government in the context of challenging
government sovereignty); S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71
B.U.L. REV. 685, 701-14 (1991) (arguing in favor of a "republican" theory of federalism).
248 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (noting that federalism "makes govern-
ment more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry"); Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause, supra note 232, at 9-10 ("State and local governments increase the opportuni-
ties for citizens to participate actively in the democratic process . ... "). But see Gregory P. Ma-
garian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219, 1238 (2001) (reject-
ing the notion that states are somehow "closer" to the citizenry).
A related advantage of this "political participation" argument is the increased compliance
with the law that might accompany lawmaking at a local level. As Cass Sunstein has put it, peo-
ple are especially likely to "comply with law that has been enacted at the most local level [be-
cause if] the law comes from your neighbors or from people in your town, you are more likely
to think that the law reflects the views of those you care about." CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY
SOCIETIEs NEED DISSENT 42 (2003).
249 Briffault, supra note 223, at 1313. See also Magarian, supra note 248, at 1237 (noting that
states serve the "participation value" by "replicating and multiplying the opportunities the fed-
eral government provides for political participation").
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"[fl ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the dif-
fusion of sovereign power .... [A] healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny
and abuse from either front."'25 The United States constitutional sys-
tem divides powers, both through separation-of-powers principles and
federalism principles. Like separation-of-powers principles, then, de-
centralization furthers the ultimate goal of individual liberty.25'
Related to the anti-tyranny rationale is the political accountability
rationale that underpins the anti-commandeering cases, Printz v.
United States,25 2 and New York v. United States.2 5S I view this primarily as
505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Greg-
ory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist sys-
tem is a check on abuses of government power."); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921
(1997) ("This separation of [the state and federal] spheres is one of the Constitution's struc-
tural protections of liberty."); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (noting that federalism
and separation of power work together as a "double security" for "the rights of the people");
Akhil Reed Amar, Some New World Lessons for the Old World, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 483, 497-503
(1991) (arguing that the best rationalization of federalism is protection from tyranny); Amar,
supra note 247, at 1513-17 (discussing the possibility that states can prevent federal tyranny by
enacting state versions of 42 USC § 1983 to target unconstitutional federal action); Amar, supra
note 247, at 1448-51 (arguing that dividing government powers gives the people more control);
Friedman, supra note 222, at 402-04 (arguing that "diffusing power" protects liberty); Jackson,
supra note 247, at 2219 n.178 (1998) (citing Steven G. Calabresi, "A Government of Limited and
Enumerated Powers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 787 (1995))
("The existence of governments not controlled by the central government can help overcome
collective action barriers to organized resistance against national abuse."); Kramer, supra note
247, at 1488 n.5 (noting that, in a federal system, "officials of the subordinate units are not ap-
pointed, and cannot be fired by an official of the central government"); Merritt, supra note 237,
at 1573-74 (discussing the values of "autonomous state governments"); Rapaczynski, supra note
222, at 380-95 (discussing "tyranny prevention" as a value of federalism); cf SHAPIRO, supra
note 237, at 115 (discussing the value of separate states because they "have the political capacity
to function as alternative sources of authority and to resist incursion from without"); Stephen
Gardbaum, Rethinking Constitutional Federalism, 74 TEX. L. REV. 795, 798 (1996) (discussing the
nature of constitutional constraints); Rex E. Lee, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Legacy of
Garcia, 1996 BYU L. REV. 329, 330 (1996) ("[T]he constitutional division of authority can right-
fully claim to protect the governed from governmental overreaching and arbitrariness."); John
C. Yoo, TheJudicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1313 (1997) (noting that the
Framers set up states as "primary defenders of individual rights"). But see, e.g., Magarian, supra
note 248, at 1239 (arguing that existence of private concentrations of wealth is a greater threat
to liberty, that only political institutions, including state governments, can check such power,
and that "this insight... debunks the truism that the libertarian value of states depends on
their opposition to the federal government").
25' In a related vein, having multiple layers of government to which a citizen may appeal can
also increase liberty. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 538
(1995) ("A key advantage of having multiple levels of government is the availability of alterna-
tive actors to solve important problems."); Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Toler-
ance Reconsidered, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77, 96-99 (Mark Tushnet ed.,
1990).
M 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding a law requiring background checks on prospective handgun
buyers to be unconstitutional because the law commandeered state officers to execute federal
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a rationale for the judicial enforcement of federalism rather than as a
rationale for federalism itself. The basic idea is, as Larry Lessig has
succinctly put it, that "[i]ndirection misdirects responsibility. 2 , In
circumstances in which federal law requires state government officials
to enforce a federal constraint, the federal government "muddies the
responsibility for that constraint and so undermines political ac-
countability. If transparency is a value in constitutional government,
indirection is its enemy.
Now, it is all well and good to articulate the benefits of federalism,
but of course decentralized power also has costs, and it is important
to consider these as well. Otherwise, the ledger seems woefully in-
complete when attempting to assess the role that applying federalism
principles might have on social welfare. For purposes of this Part, I
am ignoring specific doctrinal or historical arguments in favor of a
strong central government and am focused primarily on the func-
tional arguments that might counter the federalism benefits I have
just raised.
First, and probably foremost, is the argument that permitting
states to regulate in certain ways can impose significant negative ex-
ternalities on the rest of the country.156 Environmental regulation will
perhaps come first to mind as the quintessential example of this
problem."7 One state may try to attract a particular business (with,
say, looser environmental regulations), deciding that the benefits to it
2"3 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding the "take title" provisions of the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Act unconstitutional because the law was viewed as giving state governments a "choice"
between two options: (1) a forced transfer of the waste (along with the accompanying liability),
and (2) a mandate to regulate the disposal of the waste according to the instructions of Con-
gress, neither of which Congress could independently mandate). Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 527-30 (2001) (Kennedy, J., concurring) also sounds the
theme of political accountability. In Gralike, the Court struck down a provision in the Missouri
Constitution that would have required ballots in federal elections to state explicitly when a fed-
eral candidate opposed term limits. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy noted, "[i]f state en-
actments were allowed to condition or control certain actions of federal legislators, accountabil-
ity would be blurred." Id. at 528 (Kennedy, J., concurring). In contrast to New York and Printz,
Gralike involved the state rather than the federal government acting in a way that arguably un-
dermined political accountability, but the basic idea is the same: citizens need to know which
government is responsible for what, and neither government (i.e., neither the state, nor the
federal government) can interfere with a citizen's direct relationship with the other govern-
ment, as this would undermine political accountability.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 96 (1999).
55 Id.; see also Magarian, supra note 248, at 1225 n.30 (noting that anti-commandeering cases
rely on this rationale, and citing case law and scholarly commentary both for and against the
rationale); cf Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557 (2000) (arguing
that cooperative federalism programs undermine accountability).
2 SHAPIRO, supra note 222, at 39-41.
117 Tushnet, supra note 246, at 332 (noting that "[s]ome obvious examples of spill-overs be-
tween two or more subnational units are the economic spill-overs that characterize many envi-
ronmental issues").
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outweigh the costs. And, yet, the environmental damage from the
business might well be felt in other states (for example, downstream
or downwind). Without national coordination (and thus, the argu-
ment goes, without national power), there is little to stop states from
causing such externalities. Conversely, environmental clean-up may
be expensive, and, though its full benefits might exceed its costs,
many of those benefits might be felt beyond a particular state's
boundaries. In such a circumstance, no single state will find its over-
all welfare increased by engaging in the clean-up, but a national re-
sponse spreading the costs could result in an aggregate increase in• 258
social welfare.
A similar argument is based on the fear that the interstate compe-
tition for which federalism is so glorified 259 will lead to a "race to the
bottom. ''260  The argument here is that, regardless of whether a par-
ticular policy might result in negative externalities, when a state com-
petes to attract businesses, it might rationally decide that its overall
welfare will increase if it reduces its regulatory standards (again, envi-
ronmental regulation might be a good example). Yet, because other
states might likewise decide to relax those same standards, overall
welfare might drop: both states will reduce their standards on the
same rationale, but only one will gain the benefits. In contrast, na-
tional standards that preempt such competition may be able to pre-
vent this "race to the bottom.
2 61
Third, federalism can lead to inefficiencies, particularly in this day
and age in which individuals and businesses engage in multijurisdic-
tional activities. One example might be sales taxes. Because much of
what states might wish to tax involves cross-border transactions, states
258 See generally Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating
State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211-19 (1977) (discuss-
ing rationales for centralization, including the tragedy of the commons, national economies of
scale, disparities in effective representation, and spillovers).
2 59 See supra text accompanying notes 237-39 (describing Tiebout's argument that interjuris-
dictional competition will result in an aggregate increase in social welfare).
2W See generally Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210-11 n.1 (1992)
(discussing the "race-to-the-bottom" arguments for federal environmental regulation and listing
literature addressing this issue); see also McConnell, supra note 232, at 1494-98 (referring to the
race-to-the-bottom as the "destructive competition for the benefits of government").
A similar claim might of course be made with respect to tax rates. One jurisdiction might
lower its corporate tax rate or provide tax subsides with the express purpose of attracting eco-
nomic development. As jurisdictions compete for that development, the resultant spiraling re-
duction in tax rates might lead to a reduction in overall welfare. Of course, it is not always the
case that an individual jurisdiction's assessment of the gains to be had from, for example, grant-
ing certain tax subsides is accurate. See, e.g., Bobbi Murray, Money for Nothing, NATION, Sept. 1,
2003, at 25 (describing various situations in which local governments provided tax subsides that
far exceeded the public benefits, including one Minnesota town's $275,000 tax subsidy to a
Dairy Queen franchise that created only one job, at $4.50 an hour).
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have a notoriously difficult time collecting those taxes. Likewise,
businesses can have a difficult time collecting taxes for the multiplic-
ity of jurisdictions in which they transact. 26 2 This problem is of course
even more acute in an era in which much more commercial activity
takes place on the Internet. A national process for collecting sales tax
might be far more efficient in raising revenue. In some circum-
stances, then, permitting a diversity or multiplicity of rules can lead to
inefficiencies that national uniformity can reduce, if not eliminate.
B. Public Library Internet Access and the Values of Federalism
With these rationales and counter-concerns in mind, let us look at
Regulatory CIPA-my hypothetical federal law that mandates filters-
and, more generally, the issue of filters in public libraries.
1. Geographic Diversity and Experimentation
Framed in terms of federalism, both the geographic diversity and
experimentation/innovation rationales spring to mind as particularly
relevant. First, both prior to and since the passage of CIPA, a wide
variety of states and local governments, including local library boards
and individual libraries themselves, have been experimenting with fil-
ters and other techniques as part of policies designed to solve the
problems Congress sought to address when promulgating CIPA-i.e.,
(1) the problem of constitutionally proscribable content on the
Intei-net; and (2) the "unwilling viewer" problem associated with pro-
tected, but otherwise offensive, content. One state has initiated a pi-
lot program to assess the feasibility of filters in public libraries;
63
some have laws that require filters, but only in school libraries, not
public libraries;264 one has a law that requires either filters "or other
262 This difficulty is of course part of the basis of the dormant Commerce Clause limitation
on states' exercise of their taxing power. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)
(holding that the dormant Commerce Clause prevents a state from taxing entities that have no
physical presence in the state).
'" See S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1-206 (Law. Co-op. 2002) (establishing an experimental program
to monitor filtering software in selected schools and libraries); see also S.C. STATE BUDGET &
CONTROL BD., A REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE: EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAMS TO ASSESS
THE FEASIBILITY OF INSTALLING INTERNET FILTERING SOFTWARE IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, PUBLIC
LIBRARIES OR INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 1, 2001) (describing the pilot study), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.net/reports/OIRFilter.doc.
" See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-21-111 (b) (Michie 1999) (requiring schools to use technol-
ogy to prevent access to "harmful to minors" materials); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 156.675 (Michie
2001) (requiring schools to use the "latest available filtering technology" to prevent access to
"sexually explicit material"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:100.7 (West 2001) (requiring that ele-
mentary and secondary schools have Internet access policies that include "the use of computer-
related technology or the use of Internet service provider technology" that blocks access to an
array of disfavored content); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-70.2 (Michie 2003) (elementary and secon-
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effective methods" of preventing access to illegal content on public
library Internet terminals; 2 65 some have laws requiring either an
Internet usage policy or filters;266 some have laws that require libraries
to have Internet usage policies, but do not require filters; one re-
quires public libraries to either create separate terminals for adults
and minors or "utiliz[e] a system or method" for preventing minors
from accessing obscene or sexually explicit material;2 16 some have laws
269that tie the filtering requirement to state funding; one state has a
law that provides specific grants that may be used to purchase filters
for schools but does not explicitly require them;2v° one state house of
representatives passed a resolution "urg[ing]" public schools to install
filters. Moreover, at the local level, there are ordinances and deci-
sions by local library boards to install filters.v Some libraries filter
dary schools must "select a technology.., to filter or block Internet access" to child pornogra-
phy and obscenity). It is worth further noting that, even among states that required filtering in
both the school and the public library contexts, some specifically recognized the distinction
between Internet access in schools, "which serve unique educational purposes," and Internet
access in public libraries, "which are designed for public inquiry." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 125B.15
(West 2000); see also id. § 134.50 (using the same language to distinguish between public schools
and public libraries). Moreover, at least one state provided that local school boards could ex-
empt themselves from the filtering requirement if they so chose. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-21-
111(c) (Michie 1999) (authorizing a school board to exempt its schools).
' MINN. STAT. ANN. § 134.50 (West 2000); id. § 125B.15.
2 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 34-502 (West 2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 182.827 (West 2000).
These laws are thus similar to Senator Santorum's bill that competed with CIPA in the 106th
Congress. See supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (describing Senator Santorum's proposed
amendment).
.7 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-2-104 (Michie 2003); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 18030.5 (West
2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 20-14-1-7 (West 2002).
2 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 397.606 (West 1997). The Michigan statute also provides that
minors may use adult terminals with their parents' authorization. Id.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-90-404 (West 2003) (conditioning grant money on filtering
public computers).
270 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-262n (West 2002).
27' H.R. Res. 359 (Ill. 2001).
272 See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Town Rejects Bid to Curb Library's Internet Access, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2000, at A12 (noting that one Michigan township installed filters on all their Internet termi-
nals); Richard J. Peltz, Use "the Filter You Were Born With": The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory
Internet Filtering for the Adult Patrons of Public Libraries, 77 WASH. L. REV. 397, 434 & n.274 (2002)
(noting "the untold number of localities that have imposed filtering by ordinance or regula-
tion"). One of these policies has been challenged in federal court, see Mainstream Loudoun v.
Bd. of Teachers of the Loudoun County Library, 24 F. Supp.2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998), discussed
supra in Part ILA, but most have not. One survey, administered in 2000, found that nearly all
(94.7% of) public libraries providing public Internet access claimed to have a written policy
"regulat[ing] public use of the Internet." See THE LIBRARY RESEARCH CENTER, UNIVERSITY OF
ILLINOIS, SURVEY OF INTERNET ACCESS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC LIBRARIES 4 (2000) [hereinafter
UNIV. ILL. SURVEY], at http://alexia.lis.uiuc.edu/gslis/research/internet.pdf. About 16.8%
claimed to have filters on some or all of their Internet terminals. Id. at 8; see alsoJOHN CARLO
BERTOT & CHARLES R. MCCLURE, NAT'L COMM'N ON LIBRARIES & INFO. SC., PUBLIC LIBRARIES
AND THE INTERNET 2000: SUMMARY FINDINGS AND DATA TABLES 18 (2000) (9.6% of libraries
block Internet access on all public access Internet terminals), at http://www.nclis.gov/
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access at some, but not all terminals.273 Perhaps, most importantly,
some jurisdictions have affirmatively rejected filters. 74 And, finally, a
quick look at the countless bills of nearly unending variation that
have been introduced in state legislatures makes it clear that the vari-
ety of laws, regulations, policies, etc. that have actually been passed
are just the tip of the iceberg.
27
statsurv/2000plo.pdf. A more recent survey, but one with a slightly more limited sample size,
found that 50.5% of libraries had filters on some or all public access Internet terminals. See Mi-
chael R. McCluskey, Internet Filtering Decisions in Public Libraries: Making Policy Choices in a
Volatile Legal and Social Climate 13 (Nov. 22-23, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
2 7 The University of Illinois survey found that, of those libraries that installed filters, 40.2%
claimed to have filters on all of their Internet public access terminals (i.e., those not limited to
staff use), for a total of approximately 7% of all libraries. UNIV. ILL. SURVEY, supra note 272, at
9; see also BERTOT & MCCLURE, supra note 272, at 18 (approximately 9.6% of libraries filter all
public access terminals).
274 See Bradsher, supra note 272, at A12 (noting that residents of Holland, Michigan defeated
a ballot measure that would have tied funding to libraries on the condition that they install fil-
ters); see also Norman Oder, Michigan Town Rejects Filters, 125 LIBR.J. 12, 12-13 (2001) (same).
But cf. Brian J. Bowe, Library OKs Filters for Kids, HOLLAND SENTINEL, Sept. 29, 2000 (noting that
the library board eventually segregated terminals for minors from those for adults and installed
filters in the former), available at http://www.thehollandsentinel.net/stories/092900/
new_3.html (posted Sept. 29, 2000).
75 Some of these bills were introduced in the wake of CIPA and attempt to mirror CIPA's
approach. See, e.g., S. 52, 147th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2003) (conditioning funding to
schools and public libraries for computers and Internet access on the condition that they install
filters). Like the laws discussed in the text, however, most of the bills, including those intro-
duced since the passage of CIPA, demonstrate a wide variety of approaches to the problem of
protecting children from inappropriate material on public Internet terminals. See S. 151, 2001-
02 Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (requiring, as a condition of state funding, that public librar-
ies filter Internet access, and appropriating additional funds to cover costs of filters); S. 392,
104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002) (requiring filters on any public library computer available to
minors); S. 404, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2002) (combined with S. 392 on Feb. 5, 2002)
(same); H.R. 415, 105th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2003) (same); H.R. 1215, 92nd Gen. Assem., 2001-
02 Sess. (Ill. 2002) (requiring filters in public libraries); S. 698, 92nd Gen. Assem., 2001-02 Sess.
(Ill. 2002) (requiring public libraries to adopt policy to prevent minors from accessing harmful
materials and requiring libraries to "consider" filters); H.R. 806, 92nd Gen. Assem., 2001-02
Sess. (Ill. 2001) (filtering required in schools); H.R. 1831, 113th Gen Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2003) (requiring filters in schools and public libraries); H.R. 393, 2001 Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Miss. 2001) (requiring filters in schools and public libraries); S. 42, 91st Gen Assem., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2001) (requiring filters in schools and public libraries); S. 214, 91st Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) (same); H.R. 478, 2001 Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. (N.C. 2001) (proposing
to create a new section 125-27 to the North Carolina General Statutes that would require filters
in schools and public libraries but permit disabling of filters for "serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal or scientific purpose"); S. 599, 2001 Gen. Assem., 2001 Sess. (N.C. 2001) (same); H.R. 94,
124th Gen Assem., 2001-02 Sess. (Ohio 2001) (requiring Internet usage policy and permitting
filters); H.R. 10, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001) (requiring filters in both schools and
public libraries); S. 483, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001) (same); H.R. 2713, 77th Leg.,
2001-02 Sess. (Tex. 2001) (tying certain funding for schools and libraries to their installing fil-
ters); H.R. 2824, 77th Leg., 2001-02 Sess. (Tex. 2001) (same); S. 1310, 77th Leg., 2001-02 Sess.
(Tex. 2001) (requiring that regional educational centers "adopt appropriate measures" to pre-
vent access to materials that "do not have a legitimate educational purpose").
Sept. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTrFUTIONAL LA W
In short, the very, experimentation that underlies constitutional
federalism is taking place. It is hard to imagine a better example of
the states and local governments serving as "laboratories" for social
policy.
Likewise, the survey above of state and local library Internet poli-
cies also supports the "geographic diversity" rationale for federalism.
While I doubt anyone would move from one locality to another spe-
cifically because library Internet access was different, a willingness to
mandate filters might correlate with a more restrictive attitude to-
wards sexually explicit content in general.276 Thus, while the issue of
filters in public libraries might not, by itself, be a great example to
support Tiebout's thesis that individuals can "vote with their feet," it
could certainly be part and parcel of a broader array of choices avail-
able to individuals when deciding where to live. Even without the
dynamic version of the geographic diversity argument, however, the
array of ways in which state and local governments have begun ad-
dressing the issue of inappropriate material on library Internet ter-
minals-including the fact that many libraries have chosen policies
that eschew filters altogether-provides at least some support for the
notion that a diversity of responses is a good thing.77
Yet, both CIPA and the First Amendment challenge to it could
have the effect of stifling that innovation. Let us start with Justice
Souter's dissent.2 7s Had Justice Souter's view prevailed, this would
have been the end of mandatory filters throughout the country.
Some forms of experimentation would have survived, but mandatory
filters in libraries (even if they could be disabled upon the request of
an adult) would have been deemed to violate the First Amendment.
276 The University of Illinois Survey found that filters were "more common in Rocky Moun-
tain and Pacific states (24.3% of libraries) and in the South (23.1%) . .. [and] least common in
the Northeast (16.1%) and Midwest (11.4%)." UNIV. ILL. SURVEY, supra note 272, at 9.
277 This might be a good example supporting some of the criticisms of the application of
Tiebout's thesis to federalism rather than localism. Surveys have suggested that size of service
area population is a better predictor of whether a library installs filters than region of the coun-
try. See id. at 8 (noting that the incidence of filters "rang[ed] from 36.1% of libraries serving
over 100,000 persons, to 25.9% of those serving 25,000 to 100,000, to 12.7% of those serving
under 25,000"); see also McCluskey, supra note 272, at 13 (noting that "[a] nalysis showed a linear
relationship among the six population groups, with the largest group being the most likely to
install filters and the smallest group the least likely" and also that "among libraries serving a
population of 500,000 of more, 72% had installed filters, while just 28% of those serving less
than 10,000 population had installed filters"); cf BERTOT & MCCLURE, supra note 272, at 18
(finding that 29.2% of urban libraries and 30.2% of suburban libraries, but only 19.6% of rural
libraries, had filters on some or all terminals). In general, central libraries in urban areas are
those with the largest service area populations, and these can, of course, be in many different
states. Nonetheless, as I noted above, see supra note 276, one survey found that filters were
"more common in Rocky Mountain and Pacific states (24.3% of libraries) and in the South
(23.1%) ... [and] least common in the Northeast (16.1%) and Midwest (11.4%)." UNIV. ILL.
SURVEY, supra note 272, at 9.
278 ALA II, 539 U.S. 194, 231-43 (2003) (Souter,J., dissenting).
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Such categorical prohibition is, of course, the natural result of doing
a "strict scrutiny" analysis, and there are good reasons for the Court
to do this in certain circumstances.2 7 9 But, my point here is simply
that Justice Souter's approach ignored the benefits of experimenta-
tion and would have prevented it from continuing.
From the standpoint of stifling innovation, the Court's judgment
hardly does any better. By upholding the law, the Court has instead
forced all local government recipients of Universal Service Fund and
LSTA funding to place filters on all of their Internet access, irrespec-
tive of whether a particular locality is having trouble with access to in-
appropriate materials on local library terminals. In particular, those
libraries that offer both filtered and unfiltered access can no longer
choose that option if they want federal funding. By constitutionaliz-
ing the question in terms of the First Amendment, South Dakota v.
Dole's "independent constitutional bar" rule left the Court with an all-
or-nothing solution. In contrast, if the Court had viewed the consti-
tutional question through the lens of federalism and had invalidated
it on that ground, a variety of approaches-some including filters,
some not-would have remained available.
More than this, moreover, a federalism solution would have per-
mitted continued dialogue in the courts on the meaning of the First
211Amendment in the context of filters in public libraries. Such an
approach would have permitted the legal system more time to discuss
and debate the important question of the merits of filters in public
libraries, an approach that would have allowed the legal structure to
exhibit a system-wide humility in the context of ever-changing tech-
nology.
2 2
2 See Anuj C. Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 353, 385 (2003)
(book review) (arguing that the Brandenburg "imminent likelihood of harm" test should be
viewed as a prophylactic rule to prevent suppression of views based on the government's notion
of truth).
According to the University of Illinois study, this was approximately 10% of libraries.
UNIV. ILL. SURVEY, supra note 272, at 8-9.
281 See Ann Althouse, Federalism, Untamed, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1207, 1220-23 (1994); cf also
MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 132-33 (2000) (noting that the "federal system
and the pre-Civil War idea that the federal government had no broad power to suppress aboli-
tionist ideas meant that the issue of suppression was decided state by state" and, thus, "[flor the
nation that at large, piecemeal suppression meant that discussion of the legitimacy of slavery
continued").
"2 See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744-45 (1995) (discussing
the common law's value for determining the rules of cyberspace because what defines common
law is "small change, upon which much large change gets built"); cf David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 891 (1996) ("[T]he traditionalism that is
central to common law constitutionalism is based on humility and, related, a distrust of the ca-
pacity of people to make abstractjudgments not grounded in experience.").
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Indeed, it is here that we see the advantage federalism provides
over the categorical approach to the First Amendment taken by the
challengers to the law, the district court, and Justice Souter. A feder-
alism solution to CIPA would have permitted the type of inter-court
dialogue that we often associate with the common law255 by leaving
the First Amendment question undecided, thereby permitting not
only continued experimentation, but also more cases challenging lo-
cal library filtering policies. 4 Such a result is thus a "compromise,"
not simply in the sense of giving each side a part of what it wanted,
but also in the sense of promoting further dialogue on-and possibly
refinement of-the question on which the parties disagreed. This is
important here because the disagreement on this question is not
only, as the challengers sought to portray it, a fight between the plain-
tiffs and the federal government but also an internal struggle within
the institutional library community.1
8 5
To be sure, the First Amendment argument is powerful. My point
does not directly question the logic of Justice Souter's "strict scrutiny"
analysis. I am merely suggesting that federalism would have permit-
ted the courts to continue, over time, to mediate between the two
conflicting visions of library Internet access (i.e., those articulated by
the plurality and Justice Souter). Federalism would have allowed the
legal system to admit implicitly that a filter on Internet access is fun-
damentally different from both a traditional collection decision and a
Pico-like removal decision, and that there is a kernel of truth in each
of the analogies raised by the plurality and Justice Souter.
Arguably, what the Court in fact did-allow as-applied challenges
to libraries implementing CIPA-amounted to the same thing.8 6 But,
five members of the Court (the plurality and Justice Stevens) have al-
ready effectively staked out their position on the constitutionality of
individual library filtering policies, and, even taking Justice Stevens
23 See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 23 (1921) (re-
ferring to common law courts as "those great laboratories of the law") (quoting MUNROE SMITH,
JURISPRUDENCE 21 (1909)); EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948)
(describing generally the process of common law reasoning). The idea of inter-court dialogue
is also embodied in the principle that the Court should ordinarily wait for splits in the lower
courts before granting certiorari. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (making conflicts between decisions of
lower courts a consideration governing petitions for certiorari). Since the ALA case was a man-
datory appeal, however, denial of certiorari was not an option for the Court.
- See supra Part II.A (discussing constitutional challenges to local decisions to filter internet
access in public libraries).
a See supra text accompanying note 123 (noting that there is an intense debate within the
library community about the role of Internet filters).
ALA II, 539 U.S. 194, 214-15 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that if an adult
user's election to view constitutionally protected material is substantially burdened, it would be
grounds for an as-applied challenge); id. at 219 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that the case
involved only a facial challenge); id. at 232 n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that ALA II
"would not foreclose an as-applied challenge").
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out of the mix, Justice Breyer's intimation that the burden of request-
ing unblocking is no "more onerous than traditional library practices
associated with segregating library materials in, say, closed stacks, or
with interlibrary lending practices, 2 7 suggests that he too would be
skeptical of an as-applied challenge. Moreover, even accepting the
possibility of an as-applied challenge, a huge number of libraries will,
in the meantime, feel compelled to comply with the filtering condi-
tion because of the large amount of money at stake.8 s
Perhaps the most potent argument in favor of the statute's ap-
proach (and, thus, the Court's upholding of it) is the possibility that
the increase in the number of libraries using filters because of CIPA
will spur further improvements in filtering technology and lead to the
development of filters designed specifically for public libraries. 28 9 Of
course, no matter how good the technology, it will almost by defini-
tion be either under-inclusive or overbroad under the theory ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs.29 °
In sum, an approach rooted in federalism would have permitted
the state and local experimentation to continue, including experi-
menting with policies that include filters, and yet would have pre-
cluded the federal government from forcing a one-size-fits-all solu-
tion to a problem.
Second, the definition of illegal sexually explicit content has tradi-
tionally been treated as dependent on location. The definitions of
"obscenity" and "harmful to minors" materials have traditionally in-
cluded a component that incorporates "community standards, '2 91 and
"7 Id. at 219 (Breyer, J., concurring).
But see Anne Marie Timmins, Libraries Pass Up Computer Money: Local Officials Reject Internet
Filtering, CONCORD MONITOR,June 13, 2004, available at http://www.concordmonitor.com.
This argument was made early on by, among others, Bruce Taylor (currently senior coun-
sel on obscenity issues for the United States Justice Department's criminal division): "S. 97
represents federal encouragement of the continued improvement and perfection of optimum
blocking and filtering devices.... [F]ederal encouragement and incentives for the develop-
ment and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies, serves the ultimate goal of U.S.
Communication policy and benefits all U.S. market segments, because it ultimately will result in
the realization of better technological devices." Taylor, supra note 97, at 9. Joel Reidenberg
mentioned a similar point briefly during a Fordham Law School symposium held in between
the district court and Supreme Court decisions in the ALA case. See www. TheGovernmentHas
Decided, supra note 64, at 871 (noting that, under CIPA, "presumably a marketplace would
emerge with a substantially greater number of companies out there offering products for sale to
libraries"). Other than these slight exceptions, however, this argument was not important in
the debate about the merits of CIPA.
m0 Indeed, events following the Court's decision have demonstrated the difficulty that plain-
tiffs have had resigning themselves to the Court's decision. See ALA Cancels Discussion on Filtering
Pornography, USA TODAY, July 18, 2003 (noting that after the Court's decision, ALA representa-
tives originally agreed to meet with software companies but later decided to cancel the meet-
ing), available at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-07-18-filtering-x.htm.
2 Ashcroft 1, 535 U.S. 564, 574-75 (2002) (discussing the Court's history of using "commu-
nity standards" for assessing sexually-explicit material); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
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the "community standards" limitation is even part of federal law.292
While Justices O'Connor and Breyer have indicated a desire to "na-
tionalize" the relevant definition of "community standards" for the
Internet, there seems little reason to do so for purposes of libraiy ac-
cess to the Internet. Whether one thinks of providing Internet access
as a collection decision or as an exclusion decision, those decisions
appropriately belong at the local level2 4 because part of what they in-
volve is deciding what content is appropriate for a local audience.
Third, the regulation of sexually explicit content has traditionally
been treated as within the purview of state and local governments as
well. More important than this, however, is the fact that even the
question of whether to regulate sexually explicit content has been
thought to be within a state's autonomy. So, for example, the ques-
tion of whether to criminalize the possession or distribution of "ob-
scenity" is a question of state, not federal, law.2 Although states may,
consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit the possession, re-
ceipt or dissemination of obscene materials, they need not do so.
Indeed, "[m]ost states do not prohibit the possession of obscenity
that depicts adults." 291 Moreover, some do not even prohibit posses-sion of obscenity that depicts children.9 A federal law prohibiting
(1973) (establishing use of "community standards" test for obscenity prosecutions); see also
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (assessing a New York statute that prohibits sell-
ing minors materials considered "harmful to minors" and noting that the statute recognizes the
parental role in assessing materials "based on community standards").
See supra Part I.B (discussing COPA and Ashcroft v. ACLU)).
See supra Part I.B (discussing COPA and Ashcroft v. ACLU).
4 See Laughlin, supra note 58, at 279 (noting that local decision makers are in the best posi-
tion to judge local community standards). A prominent public librarian in Chesterfield, Vir-
ginia, both supports the use of filters and opposes CIPA: "I hope CIPA will be overturned (and
have contributed to ALA's CIPA legal fund) because libraries do not need the intrusion of fed-
eral (or state) mandates on how to operate. We've generally been doing quite well managing
this great new Internet service over the past decade." Posting of Skip Auld,
auldh@co.chesterfield.va.us, to Chesterfield County Public Library, Web4Lib@sunsite.berkeley
.edu (May 7, 2003), available at http://legalminds.lp.findlaw.com/list/ifrt/msg01126.html.
.. The federal government does criminalize obscenity where it claims the constitutional
power to do so. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462, 1465 (2002) (criminalizing importation or interstate
transportation of obscene materials); id. §§ 1461, 1463 (outlawing use of mails to distribute ob-
scene materials); cf. Pamela J. Stevens, Note, Community Standards and Federal Obscenity Prosecu-
tions, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 693, 715-16 (1982) (arguing in favor of limitations on exercise of fed-
eral postal power to criminalize obscenity because "regulation of obscenity serves purely local
purposes").
Possession of obscene materials within the home is constitutionally protected. See Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The Stanley protection is extremely limited, however. It does not
extend to carrying obscene materials across state lines, see United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139
(1973), or to viewing obscene materials in a movie theatre. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973).
7 POSNER & SILBAUGH, supra note 236, at 188.
292 See id. at 188-206 (listing Alaska, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wyoming as
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the possession of obscenity would almost certainly fall outside Con-
299gress s enumerated powers. So, too, would a federal law that pro-
hibited a local library from including such materials in its collection.
To be sure, CIPA does not do either of these things, but my point is
simply that regulation of such materials traditionally falls within a
state's police powers and that CIPA seriously erodes state decision
making in this area.
CIPA's federalism problem arises particularly in the case of a state..... 300
like Oregon-admittedly unique in this respect 3-whose state con-
stitution provides protection for obscenity.30 Because the state con-
stitution protects obscenity, an Oregon state court might find that a
public library that installs filters, even for the purpose of blocking ob-
scenity, would violate the state constitution. An Oregon library would
thus in effect be unable to accept E-rate or LSTA funding because, by
accepting the conditions, it would be violating its own state constitu-
tion. Of course, because CIPA was a spending law, rather than a di-
rect mandate, there would be no direct conflict between CIPA and
the state constitution (i.e., CIPA would not preempt the state consti-
tution). Nonetheless, CIPA would amount to an attempt to pressure
the state of Oregon to alter its constitution. On first blush this
might seem unproblematic since, after all, the Supremacy Clause re-
quires state law to bow to federal law. The problem, though, is that
the federal government is restricting rather than expanding rights,
and, more importantly for my purposes, doing so in an area that, ab-
states with no laws regulating the personal possession of obscene materials, whether of adults or
children); cf id. at 188 (noting that "[m]any states prohibit possession of obscenity depicting
children" (emphasis added), thereby implying that not all do).
' Of course, Congress would likely "solve" the problem merely by adding a "moved in inter-
state commerce" jurisdictional element to the statute. Cf 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (criminalizing
transportation of obscene materials across state lines with intent to distribute).
" See County of Kenosha v. C & S Mgmt., Inc., 588 N.W.2d 236, 245 n.6 (Wis. 1999) (listing
states that have refused to apply Oregon's approach to their own constitutions). But see Robert
M. O'Neil, Federalism and Obscenity, 9 U. TOL. L. REv. 731, 734 & n.24 (1978) (noting that, dur-
ing the 1970s, Iowa and other states decriminalized the dissemination of obscene materials to
adults).
'' See State v. Henry, 732 P.2d 9, 17 (Or. 1987) ("We hold that characterizing expression as
'obscenity' under any definition be it Roth, Miller, or otherwise, does not deprive it of protection
under [article I, section 8 of] the Oregon Constitution."). It is perhaps no coincidence that
one of the lead plaintiffs in the ALA case was the Multnomah County Public Library, a local li-
brary system in Oregon.
"' See William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver"for the Rights of Your People: Irresistible Offers
Reconsidered as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 307 (1993)
(arguing that state and local governments should not be able to accept federal funds when to
do so would "put at risk such rights as they are forbidden by state constitutional law to
abridge").
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sent the spending power, is within the exclusive domain of the
states.3°3
2. Political Participation
Political participation could also be increased by having the ques-
tion of whether to install filters in public libraries decided at the state
and local level. States and local communities were clearly addressing
the issue in the absence of a federal mandate. Parents, librarians,
and others throughout the country were engaged in a dialogue about
the efficacy of filters. The fact that library patrons felt the impact at
the most local level could be seen as one factor in increasing com-
munity involvement with the issue.
Indeed, as I noted earlier, °4 a close variant of this argument was
made by some opponents of the bill that eventually became CIPA
when it was being debated in Congress. One witness at congressional
hearings noted that the law could be "counterproductive and even
harmful" because it "may not only discourage communities from do-
ing the hard work to reach their own solutions; it also lacks the le-
gitimacy necessary to foster broad community support. ' '30 5 Senator
Santorum, whose proposed legislation would have given schools and
libraries the option of either installing filters or soliciting local public
comment to create an Internet use policy, made similar comments in
Congress.0 6
In short, allowing local communities to debate the merits of dif-
ferent approaches to regulating Internet content in local libraries
could have promoted greater participation in the process of policy
formation. In turn, this could have resulted in the policies having
greater legitimacy in the eyes of those affected.
" Cf O'Neil, supra note 300 (noting the federalism issues raised where federal authorities
prosecute the intrastate distribution of obscene materials in states that have decriminalized
such distribution and discussing such a prosecution, Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291
(1977)).
' See supra text accompanying notes 107, 113-16 (describing the political participation ar-
guments of librarian, Candace Morgan, and Senator Santorum, and noting the ALA's agree-
ment).
.. Morgan Testimony, supra note 107.
See supra text accompanying notes 113-16 (discussing Santorum's proposed amendment).
Senator Santorum described his own amendment, which was aimed at encouraging a local hear-
ing and comment process to address sexually explicit Internet content, as being designed to tell
local parents and teachers to "go out and bring the community together and do the hard work
of democracy." 146 CONG. REc. S5843 (daily ed. June 27, 2000).
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3. Anti-Tyranny
Beyond the geographic diversity, experimentation, and political
participation rationales, however, one more aspect of federalism-
and a surprising one-comes into play here: the anti-tyranny ration-
ale. It is here that we see not only federalism, but also the First
Amendment at play. If the existence of strong and independent state
governments can in fact serve as a counterweight to prevent abuses of
power by the national government, local governmental libraries can
be one component of that resistance. Recall that the plurality in ALA
H distinguished Velazquez on the grounds that, in contrast to the role
of lawyers involved in suits against the government, "[p]ublic librar-
ies.., have no comparable role that pits them against the Govern-
ment. 0 07 Of course, in the most literal sense, the plurality is correct.
Public libraries are not pitted against the "government" because they
are the "government." But, of course, public libraries are part of local
government and are thus creatures of the states. In this sense, they
are very much "pit[ted] against" the federal government and are so
pitted by constitutional design.
Moreover, as I noted earlier, the plurality's conclusion contradicts
the historical role that public libraries have played. From the ALA's
Bill of Rights308 and the library community's institutional oppositionP 309
to censorship dating back to the early part of the twentieth century,
to the recent role of librarians in attempting to resist the USA
PATRIOT Act's grant of authority to government officials to inquire
about reading records,1 librarians have played an active role both in
promoting the values of the Free Speech Clause and in directly op-
posing the "government" when the government seeks to attack those
values. In this sense, librarians do play much the same "antigovern-
ment" role that lawyers receiving Legal Services Corporation funds
play when challenging the constitutionality of government actions in
o ALA II, 539 U.S. 194, 213 (2003); see also text accompanying notes 200-09 (discussing ALA
If's plurality discussion of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, in which Velazquez is distin-
guished).
30S See LIBRARY BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 209.
See generally EVELYN GELLER, FORBIDDEN BOOKS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIBRARIES, 1876-1939:
A STUDY IN CULTURAL CHANGE (1984) (tracing the ideal of freedom to read and the emergence
of the librarian's role as guardian of this freedom); LOUISE S. ROBBINS, CENSORSHIP AND THE
AMERICAN LIBRARY: THE AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION'S RESPONSE TO THREATS TO
INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM, 1939-1969 (1996) (studying the American library profession's devel-
oping defense of intellectual freedom, dating back to 1939).
3'0 See June Kronholz, Reader Beware: Patriot Act Riles an Unlikely Group: Nation's Libraries,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2003, at Al; see also, Freedom to Read Protection Act of 2003, H.R. 1157,
108th Cong. (2003) (attempting to amend the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to exempt
bookstores and libraries from provision making it easier for government officials to obtain
business records during investigations); Library, Bookseller, and Personal Records Privacy Act,
S. 1507, 108th Cong. (2003) (same).
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welfare disputes. For First Amendment purposes, then, one might
think of librarians' role in some ways like the role Vince Blasi posits
for the institutional press, a locus of power aimed at "checking" the
government, notwithstanding the fact that libraries are an instrumen-
tality of the government.31' Indeed, to support this thesis, one proba-
bly needs little evidence beyond the fact that it was the libraries-the
entities that would be violating the First Amendment under the
analysis mandated by the "independent constitutional bar" rule-who
were the principal challengers to CIPA. 12
Unfortunately, then, because the case got framed solely in terms
of the First Amendment, the plurality missed an opportunity to give
meaning to the anti-tyranny principles that the Court had embraced
so enthusiastically in Gregory v. Ashcroft, New York v. United States, and
Printz v. United States. In short, if in fact we are to take the anti-
tyranny principle of constitutional federalism seriously, the ALA //
Court should have considered the fact that local public libraries are
potential loci of power that stand in opposition to the federal gov-
ernment.
"' See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES.J.
521 (1977) (discussing the checking value in First Amendment theory). Even if we put aside
the federal-state dichotomy and treat libraries as simply part of "the government," the notion of
an individual or entity being "the government" for some purposes, but not others, is not as un-
usual as it sounds. For example, we might say that a defense attorney, representing his client in
a criminal prosecution, is the "government" for purposes of the state action doctrine, see Geor-
gia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding that defendant's use of race in determining
whom to strike from the petit jury with peremptory challenges constituted state action for pur-
poses of the Equal Protection Clause). Yet, it is difficult to imagine a more important bulwark
against tyranny than a defense attorney. This seeming paradox is no less present here. Al-
though the analogy does not work perfectly, a librarian might likewise be deemed to serve as
both a government employee for some purposes, and, yet, still be "pitted" against the govern-
ment for purposes of understanding her role in furthering First Amendment values.
I mention the "checking" or watchdog function of the press here not because this is neces-
sarily the best way to think about public libraries and possible analogies to the institutional
press, nor even to imply that the press's role is limited to this function. C. Edwin Baker has ex-
p1 ifl h1-r op'1 * n P,, holt the ro'le of the nres -and the First Amendment's Press C.luse-
is shaped by one's normative view of democracy. See C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA, MARKETS, AND
DEMOCRACY 129-53 (2002) (discussing purposes of the press in promoting elitist, liberal-
pluralist, republican, and complex democracy). A system of libraries can serve other goals both
similar to, and different from, the press. Thinking of librarians as local government agents
surely obscures their true role in promoting democracy. It is librarians' professional role, more
than their status as local government officials, that gave rise to their challenge to CIPA. I raise
the analogy simply to note the way in which the anti-tyranny function that the diffusion of
power is said to promote is also promoted by libraries. I do not mean to say that libraries play
an anti-tyranny function because oflibrarians' status as local government employees.
"2 One of the most striking things about the plurality opinion is that one can read much of it
with the impression that the libraries are the defendants, seeking to uphold the statute, rather
than the plaintiffs challenging it. This is a natural result of the focus on the "independent con-
stitutional bar" rule, but it has the unfortunate side effect of obscuring the strong-almost ideo-
logically driven-opposition the institutional library community has taken to filters.
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It is worth further recalling at this point that the anti-tyranny ra-
tionale finds its modern judicial underpinnings in the anti-
commandeering cases and can thus be seen as dovetailing with the
political accountability rationale for judicial enforcement of federal-
ism. Viewed in terms of political accountability, it is hard to imagine
a place more likely to be viewed as a locus of local decision making
independent of federal law constraints than a public library. Most li-
brary patrons are likely to view the imposition of filters, like other de-
cisions about the availability of content at the library, as a local rather
than a federal decision. On the other hand, this seems to be a situa-
tion in which notice, rather than judicial invalidation of the federal
law, would be the more appropriate remedy. Surely it would be rela-
tively trivial for a library to make it clear to its patrons that the filter-
ing requirement has been imposed by the federal government.
4. Arguments in Favor of Centralization
In sum, several of the rationales for constitutional federalism sug-
gest that a uniform answer to the question of whether to install filters
in public libraries is a bad idea. But, what of the costs of divergent re-
sponses to the vexing problems CIPA was designed to address? Put
simply, many of the concerns that can accompany devolution of deci-
sion making to the states and municipalities simply do not come into
play. Take for example the potential for negative externalities im-
pacting the rest of the country. Because filters installed on a local li-
brary limit access to materials only in the library itself, the negative
externalities caused by a local library's decision to install filters would
be trivial. It is true, of course, that, partly because of filters' over-
blocking, there will be web site publishers outside of the local li-
brary's jurisdiction who will not be able to "speak" to audiences in
that library. Thus, in the literal sense, there will of course be exter-
nalities. But, these will be externalities due to the filter itself, not due
to having the decision made at the local level. A uniform rule
throughout the country would impose the same costs as would differ-
ent rules in different jurisdictions. Nothing about having the federal
government impose the requirement reduces that externality.
Similarly, the negative externalities associated with a library failing
to install filters would also be trivial. With respect to the "unwilling
viewer," the impact of a local library's failure to install filters would be
limited to those who physically enter that library. 3 " There would thus
"'3 This situation contrasts with, for example, the FCC's regulation of a radio broadcast,
which in many situations can even cross state lines. In the seminal "Seven Dirty Words" case, in
which the FCC sanctioned a radio station for playing George Carlin's "Seven Dirty Words"
monologue on the radio, see FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978), the station at issue was
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be little in the way of measurable extraterritorial impact. The same
would be true with respect to the worry about protecting children
from harmful materials or preventing adults from viewing obscenity:
only those who enter the library (who it is probably safe to assume are
likely to be residents of the area within the particular library's juris-
dictional boundaries) are going to be affected.
As for child pornography, the argument might be a little trickier:
the government's interest in regulating the demand for child por-
nography is largely viewed as aimed at reducing the supply in order
to protect the children who are being exploited to produce the im-
ages.3 14 These children can be anywhere, including outside of the li-
brary's local jurisdiction. Thus, one might argue that a national rule
is necessary because a national rule imposing filters on public librar-
ies will have a greater impact on reducing the demand for-and con-
sequently, the supply of-child pornography.
Nonetheless, this argument does not militate in favor of a uniform
federal rule. First, it is difficult to imagine that a federal rule impos-
ing filters on public libraries would provide a sufficient enough gain
in the fight against the suppliers of child pornography to be worth
much in the calculus. Because requiring filters in libraries is rather
limited in its "demand-side" impact, even a federal law that required
them would be unlikely to place much of a dent in the overall supply
of child pornography. Second, and more importantly, the compari-
son here is not filters versus no regulation of the Internet in libraries.
Rather, it is between a uniform national rule imposing filters and a
rule that permits a variety of modes of regulating. The argument for
a national rule based on reducing demand for child pornography
would not, then, be based on the virtues of, or need for, uniformity.
Rather, it would be based on the assumption that filters would be a
more efficacious method of achieving the result (i.e., a reduction in
child pornography). But, it is not clear that a filter is the best
method; whether Regulatory CIPA's mandate-a policy of mandatory
filters on all library terminals, but one that permits unfettered re-
quests to disable them-is in fact the best way to reduce the demand
for cIuu puJlunliVlly on IIb-saly 1ILLaei.t' L ll .m..n..
debate. It is the increased opportunities to debate that issue that a
federalism solution provides.
Finally, it could be that the benefits associated with geographic di-
versity could lead to the very destructive competitiveness that often
WBAI, a New York City station whose broadcast would have, at the least, crossed into New Jer-
sey, see WBAI Ruling: Supreme Court Saves the Worst for the Last, BRoADCASTING, July 10, 1978, at 20
(noting that the Pacifica case involved WBAI).
" See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 254 (2002) (describing the rationale
for permitting government to suppress child pornography).
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accompanies such diversity. But, as I noted above,1 5 it is unlikely that
the dynamic version of the geographic diversity argument would play
out in a literal sense; it seems improbable that many people would
move from one locality to another, let alone from one state to an-
other, solely because of whether a locality has filters in public librar-
ies. The costs of avoiding the libraries altogether and perhaps pur-
chasing one's own computer and Internet access, filtered or not by
individual choice, are probably far lower than would be the "transac-
tion costs" of any move. Those who are highly likely to be dependent
on Internet access at a public library are probably even more unlikely
to have the means to move. Instead, it is far more likely that a deci-
sion about filters will simply reflect the competing concerns of the
community in which a particular library finds itself. As such, there
will be little in the way of the "race to the bottom" problem 16 that can
normally be associated with geographic diversity.
5. Summary
In sum, the principles of constitutional federalism provide a use-
ful lens through which to view CIPA, as well as strong reasons to think
that the law should have been invalidated on federalism grounds,
rather than framed solely in terms of the First Amendment. The "in-
dependent constitutional bar" rule's insistence on a First Amend-
ment analysis, in effect, prevented the Court from considering these
concerns. It forced the Court to make a single decision for the entire
country, notwithstanding my arguments in this Part of the Article.
These arguments are of course based on rationales embedded in
constitutional policy, rather than constitutional doctrine. In the fol-
lowing Part, I turn to doctrine. In particular, I focus on the federal
spending power in order to explore in greater detail the ways in
which the doctrine might change to help match the constitutional
policy concerns I have raised in this Part.
IV. CIPA AND THE SPENDING POWER
CIPA can be viewed as a straightforward exercise of Congress's
power under the so-called Spending Clause.1 7 Congress is simply
"5 See supra text accompanying note 276 (noting that, while a willingness to mandate filters
might correlate with a state's more general policies, it is unlikely that people will move to or
from a state due to its library Internet policies).
"' The wonderful thing about this example is, of course, that it depends upon one's perspec-
tive whether the "bottom" means mandatory filters or none at all.
s' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The text of the provision is as follows: "The Congress shall
have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide
for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." (I use the adjective "so-
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spending its tax revenues and attaching terms and conditions to re-
ceipt of those funds. From that standpoint, one way to view CIPA is
as analogous to Congress offering public libraries a contract. Con-
gress will provide federal funds if and only if the library accepts the
conditions of that contract. Those conditions include the installation
of filters. As I explained above, the government's initial defense of
the Act largely mirrored the courts' broad construction of the spend-
ing power.
Because the federal Spending Clause is the constitutional power
Congress exercised when promulgating CIPA, I use this Part to ex-
plore the jurisprudence of the spending power. In Section A, I give a
called" because, as the text makes clear, the Constitution "does not contain a 'spending clause'
as such." Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1231, 1235
(1994). I will thus refer to the "spending power" rather than the "Spending Clause," unless I
intend to make specific reference to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of the Constitution.) The
spending power is viewed as complementary to the taxing power, such that the clause is in ef-
fect the power (i) "to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" (the "taxing power")
and (ii) to spend the money collected through "Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises" for the
purpose of "pay[ing] the Debts and provid[ing] for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States." The relevant portion of this Clause ("The Congress shall have Power to
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to... provide for the.., general Welfare of the
United States," (emphasis added)), which I refer to as the "Spending Clause, is also sometimes
referred to as the "General Welfare Clause." Recent scholarship has in fact questioned whether
Congress's spending power derives from Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 or some other constitu-
tional clatse. See David E. Engdahl, The Basis of the Spending Power, 18 SEATtLE U. L. REV. 215
(1995) [hereinafter Engdahl, Basis] (arguing that the power to spend is more appropriately
found in two provisions: (1) the power to spend for "carrying into Execution" any of Congress's
enumerated powers is found in the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18;
and, (2) the power to spend any money in the Treasury is found in Article IV, Section 3, Clause
2, which grants Congress the power to "dispose of . . . Property belonging to the United
States"); David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 50-51 (1994) [hereinafter Eng-
dahl, Spending Power] (same); Bradley A. Smith, Hamilton at Wit's End: The Lost Discipline of the
Spending Clause vs. the False Discipline of Campaign Finance Reform, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 117, 121 (2001)
(suggesting that the power to spend is implicit in the Appropriations Clause, Article I, Section
9, Clause 7, which provides that "No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law."). But cf Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the
President's Paramour): An Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause I of the United States Constitution, 33J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 140 (1999) (viewing
the Appropriations Clause as implying that the spending power is technically an executive
power under the President's duty to ensure that "the Laws be faithfully executed"). I leave the
nuances of this debate to others, as the debate about the scope of the national government's
power to spend revenues from taxation, as it has done in CIPA, would not be affected by the
result of the debate as to which constitutional clause the spending power is found in. More-
over, since I am interested here simply in the power to appropriate funds, Renz's conclusion
that spending is an executive rather than legislative power is of little import. Indeed, my exclu-
sive focus is on how federal power to spend impacts the states and their subdivisions, and, thus,
whether the power is executive or legislative makes little difference. Cf Kate Stith, Congress's
Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343 (1988) (discussing the appropriations power as a congres-
sional power and a limitation on the executive branch).
3. See ALA I, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 450 (2002) (discussing the framework established in South
Dakota v. Dole). Indeed, even the plaintiffs agreed that the Supreme Court's Spending Clause
jurisprudence was the proper lens through which to view the case. See id.
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brief history of spending power jurisprudence. I focus on two par-
ticular aspects of that power that are of interest to me: First, I explain
that the spending power must be seen as inextricably linked with the
federal taxing power. By shedding light on this connection, I lay the
groundwork for a fuller understanding of Professor Baker's proposal
for the conditional spending power that I lay out in Part V. Second, I
look closely at the history of the jurisprudence of conditional federal
grants to the states (and state government entities), as this is of
course what CIPA is. Then, in Section B, I describe the current doc-
trine of conditional federal grants to states. In particular, I look
closely at the "independent constitutional bar" rule, which resulted in
CIPA being analyzed solely as a First Amendment case.319
A. History of Spending PowerJurisprudence
1. Spending Power in the Pre-1937 Era
Understanding the spending power requires a brief history of the
Spending Clause and its constitutional jurisprudence, as that history
sheds light on the current doctrine and the possibility that that doc-
trine will change.32° Since 1937, the spending power has been largely
forgotten, and, indeed, until the Court's recent federalism decisions
beginning with Lopez, most modern scholars had essentially ignored
the power.32 ' And for good reason. In a world in which Congress's
regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause (and/or other pow-
ers, such as section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment) were as broad
as they had been interpreted to be between 1937 and 1995, Congress
322had little need to rely on its spending power.
.. See supra text accompanying notes 129-32.
i" I discuss here simply the constitutional history of the spending power. As I discuss in
greater detail below, there are good policy reasons for imposing some kind of federalism-based
constraints on Congress's spending power. See infra Part V; see also Michael McConnell, Federal-
ism: Evaluating the Founders'Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1484, 1496-97 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL
BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987)) (citing James Buchanan's work to ex-
plain why "centralized decision making about projects of localized impact will result in excessive
spending-excessive meaning more than any of the individual communities involved would
freely choose").
"" See Engdahl, Spending Power, supra note 317, at 2 ("The constitutional question of Con-
gress' 'power' to spend ... has received relatively little attention from legal scholars.")
S2'2 As Dean Rosenthal has put it, "[i]f the front door of the commerce power is open, it may
not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power tightly closed."
AlbertJ. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REv. 1103, 1131
(1987); see also Baker, supra note 8, at 1918-19 (quoting Rosenthal); Mitchell N. Berman, Coer-
cion Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 50 (2001)
(same). The phrase "little need" in the text does not mean "no need." Examples of Congress
exercising its spending power beyond what might be permissible even under a broad pre-Lopez
reading of the Commerce Clause include federal regulation of how doctors practice medicine.
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The spending power did, however, raise significant constitutional
questions prior to the New Deal for the simple reason that both Con-
gress and the courts viewed Congress's other powers as much more
circumscribed. And the importance of the spending power is resur-
facing as the Court is again limiting Congress's other powers. This
resurgence implies, however, a role for the spending power of even
greater importance than the pre-1937 era because of the pervasive
role that the national government now plays in nearly all aspects of
American life. 32' All of a sudden, we have a national government with
a desire to exercise the expansive powers it thought it had in the pre-
1995 era, but one with an arguably curtailed Commerce Clause au-
thority.3 4 This has led to a skyrocketing of scholarly interest in the
325spending power. 32  Until 1936, the debate about the scope of the
Spending Clause2 6 revolved largely around two different possible in-
See Smith, supra note 317, at 118 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Bowen v. Am.
Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986)). For examples of how counselors advise patients, see Smith,
supra note 317, at 118 (citing NewYork v. Schweiker, 557 F. Supp. 354 (1983)).
12' There are perhaps two different aspects of that increased role: (1) the increased role that
government in general plays in regulating; and (2) the increased federal role in law.
121 Cf Baker, supra note 8, at 1914 ("[Pjrevailing Spending Clause doctrine appears to vitiate
much of the import of Lopez and any progeny it may have."); Mark Tushnet, What Is the Supreme
Court's New Federalism?, 25 OKLA. CiTy U. L. REV. 927, 936-37 (2000) ("The Court is unlikely to
succeed in radically transforming the relative roles of the national and the state governments
unless it changes its doctrine regarding Congress's power to require that states accepting fed-
eral grants comply with federally prescribed requirements.").
325 In 2001, Chapman Law School had a conference devoted solely to the Spending Clause.
See generally 4 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2001). Prior to Lopez, very few legal scholars concerned them-
selves with the spending power, except in the context of the unconstitutional conditions doc-
trine. The scholarship on unconstitutional conditions is of course vast. See Berman, supra note
322, at 5 n.20 (listing sources); see also Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spend-
ing: Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REx'. 85 (analyzing unconstitutional conditions ques-
tions); Albert J. Rosenthal, supra note 322 (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Condi-
tions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413 (1989) (same). Unconstitutional conditions questions, however,
involve what might be termed "external" limits on the spending power (i.e., those outside the
power itself), usually constraints in the Bill of Rights such as the First Amendment. See Van Al-
styne, supra note 302 (discussing the interaction between federal conditional spending and state
constitutions). In contrast, post-Lopez scholarship has focused on limits that inhere in the lan-
guage of the Constitution's grant of power to Congress. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 8 (arguing
that courts should enforce limits on the spending power more vigorously). There were a few
exceptions to this understandable pre-Lopez neglect. See, e.g., Engdahl, Basis, supra note 317
(analyzing federal spending power); Engdahl, Spending Power (same). See also Rosenthal, supra
(discussing the development of conditional spending).
326 As noted above, the language of the relevant provision states, "The Congress shall have
Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for
the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States." See supra text accompanying
note 317. As a textual matter, one could interpret the "provide for.., the general Welfare"
language to exist as a free-standing grant of congressional power, untethered from the taxing
power and thus unconnected to spending of funds collected-that is, Congress was given three
separate powers in the clause: (1) the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Ex-
cises; (2) the power to pay the Debts; and (3) the power to provide for (a) the common defense
and (b) the general Welfare. Such a reading would, however, effectively render the remaining
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terpretations of its scope. Those interpretations date back to a de-
bate between Madison and Hamilton. Madison viewed the Clause as
merely an adjunct to the other enumerated powers in Article I, Sec-
tion 8, while Hamilton viewed the Clause as providing a grant of
power independent of any other enumerated power. The upshot of
the Madisonian approach was to require that all federal spending be
tied to a separate enumerated power. Spending for any other pur-
pose would, under this approach, be beyond Congress's authority.
clauses in Article I, Section 8 superfluous. See LAURENCE TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 833-34 (3d ed. 2000). As I discuss below, the Clause has been interpreted to treat the
comma after the word "Excises" as though the words "in order" or "so as" or were there. So, the
Clause could be viewed as containing only one power, the power to lay and collect Taxes, Du-
ties, Imposts and Excises, and that power could be exercised for the purposes of (i) paying the
Debts or (ii) providing for either the common defense or the general welfare. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to George Washington on the Constitutionality of the National Bank (Feb.
15, 1791), 3 WRITINGS OFJEFFERSON 147-49 (Memorial Ed. 1903) (arguing that the power is the
power "'to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare.' For the laying of taxes is
the power, and the general welfare the purpose, for which the power is to be exercised"); see also
Edward S. Corwin, The Spending Power of Congress-Apropos the Maternity Act, 36 HARV. L. REV. 548
(1923) [hereinafter Corwin, Spending Power], reprinted in 1 EDWARD S. CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE
CONSTITUTION 246, 248-49 & n.10 (Richard Loss, ed. 1981).
" W"'hat I describe in the text as the "Hamiltonian" view is based on what Professor Renz re-
fers to as the "weak Hamiltonian" view (or "Story interpretation") of the Clause. Early in the
nineteenth century, the Hamiltonian view of the Clause included an even broader interpreta-
tion, one Renz refers to as the "strong Hamiltonian" view. Under the "strong Hamiltonian"
view, Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 had nothing to do with spending at all but rather was simply
an independent grant of power to enact any law in furtherance of the general welfare of the
United States. See I JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES §§ 907-08 n.1 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed., 1891) (describing the Hamiltonian view
of the Spending Clause); see also supra text accompanying note 326. Justice Story demonstrated
the mistake of such a reading, as a textual matter, with the simple observation that such an in-
terpretation would render the remainder of Article I, Section 8 superfluous. STORY, supra §
907; see also Renz, supra note 317, at 106-08 (discussing Story's conclusion and interpretation of
the clause). Indeed, Madison himself had made much the same argument a decade before
Story. Letter from James Madison to Andrew Stevenson (Nov. 17, 1830), reprinted in 3 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 483-90; see also id. at 486; Renz, supra note
317, at 105-06. The principle of avoiding interpretations that render language superfluous is of
course common today. See, e.g., Ratzlafv. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 140-41 (1994) (holding
that judges should refrain from interpreting statutes in such a way as to make other elements of
the statute superfluous). The "strong Hamiltonian" view also suffers from a historical stand-
point as well. See Renz, supra note 317, at 103-05 (recounting the history of the constitutional
convention).
.28 THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 275-76 (James Madison) (New York Heritage Press ed. 1945)
(rejecting the argument that "the power 'to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to
pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States'
amounts to an unlimited commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be neces-
sary for the common defence or general welfare" on the grounds that "a specification of the
objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows" and that this specification is
meant "to explain and qualify [the general power] by a recital of particulars"); see also Renz,
supra note 317, at 108-23. Renz describes the historical background supporting Madison's in-
terpretation:
[The Clause] originally arose from the proposal that the new government assume the
Revolutionary War debts of the States. This proposal made clear, however, that only
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those debts incurred for the common defense and general welfare were to be assumed
by the federal government. The debt proposal was [then] made less specific to ensure
that Revolutionary War securities could [also] be redeemed. The debt proposal was
[then] merged with the power to levy taxes, to make clear that the new Congress could
levy taxes for that purpose. That language, however, would have constricted the scope of
Congress' [s] taxing power. Since the Confederation's inability to raise funds was one of
the issues that triggered the Convention and because the taxing power was likely to be
one of the more controversial, the members realized that some would try to construe the
provision strictly. Thus, the Brearly Committee of Eleven added the familiar language,
"to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare ...." Madi-
son asserted until his death that this language was intended to do nothing more than
enlarge the scope of the taxing power in order to avoid an inclusio unius exclusio alte-
rius claim [that is, an argument that the taxing power was limited to taxing for the pur-
pose of paying the revolutionary war debts] and that the power of Congress to spend was
found only in the enumerated powers.
Renz, supra note 317, at 117 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Madison's original theory
of the Clause was thus based on a textual reading that, in effect, interpreted the Clause as
though the words "in order" or "so as" were placed immediately after the word "Excises." So,
the Clause would contain only one power, the power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts
and Excises, and that power could be exercised for the purposes of (i) paying the Debts or (ii)
providing for either the common Defence or the general Welfare. Under this approach, Madi-
son, like Hamilton, originally viewed the portion of the Clause after the word "Excises" as sim-
ply a limitation on the taxing power and was necessary simply to avoid the possibility that the
taxing power would be broadly interpreted. Thus, Congress could tax only for those purposes
listed after the word "Excises," but, based on such a reading, the Clause would contain no actual
power to spend. By itself, this could easily be a plausible reading of the Clause. The problem
with Madison's interpretation came later when Madison's theory of the Clause changed to in-
clude a spending power. He read the Clause as authorizing spending but only for purposes set
forth in the other enumerated powers elsewhere in the Constitution. Once Madison made this
concession, his textual reading became more difficult to sustain. Justice Story argued, for ex-
ample, that spending for any of the other enumerated powers would safely fall within the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, rendering the "provide for ... the general Welfare" language of Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 1, superfluous. See 1 STORY, supra note 327, §§ 915, 916 ("[The
continental congress] construed [its] power on the subject of ... taxation . . .as a power to
make requisitions on the States for all expenses which they might deem proper to incur for the
common defence and general welfare."); see also Renz, supra note 317, at 121 (discussing Story's
position). Professor Engdah! argues that Story's argument is not quite right and that Hamilton
himself understood the difference between what Engdahl refers to as the principles of extrane-
ous means and extraneous ends. The principle of extraneous means is best exemplified by
Chief Justice Marshall's famous interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause in M'Culloch
v. Maryland, "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the [C]onstitution, and all
means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,... are constitutional."
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). In short, if the goal is legitimately within fed-
eral power, all appropriate means are too. The principle of extraneous ends, in contrast, is the
principle that, "if Congress has a free hand in fashioning policy for those 'objects of govern-
ment' [i.e., enumerated powers] entrusted to it, it may manipulate them even to promote ob-
jects of government (in the sense of aims or ends) that are not constitutionally enumerated for
it." Engdahl, Spending Power, supra note 317, at 16. According to Engdahl, the Necessary and
Proper Clause would, in Hamilton's view, permit spending on "matters extraneous to [Con-
gress's] otherwise enumerated powers, but only in a telic manner--4.e., as a means to promote
objects within the enumeration," what Engdahl refers to as the principle of extraneous means.
Id. at 14-15 (citations omitted). It would not, however, cover spending on goals that "remain
extraneous to the enumerated powers," even if Congress could use one of its enumerated pow-
ers for effecting the same ends. See Id. at 19-24 (describing the bounds of the spending power).
Rather, Congress can exercise its spending power to promote "ends that are not constitutionally
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In contrast, under the Hamiltonian view, the Clause provides a
much broader power. First, the Clause provides a limitation on the
taxing power, limiting it to taxation for the purposes of providing for
the general welfare. While the "general" welfare refers to "na-
tional" as opposed to local purposes, only Congress can, under this
view, determine what is in the national interest.3 Second, and more
important, the Hamiltonian view of the Clause also provides for an
implied power to spend for the general welfare: the language after
the word "Excises" impliedly provides for a power to appropriate and
spend the revenues derived from taxation-that is, a power to "pay
the Debts 3 32 and to spend "for the common Defense and general
Welfare. 3  So, the Hamiltonian view includes both a limitation on
enumerated for it" only by exercising the spending power itself, not the Necessary and Proper
Clause. One corollary of this would be that the states could simultaneously regulate the object
of Congress's spending and could even do so in a way that would undermine the ultimate pur-
pose of Congress's spending. Id. at 19-24.
3 See 1 STORY, supra note 327, §§ 907, 911, 919-20 (discussing the taxing power); see also THE
WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 149, 150 (New York, Henry Cabot Lodge ed. 1885) (discuss-
ing "public welfare" and the use of public money); Renz, supra note 317, at 125 (analyzing both
Story's and Hamilton's perspectives). As noted above, see supra text accompanying note 328,
Madison agreed with this aspect of the Hamiltonian-i.e., "weak Hamiltonian"-view of the
Clause.
'" See Renz, supra note 317, at 127;John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General Wel-
fare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. RE%'. 63 (2001).
"' See 3 THE 'WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 329, at 484-85 (stating that Con-
gress's discretion is very broad); see also Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (holding
that the discretion to determine the national interest belongs to Congress); Renz, supra note
317, at 125 ("Congress... has the exclusive power to determine what is for the general wel-
fare."). That Congress alone could determine what "national purposes" were was well accepted
in the pre-1937 period as well. See 1 J.I.C. HARE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241-42
(1889) ("A government authorized to provide for the common defence and general welfare is
virtually absolute, because it must determine what means are requisite for the end in view, and
its decision will necessarily be binding on the courts."); J.N. POMEROY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
228-29 (10th ed., 1888) ("What measures, what expenditures will promote the common de-
fence or the general welfare, Congress can alone decide, and its decision is final."); Corwin,
Spending Power, supra note 326, at 266 (describing Hare's and Pomeroy's view that Congress
alone may determine what constitutes national purposes). But cf Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9
'Wheat.) 1, 199 (1824) (noting in dicta that "Congress is not empowered to tax for those pur-
poses which are within the exclusive province of the states"); Corwin, Spending Power, supra note
326, at 266 n.76 (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall's Gibbons language is sometimes cited in
support of the view that the Court might exercise some constraint on Congress if it spent for
purposes that were not "national"); Eastman, supra note 330 (discussing the "general welfare"
clause).
32 The reference to "debts" referred to Revolutionary War debts and securities. See Renz,
supra note 317, at 117.
3.3 See 1 STORY, supra note 328, § 911 (explaining the phrase "for the common Defense and
general Welfare"); id. § 923 (same); see also Renz, supra note 317, at 126-27 (discussing Story's
position). Renz argues that the "weak Hamiltonian" view (i.e., a broad power to spend for the
general welfare) suffers from the same flaws as the "strong Hamiltonian" view (i.e., a broad
power to provide for the general welfare), since several of the limitations inherent in the remain-
ing clauses of Article I, Section 8 lose their meaning under either view. I do not think Renz has
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the taxing power (i.e., taxation for limited purposes only) and an
enlargement of that power by inferring a power to spend.334
this quite right. Renz argues that Clause 8 of Article I, Section 8, for example, which empowers
Congress to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts" by creating limited exclusive
rights for authors and inventors (i.e., a system of copyrights and patents) would seem to imply
that Congress could not use other means to further that goal. Under this reasoning, Congress
could not use its spending power to provide grants to authors and inventors in lieu of establish-
ing exclusive rights. See Renz, supra note 317, at 127-28 (arguing that limitations in several
clauses of Article I, Section 8 lose their meaning under Story's interpretation). Renz's example
strikes me as incorrect. Not only can Congress provide grants to authors and inventors "to
promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts," but it does. Vast sums of federal money
from, for example, the National Science Foundation and National Institute of Health are spent
on research that leads to patentable inventions, and the National Endowment for the Arts, for
example, provides grants to artists who clearly qualify as authors in the constitutional sense. To
my knowledge, no one has ever suggested that such spending is unconstitutional because the
Promote Progress Clause (or Intellectual Property Clause) provides the only method by which
Congress may "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." See Paul J. Heald & Suzanna
Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Con-
straint on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 1119 (arguing that the Promote Progress Clause implies
that Congress cannot use the Commerce Clause to pass a law that grants exclusive rights in a
way that somehow circumvents the explicit "limited Times" language in the Promote Progress
Clause); cf. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457 (1982) (holding that Congress
could not use the Commerce Clause to pass a bankruptcy law that was not "uniform" when the
Bankruptcy Clause specifically authorizes Congress to pass bankruptcy laws but requires that
they be "uniform"). Nonetheless, there might still be some validity to Renz's principle that the
specific limitations in the remaining clauses of Article I, Section 8 could imply a limitation on
the congressional spending power. A better example might be Clause 12 of Article I, Section 8,
which empowers Congress to "raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that
Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years." See Renz, supra note 317, at 127-28 (discussing
Article I, Section 8, Clause 12). Surely Congress could not skirt the two-year limitation by claim-
ing that it was spending on the army pursuant to Clause 1, rather than Clause 12. Clause 12
does strike me as different from the other Clauses, however, because of the explicitness of the
limitation on spending itself. In this sense, the language in Clause 12 is much more similar to
the provisions in the Bill of Rights. One need not reject-as Renz does-the "weak Hamilto-
nian" view to accept the obvious fact that Congress simply may not appropriate money "to raise
and support Armies... for a longer Term than two Years."
.. As Engdahl points out, if Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 is in fact the basis of the spending
power, the necessary implication would be that the federal government could only spend reve-
nues derived from taxation pursuant to that Clause. This makes little sense, because the vast
majority of spending, both today and during the early years of the country, is of money the
United States borrows. See Engdahl, Basis, supra note 317, at 222-23 (discussing the Borrowing
Clause and the Taxing Clause). Of course, since money is fungible, this only matters if spend-
ing for purposes beyond Congress's enumerated regulatory powers exceeds the amount the
federal government collects in taxation. If that is in fact the case (and, of course, since there is
no clear line as to so many of Congress's regulatory powers, it would be virtually impossible to
determine what percentage of federal appropriations in any given year were for purposes that
would not otherwise be within Congress's regulatory powers), it would not have been true until
the 1980s, when regular large-scale deficits occurred.
[Vol. 7:1
FILTERS AND FEDERALISM
In 1936, in United States v. Butler,5 ' the Supreme Court first faced
these two conflicting views of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1. Butler in-
volved a constitutional challenge to the Agricultural Adjustment Act,
a New Deal era law that gave the Secretary of Agriculture the power
to levy a tax on the processors of certain agricultural goods and to use
the money to pay farmers who were willing to reduce production of
those crops. The reduction in supply of the crop, the theory went,
would eventually result in an increase in the market prices of the
crop. Once the market price rose to the desired level, the tax would
then end. A cotton processor on whom the tax was imposed refused
to pa the tax and then challenged the constitutionality of the stat-
ute.
The Butler Court addressed three separate issues: (1) standing,
(2) the spending power, and (3) the principle of "dual sovereignty"
in the Tenth Amendment. First, Butler held that the cotton processor
had standing to challenge the power of Congress to enact the statu-
tory scheme-including, in particular, the payments made by the
Secretary (i.e., the spending)-notwithstanding the fact that the cot-
ton processor was merely a taxpayer. Holding that the taxation and
spending embodied in the statute were integrally related, the Court
held that the law was not merely a tax but rather was an "expropria-
tion of money from one group for the benefit of another ''317 and that
the rules prohibiting taxpayer standing did not preclude the chal-
lenge. While this aspect of the Court's holding has largely been ig-
nored by commentators, one aspect of it is key: to determine the
constitutionality of the statute, one must look at the taxing and
spending together. Although the taxpayer wanted not to be taxed
"' 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936). It is fair to say, however, that, posed in the stark terms of Madison
versus Hamilton, Hamilton's view was widely accepted as the correct one throughout the na-
tion's history, except, arguably during the fifteen years immediately preceding the Civil War.
See Corwin, Spending Power, supra note 326, at 268 ("The only period when [Madison's view] was
at all generally accepted was that between 1845 and 1860, when state's rights principles were
dominant with all sections and parties."). As I note later, see infra note 377, the Court had dealt
with issues related to federal spending prior to Butler. Arguably, the 1931 case Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), which involved congressional expenditure to construct the Boulder
Dam, could be viewed as involving the spending power, though the Court treated it as a case
about the reach of the commerce power (the power to improve navigation on navigable rivers).
See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal, 1931-1940, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 504, 514 (1987) (discussing Arizona v. California).
3M Strictly speaking, Butler, the party challenging the law, was the receiver of the cotton
processor. He was also-and not irrelevantly for understanding the broader significance of the
case-a prominent Republican businessman, who had briefly served as a United States Senator
from Massachusetts and was the national manager for Calvin Coolidge's 1924 presidential cam-
paign. See Aviam Soifer, Truisms That Never Will Be True: The Tenth Amendment and the Spending
Power, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 821 (1986) (explaining who Butler was). For simplicity's sake, I
will refer to the challenger of the law as the cotton processor itself.
M7 Butler, 297 U.S. at 61.
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(and thus in the most literal sense sought to invalidate the tax rather
than the spending), the taxpayer had standing to challenge the stat-
ute because the tax was specifically earmarked for the allegedly un-
constitutional expenditure.
Having decided that the challenger did have standing, the Court
turned to the spending power issue. After laying out the Madisonian
and Hamiltonian views of the spending power, the Court concluded
that Hamilton was correct and that the only constraint on the spend-
ing power was that "the purpose must be 'general, and not local.', 3 s
This whole section of the opinion becomes dicta, however, when the
Court states that it need not determine the meaning of the phrase
"general welfare of the United States" because "another principle
embedded in our Constitution prohibits the enforcement of the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act."" 9
That principle, the Court continued, was the principle of "dual
sovereignty": 340  because the power to regulate agriculture was not
among Congress's enumerated powers, the Act was unconstitutional.
Having collapsed the taxing and spending aspect of the statute, the
Court held that Congress was in effect "regulating," not simply taxing
and spending. Because regulating agriculture was a power reserved
exclusively to the states, the principle of "dual sovereignty," as em-
bodied in the Tenth Amendment, precluded Congress from "regu-
' Id. at 67 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, in 3 WORKS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 250).
... Id. at 68.
0 The principle of "dual sovereignty" of course long predatesJustice Roberts's invocation of
it in Butler. Perhaps the quintessential example of the Court drawing a strict line between state
and federal power is the 1922 dormant Commerce Clause case Heisler v. Thomas Collier Co., 260
U.S. 245 (1922), in which the Court upheld a Pennsylvania tax on anthracite coal. The Court
recognized that anthracite coal was "found in only nine counties in [Pennsylvania], and practi-
cally nowhere else in the United States" and that "80% of the total production is shipped to
other States," id. at 258, and yet upheld the tax because the law simply taxed property that was
within the state, id. at 261. In essence, the Court was able to discount the obvious interstate im-
pact of the tax by, as Robert Post has put it, "imagining the boundary between intrastate and
interstate commerce as a precise frontier." Robert C. Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era: Can
It Be Revived?, 51 DuKE L.J. 1513, 1610 (2002). The Court assumed that "'[t]here must be a
point of time when [goods] cease to be governed exclusively by the domestic [i.e., state] law
and begin to be governed and protected by the national law of commercial regulation,"' and
the Court deemed "that moment" to be that at "'which [the goods] commence their final move-
ment for transportation from the State of their origin to that of their destination.'" Heisler, 260
U.S. at 260-61 (quoting Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886)) (first alteration in original).
'"l The Court characterized this as based on the Tenth Amendment. I do not intend to en-
ter the debate about whether the Tenth Amendment is "but a truism," see United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941), or whether it should or can impose affirmative justiciable lim-
its on federal power other than those internal limits found in some combination of the princi-
ple of enumerated powers and the text of the affirmative grants of power the Constitution gives
to Congress in (primarily) Article I, Section 8. See, e.g., Soifer, supra note 336 (discussing this
debate). Though some, like the Butler Court, might characterize "dual sovereignty" as tied to
the text of the Constitution by the Tenth Amendment, I find it more helpful to describe the
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lating" through the use of its spending power what was otherwise re-
served for regulation solely by the states. Because Congress was using
its spending power to, in effect, regulate agricultural production, it
was not really exercising its spending power at all. In terms of its
holding, then, the Court used the principle of "dual sovereignty" to
collapse the spending power question into the question of whether
Congress had regulatory power over the relevant subject.
Thought of solely as a spending power case, Butler might seem to
be the quintessential example of the application of inherently con-
tradictory logic in constitutional law. The Court explicitly states that
the Hamiltonian view of the spending power is the correct one but
then proceeds, in effect, to apply the Madisonian interpretation by
holding that Congress could not use its spending power so as to side-
step limits on its other Article I (i.e., regulatory) powers. Some
commentators have criticized the Court's reasoning on this ground.342
If we see the case jurisprudentially in terms of both the spending and
the taxing powers, however, the case makes a little more sense. I thus
turn, in the next subsection, to the Court's taxing power jurispru-
dence, which helps us better understand Butler, which I then return
to in Part LV.A.3. As we will see, it is crucial to understand Butler, as
this helps us better understand the underpinnings of Professor
Baker's proposal for changing the spending power doctrine, which
will in turn provide a lens through which to view CIPA.
2. Taxing, Spending, and Regulating
Prior to 1937, the Court had on several occasions faced claims that
exercises of the taxing power 343 were end-runs around the principle of
principle as "dual sovereignty" than as the Tenth Amendment. Here, while the Court charac-
terized its holding as based on the Tenth Amendment, the Court's reasoning, based as it was on
the principle of "dual sovereignty," would have theoretically permitted the same holding in the
absence of the Tenth Amendment. In that sense, even if the Tenth Amendment is "but a tru-
ism," the principle of "dual sovereignty" could emanate from principles that derive from the
federal structure of the United States (principles that predate the Tenth Amendment). The
basic notion is that the Constitution has delegated power to the federal government sufficiently
precisely that the federal and state governments have non-overlapping spheres of activity. See H.
Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REv. 633, 655 (1993) (noting
that many Federalists supporting the Constitution argued based on the assumption that "the
Constitution's delegations of power to the federal government were sufficiently precise to de-
marcate distinct and separable spheres of activiety for the national and state governments").
M2 See Currie, supra note 335 (discussing the Court's New Deal jurisprudence); Engdahl,
Spending Power, supra note 317, at 35-37 (discussing Butler); see also 1 TRIBE, supra note 326, § 5-
6, at 836 n.14 (3d ed. 1999); Soifer, supra note 336, at 822-23.
M3 The taxing power is also found in Article 1, Section 8, Clause 1. I do not discuss issues
related to the Constitution's textual limitations on the taxing power, such as the admonition in
Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout
the United States" and the two limitations on "direct taxes." See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3
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enumerated powers. The idea behind these cases was that, if Con-
gress uses its taxing power to, in effect, regulate in ways that it could
not otherwise regulate,3" the tax should be classified as a regulatory
measure outside of Congress's enumerated powers. As the Court put
it in the Child Labor Tax Case, "there comes a time in the extension of
the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character
as such and becomes a mere penalty, with the characteristics of regu-
lation and punishment." '345
The 1922 Child Labor Tax Case is perhaps the paradigmatic exam-
ple of this phenomenon. Four years earlier, in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
the Court had invalidated a law prohibiting the interstate transporta-
tion of goods made with child labor on the grounds that the law ex-
ceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power. The law prescribed in
("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States... according
to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the census or Enumeration herein before di-
rected to be taken."). See Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1
(1999) (discussing the constitutional history of taxation); Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of
"Direct Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2334 (1997) (same);
Calvin Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul Up in the Core of the Constitution, 7 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (1998) (same). My only concern is Congress's attempt to use the taxing
power as an indirect regulatory device when it lacks regulatory power under any of its other
enumerated powers.
,4 If Congress does have the authority to regulate certain activities under some other power,
then taxing those activities, even if clearly regulatory in intent and effect, would be constitu-
tional under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Article I, Section 8, Clause 18. See, e.g., Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393-94 (1940) (upholding exorbitant tax on coal
producers who failed to comply with a complex regulatory regime because the regulatory
scheme tied to the tax was within Congress's Commerce Clause power); Mulford v. Smith, 307
U.S. 38, 48 (1939) (upholding provisions in the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 imposing
penalty on farmers who produce tobacco in excess of established quotas as a constitutional ex-
ercise of the Commerce Clause); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 595-96 (1884) ("Head
Money Case") (upholding tax on shipowner for each alien who arrives on the shipowner's vessel
as within Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 533, 548-49 (1869) (upholding a federal tax on banknotes issued by state banks, not-
withstanding the fact that the tax effectively resulted in an outright ban, because Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 5 gives Congress power to "coin money" and "regulate the value thereof"); see also
1 TRIBE, supra note 326, § 5-7 at 844; cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)
("Child Labor Tax Case") ("Where the sovereign enacting the law has power to impose both tax
and penalty the difference between revenue production and mere regulation may be immate-
rial, but not so when one sovereign can impose a tax only, and the power of regulation rests in
another.").
M5 Bailey, 259 U.S. at 38.
16 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Hammer is one of eight cases decided in the
pre-1937 era striking down a federal statute as exceeding Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 326, § 5-4 at 810 n.8. Justice Holmes, joined by Justices
Brandeis, McKenna, and Clarke, dissented. The Court overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart in 1941.
SeeUnited States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), decided the
same day as the Child Labor Tax Case, also held a federal tax to be a regulation in disguise. In
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detail the age at which children could start working at different types
ofjobs, as well as the number of hours they could work once they had
reached the relevant age. A year after the Court invalidated the law,
Congress passed the Child Labor Tax Law, which imposed a tax of
ten percent of annual net profits on any employer that violated the
precise conditions set forth in the earlier law regulating child labor.
The "tax" was not dependent upon the extent to which the employer
used child labor in violation of the conditions and was only payable if
the employer knew the employee was under the age. 47 Moreover, the
Department of Labor, and not just Treasury, was involved in enforc-
ing the law. 8 When the case came to the Court in 1922, the Court
had never invalidated an exercise of Congress's taxing power and had
in fact rejected previous attempts to get the Court to look to Con-
gress's regulatory intent and effect when addressing the constitution-
349ality of an exercise of the taxing power.
Nonetheless, the Court held the Child Labor Tax Law unconstitu-
tional. Here, the Court said, Congress had gone too far. The Court
looked at previous cases in which it had deferred to Congress and
said:
Out of a proper respect for the acts of a co-ordinate branch of the gov-
ernment, the court has gone far to sustain taxing acts as such, even
though there has been ground for suspecting, from the weight of the tax,
it was intended to destroy its subject. But in the act before us the pre-
sumption of validity cannot prevail, because the proof of the contrary is
350found on the very face of its provisions.
The Court concluded that the "elaborate" and "detailed" specifi-
cations, the fact that the tax bore no relation to the extent of the
Hill, the Court invalidated a tax that was imposed on all futures contracts except those that were
traded through boards of trade that satisfied a complex set of regulations. The holding of Hill
was rendered irrelevant when the Court held that Congress could effectively achieve the same
result under the Commerce Clause by limiting the statute's scope to interstate commerce. See
City of Chicago Bd. of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
Bailey, 259 U.S. at 36-37.
'4 Id. at 37.
W4 Prior to the 1922 Child Labor Tax Case, the Court had long held that it had no power to
inquire into either the intent or the results that flowed from a valid exercise of Congress's tax-
ing power. "[F]rom an early day the court has held that the fact that other motives may impel
the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject."
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 93 (1919) (upholding law that taxed sales of narcotics
against challenge that the law "was not a revenue measure, and was an invasion of the police
power reserved to the state"); see also McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 51-53, 59 (1904)
(upholding a tax of 10% on yellow, but not white, oleomargarine against a Tenth Amendment
challenge based on the arguments that: (1) the purpose of Congress's power to tax is limited to
raising revenue; (2) the power to regulate oleomargarine belongs exclusively to the states; and
(3) both the purpose and the effect of the tax was to destroy the yellow oleomargarine indus-
try).
s0 Bailey, 259 U.S. at 37-38.
' Id. at 41.
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activity being taxed, and, finally, the scienter requirement demon-
strated that this was not a revenue-raising measure with an incidental
regulatory effect. It was a regulation masquerading as a tax.
Of the dissenters in Hammer, the 1918 case invalidating the child
labor regulations as exceeding Congress's Commerce Clause power,
only Justice Clarke dissented in the Child Labor Tax Case. Both Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis (as well as Justice McKenna) voted with
the majority to invalidate the Child Labor Tax Law. This, then, was
not a simple case of the Court's 1920s "troglodytes" imposing a
cramped view of Congress's powers on the "right-thinking minority."
Eight of the nine justices, including Brandeis and Holmes, agreed
that Congress could not end-run around the Commerce Clause limi-
tations by this sort of exercise of the taxing power. Twice more, once
in 1935 and then in 1936, the Court invalidated similar regulatory
taxing provisions as impermissible attempts to use the taxing power
to regulate in excess of Congress's regulatory powers.52
The last time the Court held that a federal tax was a "regulatory"• , • •353
tax exceeding Congress's taxingpower was in 1936'. The following
year, in Sonzinsky v. United States, 4 the Court upheld a license tax on
firearms dealers. Commentators have largely treated Sonzinsky as a
repudiation of the pre-1937 era.5 5 Yet, it is worth noting that all
"Four Horsemen" (the conservative Justices who generally opposed
the New Deal) joined Sonzinsky and the Court's distinguishing of the
152 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 281-82, 289 (1936) (holding that a tax of 15%
on coal produced by coal producers who would not "agree" to extensive regulations setting
forth, among other things, wages, working conditions, and maximum hours of labor could not
rest upon the taxing power); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (invalidating
federal law imposing $1,000 tax on liquor sales that occur in violation of state law on the
grounds that the law exceeded Congress's taxing power and invades the states' police power);
cf. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549, 556 (1869) (Nelson, J., dissenting) (con-
cluding that Congress violates states' sovereignty by using its power to tax state bank notes and
drive state banks out of business). These cases arise exclusively between 1922 and 1936. After
1937, of course, the issue became largely irrelevant as the Court interpreted the Commerce
Clause as covering nearly all of the "regulation" that those cases invalidated.
" The underlying purpose of a tax remains relevant for other doctrines, such as the Fifth
Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause, see Dep't of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
767 (1994) (holding that a state tax on marijuana that was collected only from those who were
convicted of marijuana possession in violation of criminal statutes was "the functional equiva-
lent of a successive criminal prosecution," thereby violating the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (holding the same for a tax
on liquor sales that doubled when tied to violation of statute prohibiting unauthorized liquor
sales); but see United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (holding that a law imposing forfei-
ture of house used during drug crimes was not a penalty for Double Jeopardy purposes or the
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause), or the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause, see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998) (holding that a law imposing forfei-
ture that was grossly disproportional to an offense was penal and thus violated the Eighth
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause).
-'5 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
155 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 343, at 47 (1999).
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Child Labor Tax Cases and its progeny, based on the fact that the fire-
arms licensing statute contained "no regulation other than the mere
registration provisions," was plausible on its face. 35 '6 The registration
provisions alone, which the Court deemed to be "in aid of a revenue
purpose," were nothing like the complex regulatory regime imposed
by the Child Labor Tax Cases or the Bituminous Coal Act invalidated in
Carter. The Court made clear that, as long as the tax is "not at-
tended by an offensive regulation, 3 8 "[i] nquiry into the hidden mo-
tives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally
conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts. 3 59 The Court
reiterated, in crystal clear language, that the mere fact that a tax had
a regulatory effect was insufficient, for "[e]very tax is in some meas-
ure regulatory. To some extent it interposes an economic impedi-
ment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed. But a
tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.
'
0
60
Sixteen years later, the Court reaffirmed Sonzinsky in United States
v. Kahriger, a Tenth Amendment challenge to a tax on bookies
based on the argument that Congress was attempting to regulate in-
trastate gambling, a subject beyond its regulatory powers.3 6' The
Court rejected the argument, concluding that "[u]nless there are
provisions extraneous to any tax need, courts are without authority to
limit the exercise of the taxing power.' ' 36 3 This language is important
because it illustrates a key distinction between a "regulatory" tax and
a revenue measure for purposes of the taxing power: a tax will not be
deemed "regulatory" simply because it appears to be designed to dis-
courage (or even eliminate) the activity being taxed. Rather, it is
only when there is a complex regulatory regime that is "extraneous to
any tax need," as in the Child Labor Tax Cases, that a tax will be
deemed "regulatory."
Calling a tax "regulatory" does not of course automatically render
it unconstitutional, since a "regulatory" measure can be within Con-
gress's powers if it regulates a subject that Congress has power to
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513.
298 U.S. 238 (1935).
Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514.
Id. at 513-14.
Id. at 513.
345 U.S. 22 (1953).
112 Kahriger also involved a second issue: whether the requirement that a bookie not only pay
the prescribed tax but also register with the tax authorities constituted a violation of the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition on self-incrimination. 'While the Court rejected that argument in
Kahriger, the case was overruled fifteen years later in Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39
(1968). See Hamilton v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 468, 473 (D.C.N.Y. 1969) (recognizing that
Kahriger had been overruled).
363 Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31. As noted above, see supra note 353, the distinction is still relevant
for other purposes.
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regulate under an enumerated power other than the taxing power. It
is for this reason that the distinction between a "regulatory" and a
"revenue" tax has largely been ignored: in a world in which Con-
gress's regulatory powers-particularly the Commerce Clause-can
do all the heavy lifting, relying on an independent taxing power is
unnecessary. The fact that Kahriger, decided in 1953, is the most re-
cent Supreme Court case even addressing the extent of the federal
government's taxing power is not a coincidence. Nonetheless, the
distinction between a "regulatory" and a "revenue" tax may return to
federalism jurisprudence for one simple reason: the Court's recent
364constraints on Congress's regulatory powers.
3. United States v. Butler and the Intersection Between the Taxing and
Spending Powers
This distinction between a "regulatory" measure and a "revenue"
measure, which derives from cases addressing the scope of Congress's
taxing power, also impacts the spending power, a fact that commen-
tators have largely ignored. In this section, I further explain why
United States v. Butler, which I described in Part V.A. 1, must be under-
stood in the context of the taxing power, not simply the spending
power. Doing so will lay the groundwork for understanding Professor
Baker's proposed doctrinal changes to current spending power juris-
prudence, which I argue have their roots in the taxing power cases I
described in the previous subsection. Fully understanding Baker's
proposal is important in its own right because of her prominence as a
critic of the Court's spending power doctrine. More than this, how-
ever, it is important for me here because Baker's proposal gives us a
lens through which to view CIPA, one that could lead to the statute
being invalidated on federalism grounds.
Let us now turn back to Butler for a moment and focus on the tax-
ing power aspect of the case. Consider the typical modern criticism
of Butler. David Currie, for example, argues that Justice Roberts mis-
understood the implications of his acceptance of the Hamiltonian
view of the spending power. Currie states:
Having assumed that promoting agriculture was a legitimate end of fed-
eral spending, [Justice] Roberts was in a poor position to argue that it
was an unconstitutional one. Having held that the spending power was
not limited by the enumeration of other congressional powers, he was
hopelessly inconsistent in doing so on the ground that Congress had no
independent authority to regulate agriculture. The Court's reliance on
Marshall's warning against the pretextual use of federal powers and on
such derivative precedents as the Child Labor Tax Case was therefore mis-
'. See 1 TRIBE, supra note 326, § 5-7, at 845-46 & nn.16-19.
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placed, for under [Justice] Roberts's own test the law was not a pretext
365
for the accomplishment of an illegitimate purpose.
Currie is correct if one sees the "purpose" of the legislation as
"promoting agriculture through federal spending." If the purpose,
however, is simply "promoting agriculture," Justice Roberts looks a
little less "hopelessly inconsistent": from Justice Roberts's vantage
point, the spending and taxation are so integrally intertwined that he
views the case as about taxation as much as about spending, and
rightly so. Since the spending in Butlerwas integrally intertwined with
the taxation and since the challenger to the law, though outwardly
challenging the constitutionality of the spending as exceeding con-
gressional power, was a taxpayer and thus concerned primarily with
the taxation, then the Court's reliance on the pretextual use of fed-
eral powers cases makes a lot more sense. Spending for the general
welfare may be okay, but not, the Court says, when Congress is so
clearly engaged in redistribution from a limited group of taxpayers to
a limited group of recipients. If Butler is seen, then, as a taxation
power case, Justice Roberts's rationale makes more sense in light of
the line of cases beginning with the Child Labor Tax Case that distin-
guish between taxation as a pretext for regulation and taxation for
revenue purposes.
Taking the decision on its own terms, the conclusion rests not on
a Madisonian view of the spending power, but rather on a realist's
view of the statute. "Congress, we see what you're doing here," the
Court seemed to be saying. "This statute is not simply an exercise of
the spending power. Rather, the taxing and spending in this statute
are integrally connected with each other, and the Act is thus a dis-
guised attempt to 'regulate' rather than spend." Criticizing the Court
for an alleged inconsistency on its view of the spending power thus
ignores the fact that the Act was not the same as a law that simply ap-
propriated funds to farmers who left their fields fallow or one that
simply imposed a tax on the processing of agricultural goods with the
proceeds placed directly into the Treasury. The Act did in fact, as the
Court recognized, "expropriat[e] .. .money from one group for the
benefit of another," and that was its intent."'
Lest I be misinterpreted, I am not arguing that the Court got it
right. Indeed, I am not even arguing the Court would have in fact
upheld either of the two halves of the law (i.e., the taxing half of the
Act or the spending half) if they had been separated, but simply that
%5 Currie, supra note 335, at 533 (citations omitted).
m6 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 61 (1936). The Act's very purpose was to raise the level
of prices that processors paid to farmers. See id. at 53-55 (quoting Agricultural Adjustment Act,
Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31, 34 (1933)).
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there is a difference. 367 The Court's mistake in logic, then, was not
that it applied the Madisonian view of the spending clause while
claiming to adhere to the Hamiltonian approach, but was rather its
reliance on a strict distinction between taxing and spending on the
one hand and regulating on the other and its failure to acknowledge
that all taxing and spending is in fact a form of regulation. As the
Court divided the powers of the states and the national government
in a strict way, it also distinguished spending and taxing from regulat-
ing in an equally strict way. Once one accepts, however, a distinction
between taxing and spending on the one hand and regulating on the
other, the Court's logic, based on the fact that the Act was regulation
in disguise, seems unassailable: if there were such a line, surely the
Court put the Act on the correct side of it.'"
Given precedent at the time and given the clear connection be-
tween the Agricultural Adjustment Act's spending and taxation, this
was not much of a stretch, particularly because the challenger was the
taxpaying processor, not the recipient of the spending. Viewed this
way, the case is not a spending power case or a Tenth Amendment
369case, but is rather simply one in a long line of taxing power cases.
Butler does differ from the Child Labor Tax Case in one important
respect. In Butler, the tax is an integral component of the regulatory
regime, because the tax is part of how Congress is attempting to regu-
late the prices. In contrast, the tax imposed by the Child Labor Tax
Law was extraneous to the regulatory regime. Nonetheless, in both
statutes, if we hypothesize the law independent of the tax, it is fair to
ask (as the majority in Butler did) whether Congress had the power to
regulate. Under the logic of the Child Labor Tax Case, Congress did
not have the power to regulate the prices of agricultural goods in the
absence of the taxing power. In this sense, the Agricultural Adjust-
ment Act's "spending" was inseparable from its "taxing."
One other aspect of the case supports this notion that the taxing
and spending must be treated as inseparable for the purposes of the
constitutional analysis: the Court's holding on the question of the
"" As I indicate below, two separate statutes could well have been upheld as a matter of doc-
trine at the time.
" See Van Alstyne, supra note 237 (arguing against "enumerated-power nominalism [as] the
sole test of federalism judicial review"); id. at 793-95 (discussing pretextual taxation cases as the
sort of inquiry he would use in assessing commerce clause challenges).
' See Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-71 (discussing the taxing power and pretext cases such as the
Child Labor Tax Case); cf. Ackerman, supra note 344, at 47 (putting Butler in the same category as
Carter Coal and noting that it follows the rationale of the Child Labor Tax Case). It is also worth
noting that the processors also argued that the processing tax violated the taxing power re-
quirement of uniformity, see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises ... ; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be
uniform through out the United States."); however, the Court declined to decide the issue. See
Butler, 297 U.S. at 62 n.8.
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cotton processor's standing. Recall that the Court held that the cot-
ton processor had standing as a taxpayer to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the spending because the taxing and spending were so in-
tegrally connected. If we take the Currie criticism seriously and
think of the law as simply promoting agriculture through spending,
then the decision on standing would likewise have to be wrong. If the
statute should have been upheld as a valid exercise of the spending
power, then the cotton processor should have had no more right to
challenge the law than any taxpayer has to challenge every federal
appropriation. Accepting the modern criticism of the case necessar-
ily undermines the case's holding on standing, a holding that no one
questions.
To be clear, I am not endorsing the Butler Court's conclusion that
the statute is unconstitutional since I believe that a statutory regime
that regulates the prices of agricultural goods falls within Congress's
Commerce Clause power.3 72 I am merely defending the Court's reli-
ance on the pretext taxing power cases (such as the Child Labor Tax
Case) against the claim of those like Currie who say that the opinion's
"dual sovereignty"/Tenth Amendment holding is based on a misun-
derstanding of the logical implications of the Hamiltonian view of the
spending power. The Hamiltonian view of the spending power does
not necessarily preclude the holding in Butler.
Butler represents the high-water mark of the Court's adherence to
the principles of "dual sovereignty." In little more than a year, with
the backdrop of Roosevelt's landslide reelection and the failed court-
packing scheme, the attitude of the Court had arguably changed
drastically. 73 By the end of the 1936 Term, the Court had eliminated
"0 See supra text accompanying note 337.
Federal standing doctrine, both then and now, precludes taxpayer standing. See
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Frothingham v. Mellon,
262 U.S. 447 (1923). These strictures are arguably relaxed for Establishment Clause cases. See
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
372 Concededly, this is not a difficult position to take in retrospect, though there may well still
be some who would disagree. See, e.g., Morrison v. United States, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the substantial effects test is inconsistent with the origi-
nal understanding of the Commerce Clause); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 936-37
(1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that Congress does not have the authority under the
Commerce Clause to regulate the intrastate transfer of firearms); Lopez v. United States, 514
U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (ThomasJ., concurring) (arguing that the substantial effects test is incon-
sistent with the original understanding of the Commerce Clause).
.73 This is of course the conventional wisdom of the "switch in time" that constituted the
constitutional revolution" of 1937. See generally BRUCE ACKERMAN, 2 WE THE PEOPLE (1998)
(discussing the New Deal Court and the "switch in time that saved nine"); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN,
AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 160 (2002) (same); WILLIAM LEUCHTENBERG, THE
SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT (1995)
(same); Edward S. Corwin, National-State Cooperation-Its Present Possibilities, 8 AM. L. SCH. REV.
687, 698 (1937) (noting, in a speech given in December 1936 that, "The retreat has, to be sure,
only just begun, but who, with the results of the recent election in mind, can seriously doubt
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most of the federalism constraints on Congress's powers, including its
spending power.
The companion cases Steward Machine Co. v. Davis74 and Helvering
v. Davis, 7 decided on the same day in 1937, are widely viewed as en-
dorsing Butles dicta about the spending power. 76 Both Steward Ma-
chine and Helvering involved major portions of the Social Security Act
of 1935, one of the cornerstones of New Deal legislation. Helvering
upheld the part of the Act that we now colloquially refer to as "social
security," a national pension benefit scheme for those over sixty-five,
while Steward Machine upheld the establishment of a national unem-
ployment insurance scheme. The two cases clearly applied the Ham-
iltonian vision of the spending power, and, in their wake, Madison's
view of the spending power has effectively been relegated to an his-
torical artifact.
Beyond the dichotomy between Hamilton and Madison, however,
the New Deal era cases raised a new issue in spending power juris-
prudence, one of importance when we look at CIPA: the constitu-
tionality of a congressional attempt to use its spending power to in-
duce states to act in certain ways, ways that arguably invade the core
of the states' sovereign autonomy.3 7 7 I turn to this issue in the follow-
ing subsection.
that it will be continued?"). But see BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE
STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998) (arguing that the conventional wisdom
of the "switch in time" is incorrect, or at least more nuanced than its legend suggests); G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000) (same). Indeed, Butler is
largely viewed as the case most responsible for Roosevelt's attempt to "pack" the Court. See
Soifer, supra note 336 (noting Butler's role in the New Deal Court).
37' 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
175 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
376 See Engdahl, Spending Power, supra note 317, at 3 (noting that the cases "typically are
viewed as having corrected Butlers error").
17 The Court had been asked to face a similar issue before, but had never decided it. In
1923, in the twin cases of Frothingham v. Mellon and Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
the Court was faced with the constitutionality of the 1921 Sheppard-Towner Act (also known as
the "Maternity Act"), which provided for grants to states conditioned on the states taking cer-
tain actions "to reduce maternal and infant mortality and protect the health of mothers and
infants." Id. at 479. The statute was challenged as an unconstitutional inducement to the states
"to yield a portion of their sovereign rights" in violation of the Tenth Amendment and princi-
ples of state sovereignty. Id. Rather than deciding the merits of the case, the Court held that it
lacked jurisdiction over both suits. The case brought by Massachusetts, the Court ruled, consti-
tuted a political question not cognizable by the judiciary. Id. at 483-85. In what could only be
considered a dictum in light of the Court's holding on jurisdiction, the Court did intimate that
the mere offer of funds from Congress would not constitute any invasion of the state's rights.
Id. at 480 ("Probably it would be sufficient to point out that the powers of the State are not in-
vaded, since the statute imposes no obligation but simply extends an option which the State is
free to accept or reject. But we do not rest here."); see also id. at 482-83. Arguably, the Court
was in fact rejecting the argument that an offer of conditioned funds could in any way be seen
as coercive. See Corwin, supra note 373, at 702 (noting that the Court's language "also meets the
contention that this type of legislation is coercive with respect to the States, and rejects that con-
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37 8
Though Steward Machine and Helverin 7 9 were both decided the
same day, only Steward Machine is of importance to me here, for it is
tention"). In retrospect, and in light of Steward Machine, Corwin's view was certainly borne out.
Nonetheless, the Court's holding in the Massachusetts case was, strictly speaking, based on the
political question doctrine.
Four years later, in Forida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927), the Court was faced with the consti-
tutionality of the federal statute that created the estate tax. Included in the statute was a provi-
sion that permitted a credit of up to eighty percent of the federal tax for any estate taxes paid
pursuant to a state law. Florida's constitution prohibited the imposition of an estate tax, and
Florida brought suit claiming that the law "constitute [d] an invasion of the sovereign rights of
the state and a direct effort on the part of Congress to coerce the state into imposing an inheri-
tance tax and to penalize it and its property and citizens for the failure to do so." Id. at 16. Al-
though the case was decided on the merits, and, in many ways, strongly resembles Steward Ma-
chine because, in both cases, taxpayers were entitled to credits from federal taxes if the
taxpayer's state passed legislation satisfying certain federally imposed conditions, see infta note
382 and accompanying text, the Court did not characterize the taxpayer credit in Florida v. Mel-
lon as an exercise of the spending power. Florida v. Mellon is nonetheless the logical precursor
to Steward Machine, and could be characterized as the first time the Court upheld an exercise of
the spending power used as an inducement to states to act in certain ways. See Steward Mach.,
301 U.S. at 591-92 (citing Florida v. Mellon).
Although the Court did not address the constitutionality of conditional grants from Con-
gress to state governments until Florida v. Mellon, conditional grants to states have a long history
dating back to at least 1802 when Ohio was admitted as a state. In exchange for a grant of lands
for public schools and a pledge by the national government to use five percent of the money
raised from the sale of lands in the state to build roads from Ohio to the seaboard states, Ohio
agreed not to tax the land that the federal government sold to settlers for five years. See Corwin,
supra note 373, at 698; Corwin, Spending Power, supra note 326, at 252. Other states admitted to
the union were offered the same deal. Id. at 262. These "contracts" between state and national
governments were upheld in Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244, 250 (1900). See Corwin,
supra note 373, at 698. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862, ch.
130, 12 Stat. 503 (1862), provided land to states conditioned on the creation of public universi-
ties "to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." Id.
at 698-99; see Corwin, Spending Power, supra note 326, at 262-64. These conditional grants of
land were based on Congress's power to "dispose" of the property of the United States under
Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, see Corwin, supra note 373, at 699, although,
as President Buchanan noted when vetoing an earlier version of the Morrill Act with similar
provisions, much of the land was itself paid for out of money raised by taxation, see Corwin,
Spending Power, supra note 326, at 263 (quoting Buchanan veto). Buchanan's point simply goes
to the fungibility of money and the fact that any power to spend beyond Congress's regulatory
powers can ultimately "expand" Congress's power, whether it is based on Article I or Article IV.
Extensions of the Morrill Act later in the nineteenth century bore Buchanan's point out well, as
Congress later appropriated the proceeds from land sales for the same purpose, postsecondary
education. See id. at 264. In any event, the first serious attempts by Congress to claim that it was
exercising its "spending" power (or its power to spend the proceeds of taxation) for conditional
grants to states did not occur until early in the twentieth century. See id. at 264-65; Corwin, su-
pra note 373, at 699-700.
... For a textual and historical argument that conditional federal grants to states are constitu-
tionally impermissible under even the Hamiltonian and Story interpretation of the spending
power, see Somin, supra note 225, at 489-94. Somin's argument focuses on the word "general"
in the phrase "general Welfare," and his point is that any grant to a state is, by virtue of that fact
alone, local or regional and thus not "general." While clever, this argument seems to ignore the
fact that conditional grants to states are generally available to all states. Certainly if one thinks
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the first spending power case in which state autonomy, and not sim-
ply the principle of enumerated powers, was at stake: The case in-
volved a challenge to a complex federal unemployment insurance
scheme. All employers with eight or more employees were required
to pay a tax. In contrast to the Agricultural Adjustment Act (at issue
in Butler), whose accounting scheme involved an obvious redistribu-
tion of revenues, proceeds from the federal unemployment tax went
to the Treasury "like internal revenue collections generally" and were
"not earmarked in any way.,381
Congress's spending power was at issue, however, because the law
provided employers with credits for contributions made to a state un-
employment fund that satisfied certain conditions set forth in the
statute. Thus, employers in states that established an unemploy-
ment fund meeting the federal conditions were largely saved from
having to participate in two separate unemployment schemes. Sev-
eral of the conditions imposed on participating states were aimed at
ensuring that the state unemployment fund was an unemployment
fund in substance as well as name. But, the one condition that raised
serious questions involved a requirement that contributions to the
state unemployment fund be "immediately upon.., receipt be paid
over to the United States Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the
Unemployment Trust Fund., 38 3 Each state's "deposits" in the federal
Unemployment Trust Fund were maintained in a separate account,
from which the state could draw to pay unemployment benefits.
of the individual grants separately, Somin's argument sounds persuasive, but most conditional
grants-CIPA being one example-consist of a single statutory provision that does in fact cover
the entire country.
179 A private company's shareholder initiated the Helvering case and did not involve any state
as a party. The Court majority in Helvering consisted of the three dissenters from Butler, along
with Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Roberts, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. That Helvering
did not involve the same level of infringement of state sovereignty as the employment tax at is-
sue in Steward Machine is also clear from the breakdown of the Justices. Justices Sutherland and
Van Devanter, both of whom were in the Butler majority, joined the majority in Helvering, but
not in Steward Machine. As I describe below, Justice Sutherland's dissent in Steward Machine,
joined by Justice Van Devanter, addresses head on the state autonomy aspect of the case.
"' Of course, before Steward Machine the Court had often held that the Tenth Amendment
"preserves a field of autonomy" for the states such that, even if a particular law fell within an
exercise of one of Congress's enumerated powers, it might nonetheless be inconsistent with
principles of state sovereignty if the law regulated the states as "States." Indeed, the Court had
so held with respect to Congress's Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 "taxing" power. See Collector v.
Day, 78 U.S. (11 wall.) 113 (1870) (holding that Congress cannot, under its constitutional au-
thority to "lay and collect taxes," impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial officer of a state).
Steward Machine is simply the first spending power case.
Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 574.
"' Id. at 574-75.
38 Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620, Section 903(a)(3) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1103(a) (3)), quoted in Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 575 n.1.
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For the first time, then, the spending power was being used not
simply to further a goal that could be thought outside of Congress's
enumerated powers, but rather as part of an attempt to induce the
states to do something they might not have otherwise done. As we
will see, Congress's current approach to tying spending to legislative
action by the states is slightly different because the actual spending at
issue in Steward Machine (i.e., the credit toward the amount due to the
federal unemployment scheme) was not given directly to the states
but instead to its residents. Nonetheless, the law was clearly an at-
tempt to use federal spending to induce the states to establish their
own fund by holding out the carrot (or stick, depending on one's
view) of credits for a participating state's residents.
The law was challenged on a number of grounds. Of importance
here are two arguments, the first based on the "Tenth Amendment or
of restrictions implicit in our federal form of government"38 4 and the
second that the statute called "for a surrender by the states of powers
essential to their quasi-sovereign existence." 85 Though related, the
two were framed as separate arguments.
The thrust of the Tenth Amendment argument was that the stat-
ute's "dominant end and aim is to drive the state Legislatures under
the whip of economic pressure into the enactment of unemployment
compensation laws at the bidding of the central government. 3 6 The
Court's response to that argument was based on the theoretical
premise that continues to dominate discussion of the conditional
spending power: not every exercise of the spending power condi-
tioned on the state acting in a certain way constitutes "coercion." As
the Court put it:
The difficulty with the petitioner's contention is that it confuses motive
with coercion. "Every tax is in some measure regulatory. To some extent
it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared
with others not taxed." In like manner every rebate from a tax when
conditioned upon conduct is in some measure a temptation. But to hold
that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in
endless difficulties. The outcome of such a doctrine is the acceptance of
a philosophical determinism by which choice becomes impossible. Till
now the law has been guided by a robust common sense which assumes
the freedom of the will as a working hypothesis in the solution of its prob-
lems."
The party posture of the case also framed the Court's rejection of the
"coercion" argument. The claim that the state legislature was being
coerced was made not by the state itself but rather by a taxpaying
"4 Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 585.
... Id. at 593.
1 Id. at 587.
387 Id. at 589-90 (quoting Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 555-56 (1937)).
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employer. The employer's state had established an unemployment
compensation scheme that satisfied the federal criteria, and the em-
ployer was in effect challenging the state law that had been "coerced"
by the federal law. 88
The second holding of importance here was that the state was not
giving up any of its quasi-sovereign powers in passing a law complying
with the conditions necessary for its employers to be eligible for the
credit. Interestingly enough, the Court explicitly distinguished the
conditional unemployment tax credit from a contract between the
state and federal governments.3 8 9 As we will see, the contract analogy
pervades current thinking about the breadth of the conditional
spending power. The Court's rejection of the taxpayer's argument
was based on the fact that any alleged abdication of sovereignty was
based entirely on the consent of the state and that the federal gov-
ernment had no power, financial or otherwise, to compel the state to
act.3
9
0
Justice Butler dissented, concluding that the law violated the
Tenth Amendment.3 9 ' He continued to adhere to his view that the
Constitution incorporated the principle of "dual sovereignty." Ac-
cording to Justice Butler, the unemployment insurance tax-and-credit
scheme was simply regulation in disguise, and because Congress had
no power to enact laws paying unemployment benefits, it likewise had
no power to use the scheme to "persuade" states to do so. 92 Justice
Butler argued:
The provisions in question, if not amounting to coercion in a legal sense,
are manifestly designed and intended directly to affect state action ....
And, if valid as so employed, this "tax and credit" device may be made ef-
fective to enable federal authorities to induce, if not indeed to compel,
state enactments for any purpose within the realm of state power, and
generally to control state administration of state laws. 93
Starting from the "dual sovereignty" premise, whereby every
power belongs to either state or national government, the fact that
the unemployment insurance scheme was an attempt to induce state
action was unnecessary to Justice Butler's view that the statute was
Id. at 589 ("For all that appears, [the state] is satisfied with her choice, and would be
sorely disappointed if it were now to be annulled.").
Id. at 594-95.
Id. at 594-98.
Justice McReynolds also dissented. His dissent consists almost entirely of a verbatim quo-
tation of President Franklin Pierce's 1854 statement vetoing a law that would have provided for
a grant of public lands to the states "for the benefit of indigent insane persons." Pierce's state-
ment, and thus McReynolds's view, was based on the Madisonian view of the spending power.
See id. at 600-09 (McReynolds,J., dissenting).
39 Id. at 618 (Butler, J., dissenting).
393 Id. at 616-17 (ButlerJ., dissenting).
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unconstitutional. All that was relevant was that regulating in the field
of unemployment insurance exceeded Congress's powers.
More interesting than Butler's dissent, however, was Justice Suth-
erland's dissent, joined by Justice Van Devanter. Both Sutherland
and Van Devanter joined the majority in Helvering, voting to uphold
the Social Security Act's creation of a federal pension benefit pro-
gram,394 and both agreed that Congress could use its power of the
purse to induce states to adopt unemployment insurance legisla-
tion.9  What they found offensive about the law, however, were the
"administrative provisions" of the unemployment insurance scheme.
By requiring that states deposit their funds in the U.S. Treasury
"upon terms which make the deposit suspiciously like a forced loan to
be repaid only in accordance with restrictions imposed by federal
law,"3 9 the law went too far in infringing on the states' autonomy. In
Justice Sutherland's view, the statute effectively had the federal gov-
ernment sit "not only as a perpetual overseer, interpreter and censor
of state legislation on the subject, but, as lord paramount, to deter-
mine whether the state is faithfully executing its own law-as though
the state were a dependency under pupilage and not to be trusted."
3 97
Congress had conditioned the credit on a state's willingness to sur-
render to the national government the state's "governmental power to
administer its own unemployment law or the state payroll-tax funds
which it has collected for the purposes of that law." 99  The Act
thereby authorized federal agencies "to supervise and hamper the
administrative powers of the state to a degree which not only does not
comport with the dignity of a quasi sovereign state.., but which de-
nies to it that supremacy and freedom from external interference in
respect of its affairs which the Constitution contemplates. 3 99
In contrast to Butler and McReynolds' view that the principle of
enumerated powers simply precluded Congress from legislating in
the field of unemployment insurance, Sutherland's dissent thus fo-
cused on the impact of the law on the states' governmental functions.
For this reason, Sutherland's Steward Machine dissent might be seen in
some ways as another of the intellectual forbearers of the National
394 Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
... Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 610 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) ("I agree that the states are not
coerced by the federal legislation into adopting unemployment legislation. The provisions of
the federal law may operate to induce the state to pass an employment law if it regards such ac-
tion to be in its interest. But that is not coercion."); see also id. at 612 (stating that grants to
states for "old-age assistance" conditioned on state adoption of an old-age assistance law is con-
stitutional). This was not surprising, since it was Justice Sutherland who wrote for the Court in
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See supra note 377.
96 Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 612 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 613 (Sutherland,J., dissenting).
... Id. at 611 (Sutherland, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id. at 613-14 (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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League of Cities v. Usery Court's emphasis on "traditional governmental
functions, 40 0 (or what the pre-1937 Court often referred to as the "es-
sential"' ' or "ordinary4 2 state governmental functions). However,
what the Sutherland dissent in Steward Machine gives us that the many
pre-1937 cases cited in National League of Cities does not is a case in
which Congress is using the spending power (as opposed to one of
Congress's other powers) to effect a supposed surrender of a state's
"essential functions." There is a point, Sutherland concludes, at
which even an exercise of the spending power interferes with, as one
might put it in National League of Cities language, the "States Qua
States."4°  For understanding the spending power in the era of the
"new federalism," Sutherland thus gives us one hook.4
Although Steward Machine involved a challenge to an exercise of
Congress's spending power that allegedly infringed on principles of
state autonomy, the case did not address the more common situation
today-a federal grant of funds to the state itself conditioned on the
state complying with certain conditions.4 5 Although that distinction
is arguably of little import, it was not until 1947 that the Court
squarely faced a challenge to a conditional grant to the states on the
grounds that it infringed state autonomy. By that time, every single
member of the 1937 Court had been replaced.
In that 1947 case, Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Commis-
406sion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of the
Hatch Act that prohibited all state and local employees financed "in
whole or in part by loans or grants" from the national government
from "taki[ing] any active part in political management or in political
4W Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981); Nat'l
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976).
Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 172 (1911).
412 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 451 (1905).
Nat'l League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 847.
I am of course not saying that Justice Sutherland's view in Steward Machine is good law to-
day. As I explain in greater detail below, see infra Part IV.B, the scope of the spending power is
well-settled as a matter of current doctrine. As I further explain, however, that doctrine may be
open to reinterpretation in light of the Court's recent federalism decisions. I focus my discus-
sion of a possible change in spending power on Professor Baker's theory of the spending power
and her proposed test for spending power doctrine. See infra Part V.A. Nonetheless, if the
Court seeks to revive National League of Cities, then Justice Sutherland's partial dissent in Steward
Machine strikes me as a more plausible approach to limiting the spending power than does
Baker's. It seems to have a greater affinity to the Court's current focus on the "etiquette of fed-
eralism."
405 Interestingly, Title III of the Social Security Act, which authorized appropriations to be
made to states to assist in the administration of state unemployment insurance programs (i.e.,
unemployment insurance programs that satisfied the same federally imposed conditions) was
also challenged in Steward Machine. The Court punted on the issue, ruling that the constitu-
tional issue was not ripe since Congress had not actually appropriated any money pursuant to
Title III. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937).
330 U.S. 127 (1947).
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campaigns."0 7  The Court quickly rejected Oklahoma's Tenth
Amendment argument, again relying on the conclusion that no coer-
cion was involved when a state could, as Oklahoma had in fact done,
adopt "the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is
federal coercion. No infringement of sovereignty was involved, the
Court held. Indeed, the basis of the Court's rejection of the Tenth
Amendment argument is in fact a strict view of sovereignty in its clas-
sic sense. Under international law, a sovereign state has the power
"to make contracts and give consents bearing upon the exertion of
governmental power."' 5 Starting from this standpoint, the structure
of the Constitution in general and the Tenth Amendment in particu-
lar "protected, and did not destroy, [the states'] right to make con-
tracts and give consents where that action would not contravene the
provisions of the Federal Constitution., 4'0 Treating the state as a sov-
ereign, therefore, strengthened, rather than weakened, the argument
that a conditional grant to the states was constitutional.
B. Current Spending Power Doctrine: South Dakota v. Dole
In 1987, the Court consolidated its doctrine on conditional spend-
ing to states in South Dakota v. Dole.41' Dole arose out of a challenge to
the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment, which required
the Secretary of Transportation to withhold a portion of otherwise al-
locable federal highway funds from States "in which the purchase or
public possession.. . of any alcoholic beverage by a person who is less
than twenty-one years of age is lawful. 4 2 The statute was, in effect, a
financial inducement to states to adopt a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one, or, put another way, a financial penalty for states that
failed to adopt such a minimum drinking age. The Amendment was
passed in 1984, long before Lopez, and Congress's desire to connect
its regulatory goals with the spending power was due to the open con-
stitutional question whether the Twenty-first Amendment stripped
Congress of the power to regulate the minimum age of liquor con-
sumption, notwithstanding what otherwise would have been clear au-
thority to regulate under the Commerce Clause.
" Id. at 129 n.i. The same day, the Court sustained, in face of a First Amendment chal-
lenge, the constitutionality of the Hatch Act provision that prevented all federal employees from
engaging in political management or political campaigns. See United Pub. Workers (C.I.O.) v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
o Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Svc. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947).
United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 51-52 (1938); see also U.S. Civil Svc. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
at 144 n.20 (citing Bekins).
40 Bekins, 304 U.S. at 52.
." 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
412 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1998).
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In assessing the constitutionality of the statute under the spending
power, the Court first made clear that the power to impose condi-
tions on the receipt of federal funds flows naturally from the power to
spend. It then reaffirmed the Hamiltonian view of the Spending
Clause as articulated by the Butler Court."'
Drawing upon and consolidating past case law on the spending
power, the Court then set forth four limitations on the federal gov-
ernment conditioning funds to the states.4 4 The first limitation,
taken directly from the language of the Constitution, is that "the ex-
ercise of the spending power must be in pursuit of 'the general wel-
fare.' 41 5  The second limitation is, in effect, a clear statement rule:
"[I]f Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal
funds, it 'must do so unambiguously. . . , enabl[ing] the States to ex-
ercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.' 41 6 The third limitation is that the federal grant must
be related "to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs. 4 7  Finally, the fourth limitation on Congress's spending
power, which I mentioned briefly in describing the Court's opinion
in ALA v. United States, is known as the "independent constitutional
bar" rule. It states, quite simply, that "other constitutional provisions
may provide an independent bar to the conditional grant of federal
funds."
4 18
In Dole, the Court quickly dispensed with the first three limita-
tions. The Court first made clear that it considered the "general wel-
fare" limitation to be almost nonjusticiable: "We can readily con-
clude," the Court stated, "that the provision is designed to serve the
general welfare, especially in light of the fact that 'the concept of wel-
fare or the opposite is shaped by Congress... ,,,4'9 The Court then
noted that the statute was crystal clear as to the consequences a state
4" Dole, 483 U.S. at 206-07. See supra notes 335-38 and accompanying text.
4,4 Beyond the four limitations, the Court also noted that "in some circumstances the finan-
cial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pres-
sure turns into compulsion.'" Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301
U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). The Court gave little indication as to where that point might be.
Id. at 207 (citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)) (ellipsis
and alteration in original).
1' Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 453 U.S. 444, 461 (1978) (plurality opinion)).
"' Id. at 208.
4,1 Id. (quoting Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937)) (ellipsis in original). In a re-
cent article, Professor Eastman has argued that the Court has been wrong about the phrase
"general welfare" since Butler and that the phrase was originally understood as a limitation on
Congress's spending power. See generally John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the General
Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 63 (2001). But cf Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting the Spending
Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 90 n.5 (2001) (noting that all of Eastman's examples involve the po-
litical branches of government and that none of them justify a judicial check on the spending
power).
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would suffer if the state failed to raise its minimum drinking age and
then explained that the law was sufficiently germane to a federal in-
terest, namely reducing alcohol-related accidents and fatalities on the
nation's highway system.420
Because of the Twenty-first Amendment implications of the case,
the Court discussed the fourth limitation more fully, but nonetheless
concluded that the statute did not implicate the "independent consti-
tutional bar" rule. South Dakota argued that Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment a21 precluded Congress from establishing a national
minimum drinking age and that the "independent constitutional bar"
rule should be interpreted so as to prevent Congress from doing with
the spending power what it could not do directly with one of its other
powers. Declining to decide whether Congress had the power to im-
pose a national minimum drinking age, the Court made clear that
the "independent constitutional bar" rule "is not.., a prohibition on
the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empow-
ered to achieve directly.4 2 2 It further stated that "a perceived Tenth
Amendment limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs
[does] not... limit the range of conditions legitimately placed on
federal grants., 423 Rather, the "independent constitutional bar" rule
simply
stands for the unexceptionable proposition that the power may not be
used to induce the States to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional. Thus, for example, a grant of federal funds condi-
tioned on invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel
and unusual punishment would be an illegitimate exercise of the Con-
424gress's broad spending power.
The Court concluded that if South Dakota were "to succumb to
the blandishments offered by Congress and raise its drinking age to
21, the State's action in so doing would not violate the constitutional
rights of anyone. '420 There was thus no "independent constitutional
bar" to the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment./. 1426
Justice O'Connor dissented. While agreeing in principle with
the Court's four limitations on the spending power, Justice O'Connor
12o Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
411 Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment provides: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxi-
cating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
12 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
23 id.
121 Id. at 210-11. Given this characterization of the fourth prong, the Court seems to be mak-
ing clear that the federalism-based limits on the spending power are to be found only in the first
three prongs of the test.
:25 Id. at 211.
See id. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also wrote a short dissent, essen-
tially agreeing withJustice O'Connor. See id. at 212 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
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would have required a tighter nexus under the "germaneness" re-
quirement. In her view, a clear line could be drawn between permis-
sible and impermissible conditions on federal grants to states:
Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose require-
ments on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be
spent. A requirement that is not such a specification is not a condition,
but a regulation, which is valid only if it falls within one of Congress's
427delegated regulatory powers.
Justice O'Connor drew her germaneness requirement from a dis-
tinction that the Court articulated in Butler, between "a statute stating
the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effec-
tive only upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a
regulation which otherwise could not be enforced., 42 Since the Na-
tional Minimum Drinking Age Amendment was not aimed at specify-
ing how the highway funds were to be spent, it could only be upheld
if the law was a valid exercise of one of Congress's regulatory powers.
Justice O'Connor then concluded that, notwithstanding the Com-
merce Clause, the Twenty-first Amendment effectively reserved to the
States the exclusive power to regulate the age of the purchasers of
liquor.429 Thus, the law was not within Congress's regulatory powers,
and Justice O'Connor would have invalidated it.
Though she does not articulate it in quite these terms, Justice
O'Connor was proposing somewhat of a compromise between the
Hamiltonian and Madisonian view of the Spending Clause. The
spending power was not limited to the enumerated powers, but, when
exercised in a manner not otherwise within the enumerated powers,
the spending power was limited to "specifying how the money should
427 Id. at 216 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting the amicus curiae brief filed by the National
Conference of State Legislatures).
28 Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936)); see
also Baker, supra note 8, at 1961 (analyzing O'Connor's dissent). The Butler Court did not make
anything of this distinction in its holding. Rather, as noted above, see supra Part IV.A, the Court
effectively ignored the spending power issue in the case altogether, holding that the statute vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment and principles of dual sovereignty, since the statute was an attempt
to regulate in the guise of an exercise of the taxing and spending power.
4. While this approach might seem similar to saying that the Twenty-first Amendment im-
poses an "independent constitutional bar"-even more so if one were to assume that a law im-
posing a national minimum drinking age would fall within Congress's Commerce Clause power
in the absence of the Twenty-first Amendment, see infra note 431-Justice O'Connor intended it
to be analytically distinct. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 213 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I am also willing
to assume, arguendo, that the Twenty-first Amendment does not constitute an 'independent
constitutional bar' to a spending condition."). This makes sense, since the independent consti-
tutional bar rule, at least as articulated by the Court in Dole, prohibits the federal government
from using the spending power to "induce the States to engage in activities that would them-
selves be unconstitutional." Id. at 210. In the majority's characterization of the "independent
constitutional bar" rule, the focus is on whether a state accepting the conditional funds would
"violate the constitutional rights of anyone," id. at 211, not on whether the State's constitutional
rights have somehow been violated by the federal government.
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be spent., 450 In light of the Court's approach to the Commerce
Clause at the time,' this compromise still would have left Congress
with significant regulatory authority. But, given the Court's recent
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and the fact that virtually all federal
grants to states are conditional " such an interpretation of the
Spending Clause matters a lot more. In Part V, when I discuss Profes-
sor Baker's approach-an approach that derives from Justice
O'Connor's view-I will elaborate on this theme further.
Since South Dakota v. Dole, the Court has addressed the spending
power once more: in New York v. United States. 3  While the case is
best known for being the first time the Court held a federal statute
unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering principle ,43 New
York was also an explicit reaffirmation that the Court would continue
to defer to Congress on spending power matters. New York involved a
constitutional challenge to the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Amendments Act of 1985. Among the provisions at issue was a por-
tion of the statute known as the "monetary incentives." These provi-
sions permitted states with low-level radioactive disposal sites to im-
pose a surcharge on radioactive waste received from other States, part
of which the federal Secretary of Energy would place in an escrow ac-
count for payments to those states that complied with a series of
deadlines set forth in the federal statute.43
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor herself, the Court re-
jected the constitutional challenge to the "monetary incentives," con-
cluding first that the federal authorization of the state tax and the
collection of a portion of it by the federal government were valid un-
der the commerce and taxing powers; and second, that transferring
the money to states in exchange for compliance with federal dead-
lines for the safe disposal of radioactive waste satisfied the four Dole
factors and was thus a constitutional exercise of the spending power.
The State of New York, which challenged the provision, did not seri-
ously contend that each step of the provision was not within Con-
Dole, 483 U.S. at 216.
," Note that this is 1987, between Garcia (1985) and Lopez (1995). As noted above, the Court
did not address the question whether Congress would have had the power to pass a national
minimum drinking age (i.e., a federal prohibition on drinking below the age of twenty-one as
opposed to the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment, which simply conditioned funds
on states passing such a prohibition). But, putting aside the Twenty-first Amendment, there is a
good chance that a national minimum drinking age would have been upheld as a constitutional
exercise of the Commerce Clause at the time.
432 See RONALD L. WATTS, THE SPENDING POWER IN FEDERAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
13 (1999); id. at 56.
4" NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
" I discuss New York again in greater detail below when I discuss the anti-commandeering
principle in Part V.
"" New York, 505 U.S. at 152-53.
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gress's power. Rather, New York argued that Congress was not exer-
cising its spending power at all because of the way in which the
money was disbursed. Because the money collected from the sur-
charge was placed in a special escrow account rather than in the U.S.
Treasury, New York argued that the federal government was simply
the trustee of the funds, not the owner of the funds. This fact, New
York argued, meant that the expenditures could not be considered
an exercise of the federal spending power.436 The Court rejected this
argument, stating simply that the spending power
has never.., been thought to mandate a particular form of accounting.
A great deal of federal spending comes from segregated trust funds col-
lected and spent for a particular purpose .... The Spending Clause has
never been construed to deprive Congress of the power to structure fed-
eral spending in this manner.
437
Now, if we recall Butler, we can see that the Court does not have
this quite right. Surely, if Butler stands for anything, it stands for the
proposition that, when taxing and spending are intimately intercon-
nected in a single statutory scheme, the Court can inquire into
whether Congress is using its taxing and spending powers to regulate
in areas that would otherwise be outside federal power. Since there
was little doubt that the federal government could regulate the dis-
posal of low-level radioactive waste, the Court's overstatement here
probably made little difference. In any event, the Court could be
forgiven for omitting any mention of Butler, a case that was by then
thought of as representing an expansive Hamiltonian view of the
spending power (the case's dictum) rather than a cramped view of
Congressional regulatory powers (the case's actual holding).
The New York Court's failure to consider Butler at this point is in-
teresting for my purposes because most of the money affected by
CIPA (the E-rate discounts, but not the LSTA grants) comes from
"segregated trust funds collected and spent for a particular pur-
pose." 8 In essence, the New York Court precluded CIPA's challengers
... To be fair, the Court's characterization of this argument in the case ignored the fact that
it was very weakly made. It was one minor point in New York's Reply Brief, see Reply Brief for
Petitioner NewYork, 1992 WL 526750, at *5-7, NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
and barely touched upon at oral argument:
And by the way, I should say that the Government somehow thinks in its brief that the
Spending Clause is involved here because of the payments that go from the, some money
is going from the generators and some of it goes in an escrow fund. But the statute
makes it clear that's not Federal money. It's not appropriated, it's simply kept there. So
I simply don't understand the argument that the Government has made that that is, the
Spending Clause is involved here.
Transcript of Oral Argument, 1992 WL 687819, at *18-19.
... New York, 505 U.S. at 172-73.
" Id. at 172.
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from arguing that CIPA, like the Agricultural Adjustment Act, was
regulation in the guise of spending.439
At this point, let me return to Dole for a moment. As a matter of
doctrine under Dole, there seems little question that CIPA satisfies the
first three of the Court's limitations on the spending power. Indeed,
even the plaintiffs challenging CIPA's constitutionality conceded as
much. 44°
How the fourth part of the test, the independent constitutional
bar rule, plays out in the context of CIPA, however, raises some inter-
esting questions. As I noted above, both courts to address the consti-
tutionality of CIPA treated the fourth prong of the Dole test as crystal
clear. Because it states that Congress may not use its spending power
to "induce States to engage in activities that would themselves be un-
constitutional," one can treat their First Amendment challenge to
CIPA as if the spending power were not at issue in the case at all, i.e.,
under the fourth part of the Dole test a court simply asks whether in-
stalling filters in a public library violates the First Amendment. If in-
stalling filters on public library Internet access violates the First
Amendment, CIPA is itself unconstitutional. In short, the fourth
prong of the Dole test simply turns the whole case into an ordinary
First Amendment case. Given that I have been unable to find a single
case in which a court has invalidated an exercise of the spending
power under the "independent constitutional bar" rule, this is not an
implausible reading of the language in Dole. Indeed, textually, it is
almost unassailable. Nonetheless, the way the doctrine ends up work-
ing, a number of interesting things happen.
First, the rule is probably best seen as a rule embodying third-
party standing. 441 While an ordinary First Amendment challenge
could not be brought by the government body alleged to be violating
individuals' First Amendment rights, the independent constitutional
bar rule permits, as we see here, the libraries to challenge the consti-
tutionality of, in effect, their own (proposed) unconstitutional ac-
tion-i.e., installing the filters. In the context of the spending power,
it makes sense that the libraries are bringing this case, of course,
since they are the recipients of the conditional funds. It is not clear
that anyone other than the funding recipient would have had stand-
ing to challenge the constitutionality of funding conditions (though,
as I noted above, there were in fact many other plaintiffs in the case).
9 The Agricultural Adjustment Act, like the E-rate discount program, was a comprehensive
law that included both taxing and spending. One interesting difference, however, is that the
challengers in Butler did not want to be taxed, while the CIPA challengers were not complaining
about the tax at all. In fact, they liked every aspect of the statute (including the spending itself)
except the condition imposed on recipients of the funds.
... ALA 1, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 450 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
" I am indebted to my colleagues Ann Althouse and David Schwartz for this insight.
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Second, notice what the fourth prong of Dole does in terms of the
nature of the constitutional challenge. It changes it from a case
about federalism and the structure of government to a case about the
relationship between the individual and her government. The struc-
tural aspects of the case are completely lost in the analysis. This
should strike the reader as somewhat odd: the law being analyzed is a
federal law conditioning funds to state entities, and the only question
being asked is whether the recipients of the funds would violate the
First Amendment by complying with the condition. In essence, then,
an analysis under the independent constitutional bar rule requires
courts to ignore the complexity of a federal law that conditions funds
to states. This happens in a few different ways.
First, it takes the federal government out of the calculus alto-
gether. The relationship being probed when addressing the constitu-
tionality of the statute under the independent constitutional bar rule
is the relationship between the library (as a governmental entity) and
the individual. The federal government's role in the statute becomes
irrelevant to the analysis. The constitutional analysis of CIPA is thus
no different than if the libraries themselves were federal government
instrumentalities-that is, no different from a law that required the
442Library of Congress to install filters-or if the law being challenged
were either a state law mandating that all public libraries in the state
install Internet filters or even simply a decision by a local public li-
brary board to install filters as in Mainstream Loudoun.443 In each situa-
tion, one would ask a straight First Amendment question: "Does a li-
brary that installs filters on its Internet terminals violate the First
Amendment?" CIPA is being analyzed in exactly the same way, not-
withstanding the fact that it is a /ederal law and the libraries are local
(i.e., state) government entities.
442 It is worth noting that the Library of Congress is different from other public libraries in
that it makes no content selection decisions as to what materials it would have, since it obtains
virtually all published materials. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE MISSION AND STRATEGIC
PRIORITIES OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: FY 1997-2004 ("The Library of Congress is the only
library in the world that collects universally."), at http://www.loc.gov/ndl/mission.html (last
visited Sept. 17, 2004). The Library of Congress does exclude two categories of content, techni-
cal agriculture and clinical medicine, which are collected by the National Agricultural Library
and National Library of Medicine respectively. Id. The question of selection criteria by the Li-
brary of Congress has arisen, however. In American Council of the Blind v. Boorstin, 644 F. Supp.
811 (D.D.C. 1986), a federal district court held that the Librarian of Congress had violated the
First Amendment when he made a viewpoint-based decision to discontinue the production and
distribution of Braille editions of Playboy magazine.
24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (D. Va. 1998).
4' There is a slight complication because the case was brought as a facial challenge, and the
question was thus whether any local library could implement the condition in a constitutional
manner. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (discussing the Due Process
Clause); see generally Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 235 (1994) (analyzing the Supreme Court's facial challenge doctrine). This issue would
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Second, it takes the conditional spending power aspect of the law
out of the analysis as well. That is, the analysis would be no different
if the federal government passed a law mandating that all public li-
braries install filters, not just those that receive federal funding.
445
This is important because a number of commentators have argued
that the spending power provides an easy end-run around the limits
that a system of enumerated powers should impose upon federal
power." In short, the analysis mandated by the independent consti-
tutional bar rule avoids the complexity of the federal law completely.
Finally, let me note one fact that arguably could have ended the
inquiry before it even started: theoretically, some of the recipients of
the money conditioned by CIPA are private, nongovernmental librar-
ies.447 Thus, analyzing the issue under ordinary principles of a facial
challenge, one might argue that these private libraries could imple-
ment the condition in a constitutional manner (since they are not
subject to the Constitution at all) and that the facial challenge would
thus fail. The government never made this argument, and it may well
be too clever by half, but it helps make clear my principal point here,
that the independent constitutional bar rule, as a doctrinal tool, is a
lousy match for analyzing CIPA.
At some level, of course, one can understand why the doctrine
does this. The plaintiffs are challenging the statute not as exceeding
Congress's enumerated powers (i.e., the internal limitations inherent
in the scope of Congress's Article I, Section 8, Clause 1), but rather as
an affirmative external limitation on the spending power found in
the Bill of Rights. Yet, when the lead plaintiffs are local governmen-
tal entities (or an organization composed of such entities) suing the
national government, surely something about the structure of gov-
ernment is relevant.
Beyond the broad principles of constitutional federalism that sug-
gest, as I argued in Part III, that local governments should be decid-
ing whether to install filters on local library Internet terminals, a law
that brings the federal government into the business of regulating
public libraries-institutions that have been local throughout Ameri-
can history-necessarily raises constitutional issues beyond the First
Amendment questions that were addressed in the case. I explore
still be of relevance in a challenge to a state law mandating filters statewide, but would otherwise
not play into the analysis.
445 Of course, Congress might lack the regulatory authority to pass such a law in the first
place, which would render the First Amendment analysis unnecessary.
446 See, e.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A NATIONAL DIALOGUE 33 ("[I] t is hard to imag-
ine an intelligent drafter of federal legislation who could not achieve the desired goal by work-
ing around the Court's decision in the New York case (through resort to the power of the purse,
for example)."); Baker, supra note 8, at 1950.
... I discuss this issue later. See infra text accompanying note 529.
Sept. 2004]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
those questions in the following section by looking at one way that
spending power doctrine could be different and how that might have
affected the ALA Court's analysis.
V. CIPA AND THE SPENDING CLAUSE: THE IMPACT OF THE "NEW
FEDERALISM"
In the previous Part, I addressed the constitutionality of CIPA in
light of current spending power doctrine. I concluded that applying
Dole v. South Dakota to CIPA yields precisely the constitutional ques-
tion that the ALA II plurality and Justice Souter's dissent asked. Doc-
trinally, both opinions clearly got Dole right. As I previously argued,
however, because the doctrine leads to an analysis that ignores the
federalism aspects of the law, the doctrine avoids consideration of
much of the true impact of CIPA, and, more importantly, forces a
one-size-fits-all answer on a question (whether a public library should
filter Internet access) that would have been better addressed with
more local autonomy. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine
likewise ignores the federalism aspect of the case, though the district
court's dictum that the libraries had standing to make a claim on be-
half of their patrons (even though their patrons are not recipients of
the funding) does at least incorporate some of the complexity of the
relationships that CIPA implicates.
In this Part, I turn to the possibility that spending power doctrine
might change and the impact such changes could have on the consti-
tutionality of CIPA. In particular, I look at the work of the most
prominent "new federalism" theorist of the spending power, constitu-
tional scholar Lynn Baker. I analyze CIPA in light of Baker's pro-
posed doctrinal changes to the spending power. I conclude that un-
der Baker's proposal, there are good arguments that CIPA would be
declared unconstitutional on federalism grounds-that is, in such a way
that would have permitted local libraries to continue to filter. I fur-
ther conclude, however, that the federalism concerns I raised in Part
III are in some ways different from those that form the basis of
Baker's theory and proposal.
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A. Professor Baker's Proposed Limitation on the Spending Clause
If the Spending Clause is the next battle in the federalism war,448
Lynn Baker is surely one of the key generals. Her 1995 article in the
Columbia Law Review, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez,449 and
her more recent work4 50 have articulated a cogent vision of a limited
spending power, one that she argues would be in keeping with the
Court's recent foray into federalism-based limits on the federal gov-
ernment's power. In this Section, I describe both the theoretical un-
derpinnings of her proposal to tighten judicial scrutiny of the federal
spending power and the doctrinal changes she proposes. In Section
B, I apply her proposal to CIPA, and in Section C, I look back at some
of the federalism concerns CIPA raises and explore the match be-
tween those concerns and the way in which Baker's proposal would
apply to CIPA.
1. Theoretical Basis for Baker's Proposal
Baker's approach to the spending power begins with the proposi-
tion that courts should "presume invalid those offers of federal funds
to the states which, if accepted, regulate them in ways that Congresscould not lrec , m..,. .. 451 ..
could not directly mandate. In other words, when the federal gov-
ernment offers funds to the states with strings attached, such spend-
ing should be treated differently from other types of federal spending
and should be presumed invalid unless Congress could otherwise re-
quire those conditions in the absence of the congressional spending
power. Baker gives three interconnected reasons why conditional of-
fers of funds to the states should be treated as distinct from other
types of congressional spending. First, the fact that the federal gov-
ernment has a "monopoly power over the various sources of state
48 Having said this, Richard Garnett appears to be right that the Court does not appear par-
ticularly interested in restricting Congress's spending power. See Richard W. Garnett, The New
Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 & n.23 (2003).
As Garnett points out, in 2003, in Pierce County v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 n.9 (2003), the
Court dismissed in a footnote an argument that portions of the federal Hazard Elimination
Program, 23 U.S.C. § 152, exceeded Congress's spending power, an argument that was accepted
by the court below, see Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 651 ('Wash. 2001).
9 Baker, supra note 8.
- See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States' Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 104 (2000) [hereinafter Baker, States' Rights] (favoring a limited spending
power); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46
VILL. L. REV. 951 (2001) [hereinafter Baker, Political Safeguards] (same); Lynn A. Baker, Should
Liberals Fear Federalism, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 433 (2002) [hereinafter Baker, Liberals] (same); Lynn
A. Baker, The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 195 (2001) [hereinafter
Baker, Spending Power] (same).
'5' Baker, supra note 8, at 1935. As I explain in greater detail below, this presumption is re-
buttable. See infra text accompanying note 476.
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revenue .. render[s] any offer of federal funds to the states pre-
sumptively coercive., 452 Second, many conditional offers of federal
funds effectively provide a real choice to very few states, and "this mi-
nority cannot effectively protect themselves against the majority of
states through the political process. ' '453 Finally, because federal regu-
latory spending will reduce the "diversity among the states in the
package of taxes and services, including state constitutional rights
and other laws, that each offers to its residents and potential resi-
dents," conditional federal spending is likely to reduce aggregate so-
cial welfare.4' 4
Baker begins by noting that, when considering a conditional offer
of funds from the federal government, states will implicitly fall into
two categories: states that would otherwise comply with the condition
even in the absence of the offer of federal money (including both
those that already satisfy the condition and those that would happily
do so without the condition) and those that would not otherwise
comply with the condition (i.e., those that thereby face a real
14 455"choice" as to whether to forgo the federal funds).
Starting from this categorization, Baker turns to her first point
about the federal government's "monopoly" power over the sources
of state revenues. For states in the first category, the federal money is
a windfall, since, by presumption, the conditional offer of funds is not
affecting their behavior. States in the second category, however, are
effectively constrained in their decision making because there is no
other equivalent, alternative source of revenue-that is, there is no
"competitor" to the federal government's offer of funds. More im-
portantly, since the adoption in 1913 of the Sixteenth Amendment,
which granted Congress the power to tax income "from whatever
source derived, [and] without apportionment among the several
States,4 much of the money that the federal government has to of-
fer to the states derives from sources within the state that the state
would itself have been able to tap if the federal government did not
have the broad power to tax. Therefore, "when the federal govern-
ment offers a state money subject to unattractive conditions, it is of-
ten offering funds that the state readily could have obtained without
those conditions through direct taxation-if the federal government
did not also have the power to tax income directly. 4 57 Thus, Baker
argues, one way to view federal offers of conditional spending to the
152 Baker, supra note 8, at 1935.
453 Id.
45 Id.
155 Id. at 1935-36.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
Baker, supra note 8, at 1937.
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states is to view the federal government as "returning" money to the
states with unattractive conditions, money that the state could other-.• 458
wise get from its own populace without those conditions.
By itself, this might not be problematic if the state could both re-
fuse the conditional offer and, at the very least, get back its propor-
tionate share of the tax revenues that the federal government has to
"offer." But, of course, states that refuse a conditional offer of funds
from the federal government get nothing and are not entitled to any
rebate for their state's share of the tax revenues that the federal gov-
ernment is using to impose conditions on the state. In sum, federal
conditions on funding to states are necessarily coercive, Baker argues,
because at least some chunk of the revenues that the federal govern-
ment is "offering" to a particular state in fact derives from that state's
sources of revenues and is legitimately that state's right to have with-
out the condition.
Second, by itself, the fact that conditional spending is inherently
coercive would not be worrisome if one believed that the states could
effectively constrain the federal government's lawmaking power
through the political process. This, of course, is the basis of the the-
ory of the "political safeguards" of federalism made by, among others,
Herbert Wechsler40 and most recently Larry Kramer. Baker argues,
158 Id.; see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 152 (1993) (analogizing
conditional federal spending to states to "the thief who will resell stolen goods to [their] true
owner"); Matthew Adler & Seth Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, and
Yeskey, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 71, 107 ("Congress funds its conditional payments to the states
through the taxation of resources that would otherwise be available for state taxation and for
the (geographically variable) state programs that state taxation could fund."); Lino A. Graglia,
From Federal Union to National Monolith: Mileposts in the Demise of American Federalism, 16 HARV.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 129, 130-31 (1993) ("By extracting money from the now-defenseless states and
offering to return it with strings attached, the national government is able to control by prom-
ises of reward-some would say bribery-whatever it might be unable or unwilling to control by
threat of punishment."); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism's
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 124 ("There is no immediate sense [among the average
voters] that it is their own money being returned to them with strings attached and that the net
effect of the money's round trip to Washington is simply to carry the regulatory strings with it
back to the state."); cf Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimen-
talism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 425 (1998) ("A state that decides to refuse federal funds essen-
tially opts to subsidize the states that accept federal funds, because, of course, the state's refusal
does not result in a diminished federal tax burden for its citizens. This is a steep price to pay.").
, Baker, supra note 8, at 1935-39; Baker, States'Rights, supra note 450, at 106-07.
', Herbert Wrechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composi-
tion and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
46 Kramer, supra note 225. Jesse Choper has of course also written on a related issue, argu-
ing that the courts should preserve their political capital for individual rights cases by rendering
structural issues, including federalism, nonjusticiable. JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND
THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME COURT (1980); see also Gregory P. Magarian, Toward Political Safeguards of Self-
Determination, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1219 (2001) (discussing Choper's "statements on the political
safeguards of federalism").
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however, that the problems caused by a broad spending power are
different from those that the "political safeguards" of federalism pro-
tect, and judicial review is thus necessary to police the spending
power.46 ' As I noted in Part III, concerns about protecting state
autonomy from federal encroachment can be put into two broad
categories: first, "vertical aggrandizement," which involves "efforts by
the federal government to increase its own power at the expense of
the states"46 ; and, second, "horizontal aggrandizement," which in-
volves use of the federal lawmaking process to homogenize law across
the country by threatening the policy preferences of outlier or minor-
ity states.46 According to Baker, while the "political safeguards" of
federalism might protect state interests against federal oppression of
states (vertical aggrandizement), they do little to address the problem
that arises from federal offers of conditional funds to the states,
which is a problem of "horizontal aggrandizement," whereby some
states harness "the federal lawmaking power to oppress other states."
465
With respect to the problem of "horizontal aggrandizement," "[n]ot
only can the state-based allocation of congressional representation
not protect states against this use of the federal lawmaking power, it
facilitates it.
466
62 Others have criticized the "political safeguards" argument as well. See Marci Hamilton,
The Elusive Safeguards of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 93, 98-99 (2001)
(noting that state officials are more beholden to federal officials than the other way around);
Robert F. Nagel, Judicial Power and the Restoration of Federalism, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 52, 58 (2001) (noting that "political influence of state and local governments does
not seem to have been generally effective in reversing the trend towards centralization of
power"); William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 n.64
(1985) ("[I]t is difficult to take the political science portion of the whole 'safeguards' argument
as other than a good-hearted joke."); cf Bradford A. Clark, Putting the Safeguards Back into the
Political Safeguards of Federalism, 80 TEX. L. REV. 327, 329 (2001) (arguing that political safe-
guards do not reduce the necessity ofjudicial review); Saikrishna B. Prakash &John C. Yoo, The
Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1472 (2001) (same).
40 Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 435 n.8; see also Baker, Political Safeguards, supra note 450,
at 955-56; Baker &Young, supra note 229, at 109-10.
4M Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 435 n.8. See generally Baker & Young, supra note 229, at
109-10.
Baker, supra note 8, at 1940.
Id.; Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 439-41. Baker starts with the presumption that, in
general, Congress will not likely enact a conditional offer of federal funds unless a majority of
states would otherwise willingly comply with the stated condition (i.e., the states that fall into
what I referred to above as the first category of states) because most congressional representa-
tives would not wish to support a law that provides money to their own states with a condition
that a majority of their own constituents would independently oppose. So, for example, accord-
ing to Baker's theory, one would expect that South Dakota's representatives would have voted
against the statute that was challenged in South Dakota v. Dole, but one would expect that a ma-
jority of states already had drinking ages of twenty-one or more.
Unfortunately for Baker's thesis, neither of these assumptions is in fact true in the example
she considers the paradigm of this problem. First, both of South Dakota's senators voted in
favor of the amendment that imposed this condition. See 130 CONG. REc. 18,680 (Senators
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Baker's theory appears to rely on two very different arguments,
one normative and the other empirical. The first argument is a nor-
mative claim premised on the Constitution's supposed dividing line
between state and federal powers. So, consider Baker's first point,
that the conditional spending power can be used to the advantage of
a majority of states and to the detriment of a minority of states. Cer-
tainly one can make the same argument when Congress exercises any
federal power: the majority acts to its benefit and to the detriment of
the minority. Indeed, one might say that the spending power is less
problematic than many exercises of Congressional power, because a
federal mandate is more of an imposition than a conditional grant.
There is at least the possibility of noncompliance with respect to the
grant.467 Thus, to make the case that the power to pass a conditional
spending law is special we must assume that the federal government's
"regulatory powers" (i.e., all Article I powers except the conditional
spending power) properly limit the federal government's actual
power of regulation, and any use of the spending power to in effect
"regulate" the states is a normatively illegitimate exercise of the fed-
eral spending power.
There are two different reasons why this sort of "regulation" might
be illegitimate, both of which dovetail with broader federalism con-
cerns: (1) because a federal offer of funds to a state conditioned on
the state acting in a certain way-in contrast to most exercises of the
spending power-effectively "commandeers" state actors-either the
state lawmaking process or its administrative or executive apparatus;
468
Abdnor & Pressler both voting in favor of the relevant amendment). So too did both of the
senators from New York and Connecticut, which were in many ways the primary states targeted
by the legislation. Id. The relevant amendment was introduced by Senator Lautenberg of New
Jersey, one of whose principal worries was the fact that youth from New Jersey could drive to
New York and Connecticut, legally buy alcohol, and then drive home. Id. at 18,641-42 (quoting
newspaper reports about cross-border issues affecting New Jersey, particularly in light of the
New York assembly's rejection of a bill that would have raised the drinking age from 19 to 21).
Second, at the time of passage of the law, only sixteen states had a minimum drinking age of
twenty-one. See Aggressive Driving: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Surface Transp. of the House
Comm. on Transp. and Infrastructure, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of David F. Snyder, Assistant
Gen. Counsel, American Ins. Ass'n), available at 1997 WL 11235113.
7 One response to this point might be that the majority is more likely to use the spending
power, because it gets more of a benefit from a regulatory exercise of the spending power than
from the equivalent regulation (i.e., the windfall for doing what it already was doing or would
happily otherwise do). While this might be true, regulation can sometimes be essentially "cost-
free" to legislators in ways that are not applicable to a conditional spending law. It is perhaps
for this reason that the Gun Free Schools Act, see Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549 (1995),
and Violence Against Women Act, see United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), were not
passed as conditional spending laws in the first instance. At some level, those legislators pre-
ferred to pass a criminal statute to an appropriation.
.. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-27 (1997) (discussing the anti-
commandeering doctrine); NewYork v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-67 (1992) (noting that
"Congress may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
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and (2) such an offer effectively "regulates" a matter that, according
to the federal Constitution, lies exclusively within the state's control.
Of course, these two concerns are interrelated. The key, however, is
that implicit in Baker's argument about the use of the spending
power to condition grants to states is the view that such "regulation"
somehow encroaches on the minority states more than would a fed-
eral mandate within Congress's other regulatory powers.
The second argument really boils down to an empirical claim that,
in general, when majority states harness the federal lawmaking proc-
ess to pass laws conditioning grants to states, this will lead to an over-
all decrease in aggregate social welfare, an empirical claim that Baker
acknowledges involves assuming the answer to difficult, if not unan-
swerable, questions.469 Without this assumption, however, one could
make exactly the opposite argument from the one Baker makes. One
could concede her point about "horizontal aggrandizement," that
majority states use the federal lawmaking process to oppress minority
states, but still conclude as a normative matter that this is a good
thing.
To argue against "homogenization," therefore, Baker's assump-
tion that "horizontal aggrandizement" leads to a decrease in aggre-
gate social welfare is crucial. If it were otherwise, a good utilitarian
might simply respond that "horizontal aggrandizement" is a good
thing. One need not answer the question individually with respect to
a particular policy, but it does strike me that one would need to an-
swer it broadly with respect to exercises of the conditional spending
470power. I suspect that Baker's answer would revert to the line drawn
by the extent of Congress's regulatory powers and that she would ar-
gue that the ability of some states to use the spending power to ex-
tract a windfall for what they would otherwise do and to pressure
other states to abandon their own preferences should make us think
that this is the line where we want to maintain diversity. Depending
on where the line of Congress's regulatory powers is drawn, that is
probably a satisfactory answer, but whether that line is drawn in the
right place is of course the $64,000 federalism question.
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.'" (quoting Hodel v. Va.
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). 1 discuss the anti-
commandeering cases in detail below. See infra Part V.B.3.
'6 Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 439 n.21. One could of course consider goals other
than maximizing aggregate social utility, but I suspect that Baker assumes, in the words of Hart
& Sacks, that "[t]he Constitution of the United States and the various state constitutions com-
mit American society, as a formal matter, to... the objective of maximizing the total satisfac-
tions of valid human wants." HART & SAcKs, supra note 225, at 105.
'" Cf Ann Althouse, Why Talking About "States' Rights" Cannot Avoid the Need for Nonnative Fed-
eralism Analysis: A Response to Professors Baker and Young, 51 DuKE L.J. 363, 372-73 (2001) (argu-
ing that one needs a normative analysis about the costs and benefits that giving autonomy to
states will produce).
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If we return to the question of filters in public libraries for a mo-
ment, we can see how crucial these two normative assumptions are to
Baker's theory. Recall that Oregon's state constitution protects sexu-
ally explicit content, including content that satisfies the Miller defini-
tion of "obscenity" and that CIPA might thus force Oregon to choose
between the federal funds and changing what it deems to be a fun-
damental right of its citizens.47' It strikes me that there is nothing
wrong with this unless one assumes that (1) the federal government
should not be regulating the intrastate viewing of obscenity and (2)
interstate diversity on this question is normatively a good thing. The
Supremacy Clause can of course override state constitutions in any
number of circumstances, 472 and so, ultimately, Baker's theory de-
pends on these normative underpinnings. In Part III, I explained
why they are true for the question of filters on public library Internet
access, and there may be good reasons to think Baker is correct as her
theory applies to other circumstances, such as, for example, the ques-
tion of state benefits for gay partners. s It is not obvious, however,
that these assumptions hold true for all conditional federal grants to
the states.
Having described Baker's theory, I turn now to Baker's proposed
changes to spending power doctrine.
2. Baker's Proposed Doctrinal Changes to the Spending Power
Based on her argument about conditional funding to states, Baker
proposes a substitute test. As I noted earlier,474 she begins with the
idea that courts should presume invalid any "offer[] of federal funds
to the states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in ways that
471 See supra text accompanying notes 300-02.
47 Cf PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79-80 (1980) (treating a state consti-
tutional provision as a "statute" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which gives U.S. Supreme
Court review over the question of whether the state "statute" violates the Federal Constitution).
473 One of the prime examples Baker uses to illustrate her theory is the "not-so-hypothetical
state of affairs under which a majority of the states wishes to discourage homosexual relation-
ships." Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 437-38; see also Baker, States'Rights, supra note 450, at
108-09 ("As part of its unique package [of taxes and services, including state constitutional
rights and other laws], a state might choose.., to permit same-sex civil unions."). The use of
the example of gay rights is common among proponents ofjudicial enforcement of federalism.
Professor Van Alstyne explains what is probably the obvious reason for this:
I have chosen this example carefully, thinking that, by making California the experimen-
tal (and less criminally repressive) state, and by assigning to it the substantive rule that
strikes me as that which is frankly the better rule-such that the reader will want to be
skeptical of finding power in Congress to destroy it or effectively make it of no conse-
quence-one may see the federalism value of our Constitution sympathetically even as I
do.
Van Alstyne, supra note 237, at 781.
171 See supra text accompanying note 451.
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Congress could not directly mandate. 4 75 This presumption will be
rebutted upon a determination that the offer of funds constitutes "re-
imbursement spending" rather than "regulatory spending." "Reim-
bursement spending" legislation specifies the purpose for which the
states are to spend the offered federal funds and simply reimburses
the states, in whole or in part, for their expenditures for that pur-
pose. "Regulatory spending" involves the imposition of conditions
other than specifying how the offered federal funds are to be spent.
4
1
6
Although Baker's test certainly limits the power of Congress to
impose "conditions" on federal spending, the distinction between re-
imbursement and regulatory spending does not appear to be tied di-
rectly to the functional arguments Baker makes about why the federal
spending power should be limited. After all, all federal funds come
from sources that would otherwise be available to the states to tax and
thus all spending that would not otherwise fall under one of Con-
gress's "regulatory" powers should be equally suspect. Thus, her pro-
posed test, while certainly providing a significant limitation on the
federal spending power, does not appear to provide a tight fit with
her normative theory. Nonetheless, the natural response would have
to be, "so, what?" After all, one suspects she would respond that the
"fit" is less important than providing a serious limitation on the con-
ditional spending power without reverting to the Madisonian view.
As I noted above,477 Baker's proposed test is a variation of the pro-
posed approach to the "germaneness" prong that Justice O'Connor
articulated in her dissent in South Dakota v. Dole, which in turn derives
from dicta in United States v. Butler. In addition to this direct connec-
:75 Baker, supra note 8, at 1916.
76 Id. at 1962-63. To explain the distinction between "reimbursement" and "regulatory"
spending, Baker gives an example of the federal government providing funds to those states
that make the death penalty available for first-degree murder. The first thing to note is that
Congress could not directly mandate that states pass a law providing that the death penalty be
available for first-degree murder. So, a federal grant of funds conditioned on a state doing so
would be, under Baker's scheme, presumed to be invalid. To explain the distinction between
"reimbursement" and "regulatory" spending, Baker posits two different laws: one that would
provide what she refers to as "Death Penalty Funds" and another that would provide what she
refers to as "Law Enforcement Funds." "Death Penalty Funds" would be "[f]unds in the amount
of [participating states'] demonstrated costs of executing those sentenced to death for first-
degree murder." Baker, States' Rights, supra note 450, at 112. "Death Penalty Funds" would be
what Baker refers to as "reimbursement spending" because providing such funds would reim-
burse the state for the costs associated with passing the laws that the federal government wants
passed. In contrast, "Law Enforcement Funds" would be "[flunds in the amount of $1.00 per
resident according to the most recent federal census" to be used "to provide beat cops who will
daily patrol the state's urban neighborhoods on foot." Id. "Law Enforcement Funds" would be
what Baker refers to as "regulatory spending," though it is pretty clearly just an example, since
"regulatory spending" could be anything other than funds tied to the actual costs associated
with the condition the law imposes, namely that the state make the death penalty available for
first-degree murder.
171 See supra note 432.
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tion with Butler, Baker's proposed test may well share a deeper con-
nection to Butler as well. As I argued earlier, the Butler Court saw the
taxing and the spending aspects of the Agricultural Adjustment Act as
inextricably intertwined, and saw the taxing-spending combination as
simply "regulation" in disguise. The pre-1937 Court was far more
willing to look into the question of whether congressional use of the
taxing power was a pretext for regulation that would otherwise be
outside of the federal government's power. Baker wants courts to do
the same thing. The only difference is that she wants to do it with the
spending power, not the taxing power. Yet, to the extent that one
sees the spending power as inextricably intertwined with the taxing478
power -and, there seems little doubt that, based on Baker's norma-
tive criticisms of the federal government's ability to condition funds
based on revenues that would otherwise be free to the states to tax,
she does-Baker is simply reviving the pre-1937 Court's notion that
the Court must not permit Congress to regulate in the guise of the
taxing power and expanding that principle to the spending power.479
B. Application of Professor Baker's Approach to CIPA
Having described Baker's proposed test, let me now turn to apply-
ing it to the Children's Internet Protection Act.
1. Introduction
There is a strong argument that CIPA would fail to pass muster
under Baker's proposed two-part approach to the Spending Clause.
First, as I explain below, 4 0 under current doctrine, Congress would
likely not have authority to pass a law mandating that public libraries
install filters on Internet access, as such a law would exceed Con-
gress's power under the "state sovereignty principle" as embodied in
the Court's recent "anti-commandeering" cases: New York v. United
4811States 8' and Printz v. United States.482 Second, CIPA's conditional offer
of funds to libraries would be considered "regulatory spending"
rather than "reimbursement spending., 483  Therefore, Baker's ap-
proach, if adopted by the Court, would result in CIPA's invalidation
478 And, recall, the prevailing view is that the spending power is implied from Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 1, which also gives Congress the "Power to lay and collect taxes." U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 8, cl. 1; see supra Part IV.A.
... See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 38 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Van Al-
styne, supra note 237, at 779-80.
4" See infra Part V.B.2-V.B.3.
48' 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
48 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
48 See infra Part V.B.4.
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under the Spending Clause without any consideration of the First
Amendment at all.
In the next two subsections, then, I turn to the question of
"whether the condition attached to the proffered federal funds
would, if a state accepts the offer, have a regulatory effect that Con-
gress could not directly mandate." 4 Analytically, the easiest way to
do this is to imagine CIPA as a direct regulation rather than as a con-
ditional funding program. So, for the next two subsections, I will re-
fer again to "Regulatory CIPA," which I discussed in Part III. "Regu-
latory CIPA" is a hypothetical federal law that requires all public485
libraries to install filters, rather than make filters conditional on re-
ceipt of the E-rate discounts and LSTA funding.
2. "Regulatory CIPA " and the Commerce Clause
The Court has "identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power., 486 First, "Con-
gress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.'087
Second, Congress may "regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.,
488
Third, Congress may "regulate those activities having a substantial re-
lation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce.,49
I need not dwell too long on the Commerce Clause analysis. Most
federal laws are premised on the third category, regulation of activi-
ties that "substantially affect" interstate commerce. Under this cate-
gory, one could certainly argue that, with Lopez and Morrison, the
Rehnquist Court has shifted its analysis away from the cumulative in-
terstate effects of the activity being regulated and towards asking
whether the nature of the intrastate activity being regulated is in fact
"commercial" or "economic., 49 One might, on this theory, be able to
48' Baker, supra note 8, at 1983.
115 Because the funding that CIPA conditions is available to nongovernmental libraries, this
is, strictly speaking, not precisely the equivalent of a CIPA mandate. I explore this fact in more
detail below. See infra text accompanying notes 529-30.
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995) (citations omitted).
417 Id. (citations omitted).
488 Id.
4" Id. at 558-59.
411 See LAURENCE TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 819 (3d ed. 2000) (arguing that post-
Lopez the focus of the Court's attention in "substantial effects" cases "will not be simply on
whether the cumulative or aggregated effects on interstate commerce of an intrastate activity can
be called substantial, but rather on whether there is a colorable claim that the intrastate activity
itself is 'commercial' or 'economic'"); see also Lopez, 514 U.S. at 568-83 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598, 609-11 (2000).
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argue that the activities being regulated by Regulatory CIPA, the
prevalence of obscenity, child pornography, and "harmful to minors"
materials on public library Internet terminals, are not sufficiently
"commercial" to permit the aggregation of their effects for purposes
of the "substantial effects" test. ' Even if one could make the argu-
ment, however, it seems very likely that the Internet would be viewed
as a "channel" of interstate commerce,452 and regulating it, even-as
Regulatory CIPA does-at the endpoint, would arguably fall into the
first category of permissible regulation under the Commerce Clause.
The E-rate discounts are part of a federal program regulating inter-
state telecommunications and, in particular, regulating the conduit
through which vast amounts of interstate commercial activity takes
place. Let me assume, then, that Congress could pass Regulatory
CIPA under the Commerce Clause. Doing this does not end the
analysis, however, as the Court has made clear that the state sover-
eignty principle can invalidate federal laws even if they are within
493Congress's Article I powers.
3. "Regulatory CIPA " and Federal Commandeering of State Officers
For the first time in 1992, in New York v. United States, the Court
held a federal law unconstitutional under what is now colloquially re-
ferred to as the "anti-commandeering doctrine.494  The law chal-
lenged in New York, the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amend-
ments Act of 1985, arose out of the national shortage of disposal sites
for low-level radioactive waste. Congress enacted a number of provi-
'9' Given the number of commercial purveyors of sexually explicit materials, I suspect the
argument would in any event be weak.
4902 See, e.g., Am. Libraries Ass'n v. New York, 969 F. Supp. 160, 161 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (analogiz-
ing the Internet to a highway or railroad system). By citing this case, I do not mean to say its
dormant Commerce Clause analysis is correct, but simply that the analogy of the Internet to a
highway or railroad is probably sufficient for purposes of Congress's Commerce Clause author-
ity.
493 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923-24 (1997) ("When a 'La[w] ... for carrying
into Execution' the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty ... it is not a
'La[w] ... proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,' and is thus, in the words of
the Federalist, 'merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation' which 'deserve [s] to be treated as such."').
194 505 U.S. 144 (1992). New York is the first case to invalidate a federal statute on these
grounds, though dicta in previous cases indicated the possibility of such a doctrine. See Hodel v.
Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981); see also Bowen v. Am. Hosp.
Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 642 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that "State child protective services
agencies are not field offices of the HHS bureaucracy, and they may not be conscripted against
their will as the foot soldiers in a federal crusade"); FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761-64
(1982); id. at 781 n.8 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). But
see South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 513-15 (1988) (rejecting the theory of "commandeer-
ing" in case upholding, against a Tenth Amendment challenge, the constitutionality of law that
requires state and local bonds to be registered to get federal income tax exemption for bond
interest).
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sions designed to encourage states, either alone or in "regional com-
pacts" with other states, to increase the nation's low-level radioactive
waste-disposal capacity.
The law included three different types of "incentives": monetary
incentives, access incentives and the "take title" provision. The
"monetary incentives" worked as follows: states with disposal sites
(the "sited states") could impose a tax on waste received from other
states (the "nonsited states"), a portion of which would be placed into
a federal escrow account. Money from the escrow account would
then be distributed to states that reached a series of milestones to-
wards developing sites of their own. The "access incentives" consisted
of congressional authorization for the sited states to increase the cost,
over time, for nonsited states to dispose of the waste and, eventually,
to deny "access" to the disposal site altogether. Finally, what the
Court referred to as the "take title" provision set a specific date on
which
each State in which such waste is generated, upon the request of the gen-
erator or owner of the waste, shall take title to the waste, be obligated to
take possession of the waste, and shall be liable for all damages directly or
indirectly incurred by such generator or owner as a consequence of the
495
failure of the State to take possession of the waste .
The Court upheld both the monetary and access incentives,496 but
invalidated the "take tile" provision. The Court saw the "take title"
provision as giving state governments a "choice" between two options:
(1) a forced transfer of the waste (along with the accompanying li-
ability), and (2) a mandate to regulate the disposal of the waste ac-
cording to the instructions of Congress, neither of which Congress
could independently mandate. A forced transfer "would 'comman-
deer' state governments into the service of federal regulatory pur-
poses,, 497 as would an order from the federal government requiring a
state to regulate in a particular fashion. 498 "A choice between two un-
constitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all. Ei-
ther way, 'the Act commandeers the legislative processes of the States
by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
,,499program.
Among the arguments the United States made was that, under the
Supremacy Clause, state courts were required to enforce federal law;
that this requirement amounted to federal "direction" of state courts;
495 42 U.S.C. § 2021e(d) (2) (C) quoted in New York, 505 U.S. at 153-54.
4" As I noted earlier, see supra Part IV.B, the Court's upholding of the "monetary incentives"
was a reaffirmation of Congress's broad spending power under Dole.
491 New York, 505 U.S. at 175.
49 Id. at 176.
' Id. (quoting Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288).
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and that such "direction" was comparable to the "commandeering" of
state legislatures. The Court rejected that argument, noting that
"[n]o... constitutional provision [comparable to the Supremacy
Clause] authorizes Congress to command state legislatures to legis-
late. '0°  Key to the decision, then, was a distinction between state
courts and state legislatures. In the opinion's final paragraph, the
Court reiterated its holding, but added a little twist, stating that
"[t]he Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or
administer a federal regulatory program., 50 1 In the two words "or
administer," the Court threw a dictum into the opinion that would
have expanded its holding significantly. State courts could clearly be
"commandeered," and after New York, state legislatures could not be.
The open question was whether state executives or administrative
agencies would likewise be subject to the anti-commandeering rule.
In Printz, the Court answered the question implicitly left open in
New York, extending the New York rule to state executive branch offi-
cials. Printz involved what were known as the "interim provisions" of
the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act. Passed in 1993, the
Brady Act required the United States Attorney General to create a na-
tional instant background-check system in order to enforce the 1968
Gun Control Act's prohibition on the transfer of handguns to certain
individuals (e.g., convicted felons, those under twenty-one, etc.).
Congress gave the Attorney General approximately five years to cre-
ate the system. As a stop-gap measure for the intervening period, the
Brady Act also imposed certain interim provisions until the national
instant background-check system was established.
Under these interim provisions, a firearms dealer who sought to
sell a handgun had to, among other things, provide the "chief law en-
forcement officer" (CLEO) of the would-be purchaser's residence, a
local government official such as a sheriff or police chief, with a copy
of what was known as the "Brady Form." The Brady Form consisted
of a sworn statement by the would-be purchaser that he did not fall
into any of the categories of individuals prohibited from buying
handguns under the Gun Control Act. The CLEO was then required
to "make a reasonable effort to ascertain within 5 business days
whether receipt or possession [of the handgun] would be in violation
of the law, including research in whatever State and local recordkeep-
ing systems are available and in a national system designated by the
Attorney General. 50 2 This "reasonable effort" to determine whether
federal law was being violated was all the statute required the CLEO
to do. Even if the CLEO were to determine that the proposed sale
Id. at 178-79.
,o Id. at 188.
0 Print v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 903 (1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) (2002)).
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violated the Gun Control Act, the CLEO did not have to do anything
further, though the CLEO was permitted to notify the gun dealer.
Extending New York, the Court held that the Brady Act's interim
provisions violated the "state sovereignty principle., 50 3  According to
the Court, the Constitution embodies a notion of "dual sovereignty"
that prohibits the federal government from acting "upon and
through the States." "The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution
that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States," the Court said, echoing its conclusion in New York. 50 4 That
principle applies as much to Congress's attempt to force State execu-
tive officers to participate in the enforcement of federal law as it does
when Congress seeks to force States, in their legislative capacity, to
promulgate laws. As the Court put it, harkening back to the final
paragraph of its opinion in New York, " [t] he Federal Government may
not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory pro-
,,505
gram.
The scholarly commentary has largely been critical of Printz, ques-
tioning the Court's formalistic approach to the case; its failure to link
the reasoning with the policy reasons underlying the principles of
constitutional federalism that it was purporting to embody;5 6 and the
0 The Court also concluded that the Brady Act "would ... have an effect upon ... the sepa-
ration ... of powers between the three branches of the Federal Government itself" because it
effectively transfers federal executive branch power to thousands of CLEOs in the 50 States,
who are left to implement the program without meaningful Presidential control." Id. at 922.
Then-Professor (nowJudge) Jay Bybee has suggested thatJustice Scalia, the author of the Printz
majority opinion, essentially pulled the wool over the eyes of the rest of the Court with this sec-
tion of the opinion by effectively incorporating the vision of a unitary executive that he outlined
in his dissent in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727 (1988). See generally Jay Bybee, Printz, The
Unitary Executive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court's Pocket?, 77
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 (2001) ("Justice Scalia picked the Court's pocket clean on separation
of powers.").
4 Printz, 521 U.S. at 920 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 166).
Id. at 933 (quoting New York, 505 U.S. at 188) (emphasis added).
See David Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377, 411-14 (2001)
(criticizing Printz as undermining local authority because the federal statute was protecting lo-
calities from the negative externalities of gun markets in neighboring jurisdictions and noting
that the U.S. Conference of Mayors supported the law); Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sover-
eignty, and the Limits of Formalism, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 199, 239-43 (criticizing the Court's reason-
ing in Printz). But see New York, 505 U.S. at 187-88 ("The result may appear 'formalistic' in a
given case to partisans of the measure at issue, because such measures are typically the product
of the era's perceived necessity."); Allison H. Eid, Federalism and Formalism, 11 WM. & MARY BILL
RTs. J. 1191 (2003) (arguing that the Court's "New Federalism" decisions, including New York
and Printz, are in fact a healthy mix of formalism and functionalism and that this mix better
promotes federalism values than would an approach based solely on functionalism). In New
York, Justice O'Connor explicitly stated that the supposed benefits of federalism "need not con-
cern us here," citing Butler for the proposition that "'[t]he question is not what power the Fed-
eral Government ought to have but what powers have in fact been given by the people."' 505
U.S. at 157 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936)); see also Michael C. Dorf,
Instrumental and Non-instrumental Federalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 829 (1997) (connecting Justice
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historical basis on which the Court purported to rely. 07 Even those
who support the Court's holding have done so on different grounds0 8
or have supported it simply based on the broad principle thatjudicial
review of federalism principles has salutary effects. 1
Putting these criticisms aside for the moment, the more signifi-
cant problem for my purposes is understanding the contours and im-
plications of the anti-commandeering doctrine, particularly given the
Court's arguable backtracking three years later in the unanimous
opinion in Reno v. Condon." What, if anything, do these cases really
hold and where might Regulatory CIPA fit into the anti-
commandeering principles the Court announced?
Matthew Adler and Seth Kreimer have given what is perhaps the
most succinct articulation of the doctrinal boundaries of the Court's
"anti-commandeering" cases. According to Adler and Kreimer, a
federal law will be unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering
principle if it satisfies all five of the following conditions: 5 '
a. the law actually "commandeers" state officials (i.e., requires state ex-
ecutive officials to implement federal law or requires a state legisla-
ture to enact a law), rather than imposing a broad preemption of
state law;512
b. the law imposes an affirmative requirement on state officials, rather
than making the commandeering conditional on the acceptance of
federal funds or on the nonpreemption of state law (i.e., condition-
O'Connor's statement with non-instrumental approaches to federalism in the writings of other
Justices).
o See, e.g., Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The Trials of an Occasional
Originalist, 70 U. COLO. L. REv. 953 (1999) (criticizing the historical argument in Printz).
'- See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813 (1998) (defending the
anti-commandeering doctrine, but criticizing the Court's sole reliance on the political account-
ability rationale).
See Vicki C. Jackson, supra note 247, at 2215-17 (arguing in favor of judicial enforcement
of federalism principles).
510 528 U.S. 141 (2000). See infra text accompanying notes 527-28.
5" Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 76-77.
512 As do many other scholars, Adler and Kreimer view the commandeering/preemption dis-
tinction as "most plausibly and sympathetically fleshed out in terms of (some version of) the
action/inaction distinction," id. at 89; that is, "commandeering" means imposing an affirmative
duty on state officials while "preemption" amounts to imposing a negative duty. See id. at 89-95.
Thus, another way to characterize this first requirement is to say that the law must impose an
affirmative obligation on state officials, rather than simply requiring state officials to refrain
from acting. Adler and Kreimer further argue that many of the principles of federalism do not
justify this distinction. See id. at 95-101. 1 need not worry about this criticism at the moment as
I am simply attempting to apply the doctrinal boundaries of the Court's anti-commandeering
cases to Regulatory CIPA.
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ally using the carrot of federal spending or the stick of preemption
exempts a federal law from the anti-commandeering doctrine);
c. the law is targeted at state officials and is not "generally applicable"
to both state officials and private persons/organizations;
d. the officials commandeered are exercising legislative or executive
rather than judicial functions; and
e. the requirement is grounded in the Commerce Clause or Congress's
other Article I powers, rather than in the grants of power to Con-. , 515
gress in the Reconstruction Amendments.
Analyzing these conditions, there is a good (though by no means
unassailable) argument that Regulatory CIPA would violate the anti-
commandeering doctrine. First, based on Printz, a court would likely
conclude that Regulatory CIPA commandeers local officials. Public
librarians are local government officials just like police officers, and
Regulatory CIPA requires them to "implement" federal law by man-
dating that they install "technological protection measures" on their
Internet access. Compared with the federal commandeering of the
CLEOs under the Brady Act-which required merely that the CLEOs
"make a reasonable effort"5"6 to determine whether a particular sale
of guns violated federal law-Regulatory CIPA's imposition on local
librarians is significant. Not only does the law require libraries to in-
stall filters, but the libraries must also "adopt and implement an
513 New York explicitly made this distinction. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-
68 (1992). In addition, the majority in Printz did not contradict Justice Stevens's statement in
dissent that conditional funding continued to be an example of the type of "cooperative feder-
alism" that would be permitted under New York. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 960
(1997) (StevensJ., dissenting).
5"4 This "intimat[ion]," as Adler and Kreimer put it, makes the most sense when footnote
seventeen of the Printz majority's opinion is read in light ofJustice Stevens's dissent making just
this distinction. See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 110. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued
that the opinion does not undermine "the three mechanisms for constructing [cooperative fed-
eralism] programs that New York expressly approved[,] ... [including programs] that affect[]
States and private parties alike." Printz, 521 U.S. at 960 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He continues
on by claiming that the "Court does not disturb the conclusion that flows directly from our
prior holdings that the burden on police officers would be permissible if a similar burden were
also imposed on private parties with access to relevant data." Id. at 961. The Court's response,
while rejecting Justice Stevens's premise by claiming that, in this context, a law that covered
both private persons and state officials was "impossible" to conceive of, did explicitly acceptJus-
tice Stevens's claim that the holding preserved a line between laws that target states and those of
general applicability. Id. at 932 n.17 (noting that "lilt is undoubtedly true" that a law that
placed a similar burden on both private parties and police officers would be permissible).
As a side point, let me emphasize that Adler and Kreimer, writing before the Court's deci-
sion in Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (1999), characterize that requirement-as with the
others-as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a court to find a law unconstitutional
under the anti-commandeering principles of New York and Printz. In Condon, South Carolina
argued that, by itself, the fact that a law was targeted to the states was enough to render it un-
constitutional. The Court rejected this argument. See infra text accompanying note 528.
55 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 76-77.
... 18 U.S.C. § 922(s) (2) (2002).
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Internet safety policy,"517 one that addresses not only protecting mi-
nors from inappropriate or harmful content online, but also "'hack-
ing' and other unlawful activities by minors online" and "unauthor-
ized disclosure, use, and dissemination" of personal information
about minors. In any event, as both the explicit holding and the
Court's language indicate, there does not appear to be a de minimis
exception to the anti-commandeering principle. 519
The second requirement, that the law not be a conditional spend-
ing or conditional preemption law, is easily met. Recall that, at the
moment, we are assuming a world in which Professor Baker's view of
the spending power has prevailed 20 and are analyzing Regulatory
CIPA, rather than CIPA itself. Thus, at this level of analysis, I am ex-
plicitly ignoring, as Baker no doubt would, both the explicit holding
in New York that conditional spending laws are not subject to the anti-
commandeering principle52' and the fact that Printz, though arguably
more equivocal, does not undermine that conclusion.
"' 47 U.S.C. § 254(l)(1)(A) (2002).
518 Id.
59 The Court did appear to create a distinction between laws that require state officials to
participate in a federal program and those that require merely that the states provide informa-
tion to the federal government, leaving open the question whether the latter were covered by
the anti-commandeering principle. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (noting that the Court was not
deciding the constitutionality of laws that "require only the provision of information to the Fed-
eral Government"-in contrast to those that involve "the forced participation of the States' ex-
ecutive in the actual administration of a federal program"); see also id. at 935, 936 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting that "the Court... refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local authorities pursuant to its
Commerce Clause powers are similarly invalid"). However one might characterize Regulatory
CIPA, it seems clearly no different in kind from the interim provisions of the Brady Act and
could not reasonably be characterized as an "information reporting" requirement.
'" Baker herself of course recognizes that her proposal is not law and is specifically pre-
cluded not only by Dole but also by New York and Pfrintz.
12' New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992).
By "equivocal," I mean two things: first, the holding in Printz did not involve a spending
power issue, whereas in New York, the Court not only distinguished between conditional spend-
ing and the "take title" provisions, but specifically upheld the former. See Adler & Kreimer, su-
pra note 458, at 103 (noting that this "demarcation was integral to the holding of New York").
Second, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court could be seen as leaving open the possibility that
this distinction might not survive when he alluded to conditional spending and then said, "[w]e
of course do not address these or other currently operative enactments that are not before us; it
will be time enough to do so if and when their validity is challenged in a proper case." Printz,
521 U.S. at 918. See Baker, States' Rights, supra note 450, at 115-16 (describing this portion of
Justice Scalia's opinion as support for the possibility that the Court would overrule Dole). But see
Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that the Printz holding permits Con-
gress "to amend the interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with
the States if it wishes, as it does with a number of other federal programs"); Adler & Kreimer,
supra note 458, at 103 (noting that the distinction between commandeering on the one hand
and conditional spending or conditional preemption on the other "was implicitly reaffirmed by
the Court in Printz"); supra note 448 (noting that the Court seems singularly uninterested in
changing spending power doctrine).
Sept. 2004)
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
It is worth noting at this point that this assumption may not be as
problematic as it first appears. As Adler and Kreimer note, the dis-
tinction between commandeering on the one hand and cooperative
federalism laws (conditional funding and conditional preemption
laws) on the other is both slippery and arguably unsupported by any
of the principles of constitutional federalism on which it purports to
rely.
523
According to Adler and Kreimer, "the constitutional permissibility
of conditional spending and conditional preemption threatens to
make the anticommandeering rule of Printz and New York a practical
nullity, 52 4 because of the problem with "distinguishing between the
impermissible threat of a 'sanction' and a permissible threat to ter-
minate federal funding., 525  Naturally, to the extent that the second
requirement is maintained in the case law, it does so because of
Dole.
526
The third requirement is that the law be targeted at state officials,
rather than being generally applicable to state officials and private
persons alike, and it is here that Regulatory CIPA may survive if the
Court is serious about the broad interpretation of what it means to be
a "generally applicable" law it gave in Reno v. Condon.2 Condon was a
constitutional challenge by South Carolina to the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act ("DPPA"), a federal law that prevented the states from
disclosing a driver's personal information without the driver's con-
sent. In upholding the law, the Court rejected an argument that
"Congress may only regulate the States by means of 'generally appli-
cable' laws, or laws that apply to individuals as well as States. 521 While
the Court refused to decide whether a law that regulates only the
states renders the law, by virtue of that fact alone, unconstitutional,
the Court clearly gave broad meaning to what constitutes a "generally
applicable" law. Because the law applied not only to the states as the
initial suppliers of the information but also to private resellers or re-
disclosers of that information, the Court considered the DPPA a
"generally applicable" law.
52' Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 104-05.
524 Id. at 106; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 917-18 (declaring the irrelevance of the government's
claim that a number of other federal statutes "require the participation of state or local officials
in implementing federal regulatory schemes," grouping together "conditional funding" grants
with laws that "require only the provision of information to the Federal Government").
5 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 103.
121 In terms of at least one of the values of federalism, Professor Barron also sees conditional
spending as indistinguishable from anti-commandeering. See Barron, supra note 506, at 415
n.118 (noting that if the concern of Printz is local autonomy rather than the regulatory costs of
compliance with the law, an exercise of the spending power should be thought to be equally as
offensive to the anti-commandeering principle).
522 528 U.S. 141 (1998).
... Id. at 151.
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In this light, let us now consider CIPA. Although the vast majority
of recipients of the funds are public libraries (and hence, state or lo-
cal entities for purposes of the anti-commandeering principle) and
most of the funds go to such libraries, non-governmental libraries
could theoretically be constrained by CIPA.5 29 Thus, treating Reno v.
Condon as defining the notion of a "generally applicable" law, Regula-
tory CIPA might not be viewed as a law targeted at state entities, and
it is thus not, as Justice Scalia put it in Printz, "posit [ing] the impossi-
ble" '530 to imagine the filtering requirement being imposed on private
parties as well as the government.
This raises a couple of issues. First, it strengthens the argument of
the critics of the anti-commandeering doctrine that the doctrine
leaves so many holes as to be essentially toothless. s1 It may be, then,
that New York and Printz really are, as critics such as Adler and
Kreimer suggest, extremely limited in their application and that anti-
commandeering is simply meant to maintain the "etiquette of feder-
5. For purposes of the E-rate, it is theoretically possible for a non-governmental library to be
subject to CIPA. The relevant FCC regulations define "library" to include not only "public li-
brar[ies]," but also "academic librar[ies]," "research librar[ies]," and "private librar[ies], but
only if the state in which such private library is located determines that the library should be
considered a library for the purposes of this definition." 47 C.F.R. § 54.500(c) (2002); see also
47 C.F.R. § 54.501 (c)(1) (noting that only libraries that satisfy the definition of "library" in the
LSTA can receive discounts under the E-rate program); id. (noting that the LSTA defines "li-
brary" just as broadly). Any of these types of libraries could be non-governmental. However,
the FCC has made clear that E-rate discounts are not available unless the library is non-profit
and its funding is completely independent of any other institution. See 47 C.F.R.
§ 54.501 (c) (2)-(3); see also Report & Order in the Matter of Federal-State Joint Board on Uni-
versal Service, F.C.C. No. 97-157, 11 558-59 (May 7, 1997, amended June 4, 1997). Since virtu-
ally all academic and research libraries are affiliated with, and funded by, some other institution
(e.g., a university), they would not be eligible for E-rate discounts. Thus, as a practical matter,
the only type of libraries that actually receive E-rate discounts are public libraries.
With respect to the Library Services and Technology Act, no non-governmental libraries
were subject to the portion of CIPA being challenged in the ALA case. The LSTA does define
"library" just as broadly as the E-rate definition. See 20 U.S.C. § 9122(2) (2002) (defining "li-
brary" in exactly the same way). In practice, many different types of libraries can and do receive
LSTA funding. See, e.g., Press Release, Tabor College, Tabor College Library Receives Grant
(Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with author) (noting that Tabor College, a "Christian liberal arts insti-
tution," received funding under the LSTA program). However, CIPA's restrictions on LSTA
recipients apply only to "school libraries" and "public librar[ies]." See 20 U.S.C. § 9134(f) (1)
(limiting restrictions to libraries described in sections 9122(2) (A) and (B)); id. § 9122(A) ("a
public library"); id. § 9122(B) ("a public elementary school or secondary school library"). Since
the portion of CIPA that applies to school libraries was not challenged in the ALA case, the fact
that many elementary and secondary schools subject to CIPA are private would not affect the
analysis.
,3 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932 n.17 (1997).
531 Cf id. at 961 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A structural problem that vanishes when the statute
affects private individuals as well as public officials is not much of a structural problem.").
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alism. '55 2  Public libraries have traditionally been local government
entities, and the mere fact that it is theoretically possible for a private
library to be a beneficiary of the funding that is being conditioned by
CIPA seems little reason not to subject Regulatory CIPA to the anti-
commandeering doctrine, at least if the purpose of the doctrine is to
promote traditional federalism values. 5  The principal concern of
the drafters of CIPA was protecting children in public libraries and yet
the law literally applies to nongovernmental libraries as well.
Second, if we think about CIPA itself rather than what I have
termed Regulatory CIPA, recall that the constitutional challenge to
the law was analyzed as a "conditional funding to states" law (i.e., un-
der the rubric of South Dakota v. Dole). Both sides of the case, gov-
ernment and challengers, agreed that CIPA is a law involving condi-
tional funding to states notwithstanding the fact that, theoretically at
least, some of the funding goes to nongovernmental entities. It may
be, of course, that this agreement simply reflected a tactical decision
on the part of both sides, the government because no exercise of the
conditional spending power had ever been invalidated (whether un-
der Dole or its predecessors), and the challengers because it simplified
their case (and, indeed, arguably strengthened it) by effectively ask-
ing the court to do a straightforward First Amendment analysis rather
than an unconstitutional conditions analysis, an analysis under which
the challenge is less likely to prevail.5 4
In any event, if there is in fact a "targeting the states" requirement
embedded in the anti-commandeering doctrine, one could make a
plausible argument on both sides of the question as to whether Regu-
latory CIPA satisfies it. Notwithstanding Reno v. Condon, it seems at
least possible to argue that Regulatory CIPA is a targeted law and for
now, let me assume this.
Finally, Regulatory CIPA clearly satisfies what Adler and Kreimer
refer to as the fourth and fifth requirements before a court can find a
52 The title of Adler & Kreimer's article is "The New Etiquette of Federalism." The phrase
comes from Justice Kennedy's concurrence in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995), in
which he referred to New York as a case "where the etiquette of federalism ha[d] been violated."
533 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 458, at 112-13.
5 By this, I mean that it should be easier to prevail in a First Amendment challenge to a di-
rect governmental mandate to engage (or not to engage) in certain behavior than to a law that
links funds to the same behavior. Cf www. TheGovernmentHasDecided, supra note 64, at 860 (not-
ing that Congress is trying to use federal funding to do something they could not otherwise
do-"that is, the Supreme Court would quickly strike down an effort to tell every library in the
country that they had to employ one of these four companies to install filters."). Thus, it seems
clear, for example, that a law like the conditional funding upheld in Rust v. Sullivan that did not
involve funding at all, but instead was simply a mandate, would be unconstitutional. In fact, it
seems fair to say that, if the federal government passed a regulation prohibiting all doctors from
providing women with information about their constitutional right to an abortion, this would
not even be a close case when analyzed under traditional First Amendment doctrines.
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law unconstitutional under the anti-commandeering doctrine. Regu-
latory CIPA regulates non-adjudicatory functions (administrative or
executive) and could not be premised on one of the Reconstruction
Amendments.
5 15
In sum, there is a good argument that Regulatory CIPA would be
unconstitutional under the "state sovereignty principle" or the anti-
commandeering doctrine embodied in New York and Printz.
4. Reimbursement Versus Regulatory Spending
Because I now will assume that Congress would not have the regu-
latory authority to mandate filters in public libraries, Professor
Baker's proposal requires one to ask next whether the exercise of the
spending power is "regulatory" or "reimbursement" spending. Here,
the answer is quite simple. CIPA makes all federal funding under
both the E-rate program and the Library Services and Technology Act
contingent on a library installing filters on all of the library's Internet
terminals. It does not provide funding merely for the filters them-
selves and any accompanying costs associated with installing and
536maintaining them.
In fact, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, 37 CIPA goes
even further than simply tying the E-rate subsidy or LSTA funding to
installing filters on those terminals or Internet access that are subsi-
dized by the federal funds. Rather, acceptance of even one penny of
this money requires a library to install filters on all terminals accessi-
ble to the Internet, even if a particular terminal or Internet service
was purchased entirely with state, local, or private funds. Under
Baker's approach, then, CIPA would be deemed impermissible "regu-
latory" spending.
In sum, if the Court were to adopt Baker's proposal, CIPA would
likely be rendered an unconstitutional exercise of the spending
power.
535 While one might argue as to which of the three bases for Commerce Clause authority
Congress would have to rely on to pass a law such as Regulatory CIPA, regulation of the Internet
(or far less plausibly, the libraries themselves) would clearly fall into the commerce power. See
infra text accompanying notes 486-89.
' One can contrast CIPA with, for example, a Connecticut law that provides grants that
schools may use to purchase filtering software. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-262n (2002). I dis-
cuss state and local initiatives regarding Internet access in libraries above. See supra Part III.B.1.
:37 ALA II, 539 U.S. 194, 220 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
m Id. at 230-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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C. Professor Baker's Approach and the Principles of Constitutional Federalism
In this final section, I look at Baker's proposal and my application
of it to CIPA in light of the federalism concerns I raised in Part III. I
conclude that, though Baker's proposed doctrinal changes might
lead to a result that comports with some of the principles of constitu-
tional federalism I raised earlier, CIPA ultimately raises federalism
concerns beyond those that worry Baker. Justice Stevens's opinion
hints at those worries, though he did not explicitly express them as
federalism concerns. What he did, however, was to incorporate those
concerns into his First Amendment analysis, an approach that opens
his opinion to criticism as being illogical . It may be, however, that
his logical flaw actually captures the reality of CIPA better than the
approaches required by both South Dakota v. Dole and the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine.
Turning back to Baker's theory for the moment, recall that her
primary concern is the problem of homogenization, what she and
Professor Young refer to as "horizontal aggrandizement," the fear
that a majority of states will use the federal process to "impose their
own policy preferences on a minority of states with different prefer-
ences."540 Here, one can see that problem. One way to view CIPA is as
a majoritarian attempt to force those in the minority to enact a policy
favored by the majority.
The "majority" want to restrict access to sexually explicit content
at the national level, and both tradition and policy concerns suggest
that individual communities are in a better position to decide
whether and, if so, to what extent and how to regulate such content
within their communities.541 One problem with viewing it this way is
to note that the Senate vote on CIPA was 95-3, while surveys suggest
that, without CIPA, only a minority of local public libraries were using
filters in the way CIPA mandates. Moreover, both Senators from
Oregon, whose state constitution arguably protects some of the mate-
rial CIPA attempts to suppress,542 voted in favor of CIPA as well. 43
Thought of in terms of Baker's theory, then, the evidence we have,
suggests that the category of states that would otherwise comply with
the conditions imposed by CIPA even in the absence of CIPA (i.e.,
those that already satisfy CIPA's conditions and those that would
happily do so) 544 is in fact the minority notwithstanding the over-
539 Cf, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 349, 357 (2003)
(referring tojustice Stevens's dissent as exhibiting "significant conceptual disarray").
Baker, Liberals, supra note 450, at 434-45 n.8.
See supra Part III.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 300-02.
See 146 CONG. REc. S5869 (daily ed. June 27, 2000).
5" See supra text accompanying note 455.
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whelming support for the law in the federal legislature. Baker's the-
ory, while arguably helpful as a theoretical construct, simply does not
match the factual context of CIPA. In this sense, CIPA is similar to
the National Minimum Drinking Age Amendment upheld in Dole." '
This does not mean, of course, that Baker's federalism concerns
are of no importance. It does mean, however, that they are insuffi-
cient. As I noted earlier, what is really problematic about CIPA-at
least from the standpoint of federalism principles-is vertical ag-
grandizement, the fear that the federal government is injecting itself
into decisions about the content of local libraries. Congress was
clearly somewhat sensitive to this concern-or at least, the local con-
trol issues-that CIPA was creating, 46 and sought to incorporate con-
straints on federal power into the substantive provisions of the stat-
ute. Nonetheless, the law is effectively creating a one-size-fits-all
policy of filters throughout the country.
In a recent article, Professor Somin argues that federal subsidies
to states can not only decrease the diversity of policy choices available
to state and local governments, as Baker argues, but also that they can
reduce competition both among the states and between the federal
and state governments.548 In this final sense-as reducing competi-
tion between the federal and state governments549-Somin is touch-
ing upon at least a part of what CIPA is doing. At one level, Somin
refers to competition in the sense of the two different levels of gov-
ernment offering citizens policy choices and thus being effectively
equivalent to preemption. But the seeds of the anti-tyranny func-
tion of federalism are certainly part of his argument. His references
to state opposition to the Federal Fugitive Slave Act in the nineteenth
century and his more recent examples of conditional funding being
used to induce state officials to follow federal policy preferences in-
15 See supra note 466.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
"" But see Libraries Oppose Internet Filters, Turn Down Federal Funds, CONCORD MONITOR, June
13, 2004 ("[M]any in New Hampshire are giving up the [federal] money without much re-
gret.").
" See Somin, supra note 225, at 464-73 (2002) ("Federal subsidization of state governments
undermines three of the most important advantages of the federal system of government rela-
tive to a unitary one-responsiveness to diverse local preferences, horizontal competition be-
tween states, and vertical competition between states and the federal government.").
" See id. at 471-73 (discussing the concept of "vertical competition between states and the
federal government").
55o In this aspect of his argument, Somin treats a federal conditional grant to states as involv-
ing the same suppression of competition as a federal law that preempts state laws, the only dif-
ference between the two being that a conditional grant to states can co-opt state officials into
supporting the federal policy preference, whereas "coercive regulatory mandates without at-
tached funding often attract state political opposition." Id. at 472-73. In the case of CIPA, of
course, the fact that the law provided conditional funds was insufficient to preclude the state
and local opposition to the law.
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volving the rights of undocumented aliens and controlled substances
hint at the emphasis I am placing here on the importance of inde-
pendent loci of power.
Interestingly enough, however, the Court-a Court that has ag-
gressively enforced its concerns about vertical aggrandizement in the
recent past-had nothing to say about the issue. To be fair, the doc-
trine-and of course, both sides' characterization of the issues-
effectively precluded the Court from doing so. But, as I noted, Jus-
tice Stevens seemed to recognize the threat to local autonomy that
CIPA, as a federal statute, created.
In sum, Baker's proposed change to spending power doctrine
might have led to a result in keeping with the federalism concerns
CIPA raises, but her underlying theory does not incorporate all the
federalism concerns that the federal spending power, using CIPA as
an example, implicates.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, the Children's Internet Protection Act raises both First
Amendment and federalism concerns. I have focused on the latter
primarily because the Court and other commentators have thor-
oughly addressed the First Amendment issues while effectively ignor-
ing the federalism principles the statute implicates. More impor-
tantly, CIPA may simply be the first of a series of laws to reach the
Court requiring application of Dole's independent constitutional bar
rule, the doctrinal means by which the Court turned the ALA case
into a straightforward First Amendment case.
A recent spending law, the Consolidated Appropriations Act of
2004,51 included a section that cuts off federal funds to any local
transit authority involved "in any activity that promotes the legaliza-
tion or medical use" of a controlled substance. Known as the Istook
Amendment (after the Congressman who added it to the bill), the
provision was aimed primarily at transit agencies that were accepting
bus advertisements advocating changes in criminal prohibitions on
marijuana possession. The ACLU and others have challenged the
law, and it will most likely be analyzed under Dole's independent con-
stitutional bar rule. The constitutional issue will devolve to a ques-
tion of whether the local government transit authorities would violate
the First Amendment by complying with the condition.5 4
5" Pub. L. No. 108-199, 118 Stat. 3 (2004).
552 Id. at Div. F § 177, 118 Stat. at 309.
5' SeeH.R. REP. NO. 108-401, § 986 (2003).
5 See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14, ACLU
v. Mineta, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9970 (D.D.C. 2004) (C.A. No. 04-262 (PLF)), at http://
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Like CIPA, however, the Istook Amendment implicates federalism
concerns. Many states and local governments have been at the fore-
front of opposition to the federal government's approach to regulat-
ing marijuana." This is not to say that the First Amendment plays no
role, but simply to point out that, as with CIPA, the constitutional
doctrine will avoid the complexity of the law. Viewing the law
through the lens of federalism gives us a way to understand more
fully the reasons the law is constitutionally problematic. In this sense,
the federalism lens demonstrates the inadequacy of constitutional
doctrine such as the "independent constitutional bar" rule because
the rule forces a law with both structural and rights-based implica-
tions to be analyzed without any consideration of the structure.
In this Article, I have not proposed any solution to this conun-
drum, but I hope to have raised it sufficiently to give courts and
commentators the desire to look more searchingly at conditional
funding laws that raise both structural and rights-based concerns.
www.changetheclimate.org/campaigns/02-18-04/. The plaintiffs' brief also includes an argu-
ment that the law fails to satisfy Dole's "germaneness" prong. Id. at 15-16.
6 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (b) (1) (A) (West 2004) (allowing "seriously
ill Californians... the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical purposes"); id. div. 10, ch.
6, art. 2.5 (codification of Proposition 215 establishing program for medical use of marijuana).
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